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Introduction
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Chapter 1
Quantum cryptography
Cryptography is the art of secrecy. Nearly as old as the art of writing itself, it
concerns itself with one of the most fundamental problems faced by any society
whose success crucially depends on knowledge and information: With whom do
we want to share information, and when, and how much?
1.1 Introduction
Starting with the first known encrypted texts from 1900 BC in Egypt [Wik], cryp-
tography has a fascinating history [Kah96]. Its goal is simple: to protect secrets
as best as is physically possible. Following our increased understanding of physi-
cal processes with the advent of quantum mechanics, Wiesner [Wie83] proposed
using quantum techniques for cryptography in the early 1970’s. Unfortunately,
his groundbreaking work, which contained the seed for quantum key distribu-
tion, oblivious transfer (as described below), and a form of quantum money, was
initially met with rejection [Bra05]. In 1982, Bennett, Brassard, Breitbart and
Wiesner joined forces to publish “Quantum cryptography, or unforgeable subway
tokens” which luckily found acceptance [BBBW82], leading to the by now vast
field of research in quantum key distribution (QKD). Quantum key distribution
allows two remote parties who are only connected via a quantum channel to gen-
erate an arbitrarily long secret key that they can then use to perfectly shield their
messages from prying eyes. The idea is beautiful in its simplicity: unlike with
classical data, quantum mechanics prevents us from copying an unknown quan-
tum state. What’s more is that any attempt to extract information from such a
state can be detected! That is, we can now determine whether an eavesdropper
has been trying to intercept our secrets. Possibly the most famous QKD protocol
known to date was proposed in 1983 by Bennett and Brassard [BB83], and is more
commonly known as BB84 from its 1984 full publication [BB84]. Indeed, many
quantum cryptographic protocols to date are inspired in some fashion by BB84.
It saw its first experimental implementation in 1989, when Bennett, Bessette,
3
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Brassard, Salvail and Smolin built the first QKD setup covering a staggering
distance of 32.5 cm [BB89, BBB+92]! In 1991, Ekert proposed a beautiful alter-
native view of QKD based on quantum entanglement and the violation of Bell’s
theorem, leading to the protocol now known as E91 [Eke91]. His work paved the
way to establishing the security of QKD protocols, and led to many other inter-
esting tasks such as entanglement distillation. Since then, many other protocols
such as B92 [Ben92] have been suggested. Today, QKD and its related problems
form a well-established part of quantum information, with countless proposals
and experimental implementations. It especially saw increased interest after the
discovery of Shor’s quantum factoring algorithm in 1994 [Sho97] that renders al-
most all known classical encryption systems insecure, once a quantum computer is
built. Some of the first security proofs were provided by Mayers [May96a], Lo and
Chau [LC99], and Shor and Preskill [SP00], finally culminating in the wonderful
work of Renner [Ren05] who supplied the most general framework for proving
the security of any known QKD protocol. QKD systems are already available
commercially today [Qua, Tec]. The best known experimental implementations
now cover distances of up to 148.7 km in optical fiber [HRP+06], and 144 km in
free space [UTSM+] in an experiment conducted between two Canary islands.
Figure 1.1: Encrypted pottery glaze
formula, Mesopotamia 1500 BC
Figure 1.2: QKD today
Traditional cryptography is concerned with the secure and reliable transmis-
sion of messages. With the advent of widespread electronic communication, how-
ever, new cryptographic tasks have become increasingly important. We would
like to construct secure protocols for electronic voting, online auctions, contract
signing and many other applications where the protocol participants themselves
do not trust each other. Two primitives that can be used to construct all such
protocols are bit commitment and oblivious transfer. We will introduce both
primitives in detail below. Interestingly, it turns out that despite many initially
suggested protocols [BBBW82, Cre´94], both primitives are impossible to achieve
when we ask for unconditional security. Luckily, as we will see in Chapter 11
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we can still implement both building blocks if we assume that our quantum op-
erations are affected by noise. Here, the very problem that prevents us from
implementing a full-scale quantum computer can be turned to our advantage.
In this chapter, we give an informal introduction to cryptography in the quan-
tum setting. We first introduce necessary terminology, before giving an overview
over the most well-known cryptographic primitives. Since our goal is to give
an overview, we will restrict ourselves to informal definitions. Surprisingly, even
definitions themselves turn out to be a tricky undertaking, especially when en-
tering the quantum realm. Finally, we discuss what makes the quantum setting
so different from the classical one, and identify a range of open problems.
1.2 Setting the state
1.2.1 Terminology
In this text, we consider protocols among multiple participants P1, . . . , Pn, also
called players. When considering only two players, we generally identify them
with the protagonists Alice and Bob. Each player may hold a private input, that is
classical and quantum data unknown to the other players. In addition, the players
may have access to a shared resource such as classical shared randomness or
quantum entanglement that has been distributed before the start of the protocol.
We will refer to any information that is available to all players as public. A subset
of players may also have access to shared information that is known only to them,
but not to the remaining players. Such an input is called private shared input. In
the case of shared randomness, this is also known as private shared randomness.
The players can be connected by classical as well as quantum channels, and use
them to exchange messages during the course of the protocol. A given protocol
consists of a set of messages as well as a specification of actions to be undertaken
by the players. At the end of the protocol, each player may have a classical as
well as a quantum output.
A player is called honest, if he follows the protocol exactly as dictated. He is
called honest-but-curious, if he follows the protocol, but nevertheless tries to gain
additional information by processing the information supplied by the protocol in
a way which is not intended by the protocol. An honest player, for example, will
simply ignore parts of the information he is given, as he will do exactly as he
is told. However, a player that is honest-but-curious will take advantage of all
information he is given, i.e., he may read and copy all messages as desired, and
never forgets any information he is given.1 Yet, the execution of the protocol itself
is unaffected as the player does not change any information used in the protocol,
1Note that since an honest-but-curious player never forgets any information, he effectively
makes a copy of all messages. He will erase his memory needed for the execution of the protocol
if dictated by the protocol: his copy lies outside this memory.
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he merely reads it. But what does this mean in a quantum setting? Indeed,
this question appears to be a frequent point of debate. We will see in Chapter 2
that he cannot copy arbitrary quantum information, and extracting non-classical
information from a quantum state will necessarily lead to disturbance. Evidently,
disturbance alters the quantum states during the protocol. Hence, the player
actually took actions to alter the execution of the protocol, and we can no longer
regard him as honest. After examining quantum operations in Chapter 2 we will
return to the definition of an honest-but-curious player in the quantum setting.
Finally, a player can also be dishonest : he will do anything in his power to break
the protocol. Evidently, this is the most realistic setting, and we will always
consider it here.
An adversary is someone who is trying to break the protocol. An adversary
is generally modeled as an entity outside of the protocol that can either be an
eavesdropper, or take part in the protocol by taking control of specific players.
This makes it easier to model protocols among multiple players, where we assume
that all dishonest players collaborate to form a single adversary.
1.2.2 Assumptions
In an ideal world, we could implement any cryptographic protocol described be-
low. Interestingly though, even in the quantum world we encounter physical
limits which prevent us from doing so with unconditional security. Unconditional
security most closely corresponds to the intuitive notion of “secure”. A protocol
that is unconditionally secure fulfills its purpose and is secure even if an attacker
is granted unlimited resources. We happily provide him with the most powerful
computer we could imagine and as much memory space as he wants. The main
question of unconditional security is thus whether the attacker obtains enough
information to defeat the security of the system. Unconditional security is also
called perfect secrecy in the context of encryption systems, and forms part of
information-theoretic security .
Most often, however, unconditional security can never be achieved. We must
therefore resign ourselves to introducing additional limitations on the adversary:
the protocol will only be secure if certain assumptions hold. In practise, these as-
sumptions can be divided into two big categories: In the first, we assume that the
players have access to a common resource with special properties. This includes
models such as a trusted initializer [Riv99], or another source that provides the
players with shared randomness drawn from a fixed distribution. An example of
this is also a noisy channel [CK88]: Curiously, a noisy channel that neither player
can influence too much turns out to be an incredibly powerful resource. The sec-
ond category consists of clear limitations on the ability of the adversary. For ex-
ample, the adversary may have limited storage space available [Mau92, DFSS05],
or experience noise when trying to store qubits as we will see in Chapter 11. In
multi-player protocols we can also demand that dishonest players cannot commu-
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nicate during the course of the protocol, that messages between different players
take a certain time to be transmitted, or that only a minority of the players is
dishonest. In the quantum case, other known assumptions include limiting the
adversary to measure not more than a certain number of qubits at a time [Sal98],
or introducing superselection rules [KMP04], where the adversary can only make
a limited set of quantum measurements. When introducing such assumptions,
we still speak of information-theoretic security : Except for these limitations, the
adversary remains all-powerful. In particular, he has unlimited computational
resources.
Classically, most forms of practical cryptography are shown to be computa-
tionally secure. In this security model, we do not grant an adversary unlimited
computational resources. Instead, we are concerned with the amount of com-
putation required to break the security of a system. We say that a system is
computationally secure, if the believed level of computation necessary to defeat it
exceeds the computational resources of any hypothetical adversary by a comfort-
able margin. The adversary is thereby allowed to use the best possible attacks
against the system. Generally, the adversary is modeled as having only polyno-
mial computational power. This means that any attacks are restricted to time
and space polynomial in the size of the underlying security parameters of the
system. In this setting the difficulty of defeating the system’s security is often
proven to be as difficult as solving a well-known problem which is believed to be
hard. The most popular problems are often number-theoretic problems such as
factoring. Note that for example in the case of factoring, it is not known whether
these problems are truly difficult to solve classically. Many such problems, such
as factoring, fold with the advent of a quantum computer [Sho97]. It is an inter-
esting open problem to find classical hardness assumptions, which are still secure
given a quantum computer. Several proposals are known [Reg03], but so far none
of them have been proven secure.
In the realm of quantum cryptography, we are so far only interested in in-
formation-theoretic security: we may introduce limitations on the adversary, but
we do not resort to computational hardness assumptions.
1.2.3 Quantum properties
Quantum mechanics introduces several exciting aspects to the realm of cryptog-
raphy, which we can exploit to our benefit, but which also introduce additional
complications even in existing classical primitives whose security does not de-
pend on computational hardness assumptions. Here, we give a brief introduction
to some of the most striking aspects, which we will explain in detail later on.
1. Quantum states cannot be copied: In classical protocols, an adversary
can always copy any messages and his classical data at will. Quantum
states, however, differ: We will see in Chapter 2 that we cannot copy an
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arbitrary qubit. This property led to the construction of the unforgeable
subway tokens [BBBW82] mentioned earlier.
2. Information gain can be detected: Classically there is no way for an
honest player to determine whether messages have been read maliciously
outside the scope of the protocol. However, in a quantum setting we can
detect whether an adversary tried to extract information from a transmit-
ted message. This property forms the heart of quantum key distribution
described below. It also allows us to construct cheat-sensitive protocols, a
concept which is foreign to classical cryptography: even though we cannot
prevent an adversary from gaining information if he intends to do so, we
will be able to detect such cheating and take appropriate action. We will
return to this aspect in Chapter 2.
3. Uncertainty relations exist: Unlike in the classical world, quantum
states allow us to encode multiple bits into a single state in such a way
that we cannot extract all of them simultaneously. This property is closely
related to cheat-sensitivity, and is a consequence of the existence of uncer-
tainty relations we will encounter in Chapter 4. It is also closely related to
what is known as quantum random access codes, which will we employ in
Chapter 8.
4. Information can be “locked”: Another aspect we need to take into
account when considering quantum protocols is an effect known as lock-
ing classical information in quantum states. Surprisingly, the amount of
correlation between two parties can increase by much more than the data
transmitted. We will examine this effect for a specific measure of correlation
in more detail in Chapter 5.
5. Entanglement allows for stronger correlations: Entanglement is an-
other concept absent from the classical realm. Whereas entanglement has
many useful applications such as quantum teleportation and can also be
used to analyze the security of quantum key distribution, it also requires
us to be more cautious: In Chapter 9, we will see that the parameters of
classical protocols can change dramatically if dishonest players share entan-
glement, even if they do not have access to a full quantum computer. In
Chapter 10, entanglement will enable an adversary to break any quantum
string commitment protocol.
6. Measurements can be delayed: Finally, we encounter an additional ob-
stacle, which is also entirely missing from classical protocols: Players may
delay quantum measurements. In any classical protocol, we can be assured
that any input and output is fixed once the protocol ends. In the quan-
tum case, however, players may alter their protocol input retroactively by
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delaying quantum measurements that depend on their respective inputs.
Essentially, in a classical protocol the players will automatically be “com-
mitted” to the run of the protocol, whereas in the quantum setting this
property is entirely missing. This can make an important difference in re-
ductions among several protocols as we will see in Section 1.3.2 below.
1.3 Primitives
We now present an overview of the most common multi-party protocol primitives,
and what is known about them in the quantum setting. We already encountered
quantum key distribution (QKD) in the introduction. In this thesis, our focus
lies on cryptographic protocols other than QKD.
1.3.1 Bit commitment
Possibly the most active area of quantum cryptography in the early stages next
to QKD was quantum bit commitment: Imagine two mutually distrustful parties
Alice and Bob at distant locations. They can only communicate over a channel,
but want to play the following game: Alice secretly chooses a bit c. Bob wants to
be sure that Alice indeed has made her choice. Yet, Alice wants to keep c hidden
from Bob until she decides to reveal c. To convince Bob that she made up her
mind, Alice sends Bob a commitment. From the commitment alone, Bob cannot
deduce c. At a later time, Alice reveals c and enables Bob to open the commit-
ment. Bob can now check if Alice is telling the truth. This scenario is known as
bit commitment. Commitments play a central role in modern-day cryptography.
Figure 1.3: Schematic run of a BC protocol when Alice and Bob are honest.
They form an important building block in the construction of larger protocols
in, for example, gambling and electronic voting, and other instances of secure
two-party computation. In the realm of quantum mechanics, it has been shown
that oblivious transfer [BBCS92b] (defined in Section 1.3.2) can be achieved pro-
vided there exists a secure bit commitment scheme [Yao95, Cre´94]. In turn,
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classical oblivious transfer can be used to perform any secure two-party compu-
tation defined below [CvdGT95]. Commitments are also useful for constructing
zero-knowledge proofs [Gol01] and lead to coin tossing [Blu83]. Informally, bit
commitment can be defined as follows:
1.3.1. Definition. Bit commitment (BC) is a two-party protocol between Al-
ice (the committer) and Bob (the verifier), which consists of three stages, the
committing and the revealing stage, and a final declaration stage in which Bob
declares “accept” or “reject”. The following requirements should hold:
• (Correctness) If both Alice and Bob are honest, then before the committing
stage Alice picks a bit c. Alice’s protocol depends on c and any randomness
used. At the revealing stage, Alice reveals to Bob the committed bit c. Bob
accepts.
• (Binding) If Alice wants to reveal a bit c′, then
Pr[Bob accepts |c′ = 0] + Pr[Bob accepts |c′ = 1] ≤ 1.
• (Concealing) If Alice is honest, Bob does not learn anything about c before
the revealing stage.
Classically, unconditionally secure bit commitment is known to be impossi-
ble. Indeed, this is very intuitive if we consider the implications of the concealing
condition: This condition implies that exactly the same information exchange
must have occurred if Alice committed herself to c = 0 or c = 1, otherwise
Bob would be able to gain information about c. But this means that even if
Alice initially made a commitment to c = 0, she can later reconstruct the run
of the protocol as if she had committed herself to c = 1 and thus send the
right message to Bob to reveal c = 1 instead. Unfortunately, even quantum
communication cannot help us to implement unconditionally secure bit commit-
ment without further assumptions: After several quantum schemes were sug-
gested [BB84, BC90a, BCJL93], quantum bit commitment was shown to be im-
possible, too [May96b, LC97, May97, LC96, BCMS97, CL98, DKSW06], even in
the presence of superselection rules [KMP04], where the adversary can only per-
form a certain restricted set of measurements. In the face of the negative results,
what can we still hope to achieve?
Evidently, we need to assume that the adversary is limited in certain ways. In
the classical case, bit commitment is possible if the adversary is computationally
bounded [Gol01], if one-way functions exist [Nao91, HR07], if Alice and Bob are
connected via a noisy channel that neither player can influence too much [CK88,
DKS99, DFMS04], or if the adversary is bounded in space instead of time, i.e., he
is only allowed to use a certain amount of storage space [Mau92]. Unfortunately,
the security of the bounded classical storage model [Mau92, CCM98] is somewhat
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unsatisfactory: First, a dishonest player needs only quadratically more memory
than the honest one to break the security. Second, as classical memory is very
cheap, most of these protocols require huge amounts of communication in order
to achieve reasonable bounds on the adversaries memory.
Do we gain anything by using quantum communication? Interestingly, even
without any further assumptions, quantum cryptography at least allows us to
implement imperfect forms of bit commitment, where Alice and Bob both have
a limited ability to cheat. That is, we allow Alice to change her mind, and
Bob to learn the committed bit with a small probability. These protocols are
based on the fact that quantum protocols can exhibit a form of cheat sensitiv-
ity unavailable to classical communication [HK04, ATSVY00]. Exact tradeoffs
on how well we can implement bit commitment in the quantum world can be
found in [SR02a]. Protocols that make use of this tradeoff are cheat-sensitive,
as described in Section 1.2.2. Examples of such protocols have been used to im-
plement coin tossing [Amb01] as described in Section 1.3.2. In Chapter 10, we
will consider commitments to an entire string of bits at once. Whereas this task
turns out to be impossible as well for a strong security definition, we will see that
non-trivial quantum protocols do exist for a very weak security definition. Bit
commitment can also be implemented under the assumption that faster than light
communication is impossible, provided that Alice and Bob are located very far
apart [Ken99], or if Alice and Bob are given access to non-local boxes [BCU+06]
which provide superstrong non-local correlations.
But even a perfect commitment can be implemented, if we make quantum
specific assumptions. For example, it is possible to securely implement BC pro-
vided that an adversary cannot measure more than a fixed number of qubits
simultaneously [Sal98]. With current-day technology, it is very difficult to store
states even for a very short period of time. This leads to the protocol presented in
[BBCS92a, Cre´94], which shows how to implement BC and OT (defined below) if
the adversary is not able to store any qubits at all. In [DFSS05, DFR+07], these
ideas have been generalized in a very nice way to the bounded-quantum-storage
model, where the adversary is computationally unbounded and is allowed to have
an unlimited amount of classical memory. However, he is only allowed a limited
amount of quantum memory. The advantages over the classical bounded-storage
model are two-fold: First, given current day technology it is indeed very hard to
store quantum states. Secondly, the honest players do not require any quantum
storage at all, making the protocol much more efficient. It has been shown that
such protocols remain secure when executed many times in a row [WW07].
1.3.2 Secure function evaluation
An important aspect of modern day cryptography is the primitive known as secure
function evaluation, and its multi-player analogue, secure multi-party computa-
tion, first suggested by Yao [Yao82]. Imagine that Alice and Bob are trying to
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decide whether to attend an unpopular administrative event. If Alice attends,
Bob feels forced to attend as well and vice versa. However, neither of them
wants to announce publicly whether they are planning to attend or whether they
would rather make up an excuse to remain at home, as this may have dire conse-
quences. How can Alice and Bob solve their dilemma? Note that their problem
can be phrased in the following form: Let x be Alice’s private input bit, where
x = 1 if Alice is planning to attend and x = 0 if Alice skips the event. Similarly,
let y be Bob’s private input bit. Alice and Bob now want to compute OR(x, y) in
such a way that both of them learn the result, but neither of them learns anything
more about the input of the other player than can be inferred from the result.
In our example, if OR(x, y) = 1, at least one of the players is planning to attend
the event. Both Alice and Bob now attend the event, and both of them can
safely claim that they really did plan to do so in the first place. If OR(x, y) = 0,
Alice and Bob learn that they both agree, and do not need to fear any political
consequences.
Secure function evaluation enables Alice and Bob to solve any such task. Pro-
tocols for secure function evaluation enable us to construct protocols for electronic
voting and secure auctions. Informally, we define:
1.3.2. Definition. Secure function evaluation (SFE) is a two-party protocol
between Alice and Bob, where Alice holds a private input x and Bob holds a
private input y such that
• (Correctness) If both Alice and Bob are honest, then they both output the
same value v = f(x, y).
• (Security) If Alice (Bob) is dishonest, then Alice (Bob) does not learn more
about x (y) then can be inferred from f(x, y).
A common variant of SFE is so-called one-sided SFE: Here, only one of the two
players receives the result of the computation, f(x, y). Sadly, we cannot imple-
ment SFE for an arbitrary function f classically without additional assumptions,
akin to bit commitment. Even in the quantum world, the situation is equally
bleak: SFE remains impossible in the quantum setting [Lo97]! Fortunately, the
situations improves when we consider multi-party protocols as mentioned below.
Oblivious transfer
A special case of secure function evaluation is the problem of oblivious transfer,
which was first introduced by Rabin [Rab81]. The variant of 1-2 OT appeared in a
paper by Even, Goldreich and Lempel [EGL85] and also, under a different name,
in the well-known paper byWiesner [Wie83]. 1-2 OT allows Alice and Bob to solve
a seemingly uninteresting problem: The sender (Alice) secretly chooses two bits
s0 and s1, the receiver (Bob) secretly chooses a bit c. The primitive of oblivious
transfer allows Bob to retrieve sc in such a way, that Alice cannot gain any
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information about c. At the same time, Alice is ensured that Bob only retrieves
sc and gets no information about the other input bit sc¯. Oblivious transfer can
be used to perform any secure two-party computation [Kil88, CvdGT95], and is
therefore a very important primitive.
Figure 1.4: Schematic run of a 1-2 OT protocol.
Unlike in the classical setting, oblivious transfer in the quantum world requires
additional caution: We want that after the protocol ends, both of Alice’s inputs
bits s0, s1 and Bob’s choice bit c have been determined. That is, they are fixed
and the players can no longer change their mind. In particular, we do not want
Bob to delay his choice of c indefinitely, possibly by delaying a quantum measure-
ment. Similarly, Alice should not be able to change her mind about, for example,
the parity of s0 ⊕ s1 after the end of the protocol by delaying a measurement.
Informally, we define
1.3.3. Definition.
(
2
1
)
-oblivious transfer (1-2 OT(s0, s1)(c)) is a two-party pro-
tocol between Alice (the sender) and Bob (the receiver), such that
• (Correctness) If both Alice and Bob are honest, the protocol depends on
Alice’s two input bits s0, s1 ∈ {0, 1} and Bob’s input bit c ∈ {0, 1}. At the
end of the protocol Bob knows sc.
• (Security against Alice) If Bob is honest, Alice does not learn c.
• (Security against Bob) If Alice is honest, Bob does not learn anything about
sc¯.
After the protocol ends, s0, s1 and c have been chosen.
Classically, 1-2 OT can be obtained from the following simpler primitive, also
known as Rabin-OT [Rab81] or erasure channel. Conversely, OT can be obtained
from 1-2 OT.
1.3.4. Definition. Rabin Oblivious transfer (Rabin-OT) is a two-party proto-
col between Alice (the sender) and Bob (the receiver), such that
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• (Correctness) If both Alice and Bob are honest, the protocol depends on
Alice’s input bit b ∈ {0, 1}. At the end of the protocol, Bob obtains b with
probability 1/2 and knows whether he obtained b or not.
• (Security against Alice) If Bob is honest, Alice does not learn whether Bob
obtained b.
• (Security against Bob) If Alice is honest, Bob’s probability of learning bit
b does not exceed 1/2.
After the protocol ends, b has been chosen.
The fact that Alice and Bob may delay their measurements makes an impor-
tant difference, as the following simple example shows: Consider the standard
reduction of Rabin-OT to 1-2 OT: Alice uses inputs sk = b and sk¯ = 0 with
k ∈R {0, 1}. Bob uses input c ∈R {0, 1}, for a randomly chosen c. The players
now perform 1-2 OT(s0, s1)(c) after which the receiver holds sc. Subsequently,
Alice announces k. If k = c, Bob succeeded in retrieving b and otherwise he
learns nothing. This happens with probability p = 1/2 and thus we have con-
structed Rabin-OT from one instance of 1-2 OT. Clearly, this reduction fails if
we use an 1-2 OT protocol in which Bob can defer his choice of c, possibly by
delaying a quantum measurement that depends on c. He simply waits until Alice
announces k, to retrieve sk with certainty. This simple example makes it clear
that implementing 1-2 OT is far from a trivial task in the quantum setting. Even
the classical definitions need to be revised carefully. In this brief overview, we
restricted ourselves to the informal definition given above, and refer to [Wul07]
for an extensive treatment of the definition of oblivious transfer.
Note that oblivious transfer forms an instance of secure function evaluation
with f : {0, 1}2×{0, 1} → {0, 1} satisfying f(s0, s1, c) = sc, where only one player
(Bob) learns the output. Hence by Lo’s impossibility result for SFE discussed
earlier, oblivious transfer is not possible in the quantum setting either without
introducing additional assumptions. Indeed, note that there exists a classical
reduction of bit commitment to oblivious transfer (up to a vanishing probability),
where we reverse the roles of Alice and Bob for bit commitment: Alice simply
chooses two n-bit strings x0 ∈R {0, 1}n, and x1 ∈R {0, 1}n. Alice and Bob now
use n rounds of 1-2 OT, where Bob retrieves xc when he wants to commit to
a bit c. To reveal, he then sends c and xc to Alice. Intuitively, one can thus
hope to use the impossibility proof of bit commitment to show that oblivious
transfer is impossible as well, without resorting to [Lo97]. However, note that we
would first have to show the security of this reduction with respect to a quantum
adversary. Fortunately, oblivious transfer becomes possible if we make the same
assumptions as for bit commitment described in Section 1.3.1. We will consider
how to implement oblivious transfer if the adversary’s quantum storage is subject
to noise in Chapter 11.
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Coin tossing
Another example of SFE is the well-known primitive of coin tossing [Blu83],
which can be viewed as an instance of randomized secure function evaluation
defined in [Gol01]. Imagine that Alice and Bob want to toss a coin, solely by
communicating over a classical and a quantum channel. We thereby want to
ensure that neither party can influence the outcome of the coin toss by too much.
Unfortunately, we cannot implement this primitive classically without relying on
additional assumptions.
What assumptions do we need to implement coin tossing? It is easy to see that
we can implement one form of coin tossing, if we could perform bit commitment:
Alice chooses a random bit b ∈R {0, 1} and commits herself to b. Subsequently,
Bob chooses a random bit b′ ∈R {0, 1} and sends it to Alice. After receiving
b′, Alice opens her commitment and reveals b. Both parties now output c =
b ⊕ b′ as their outcome. Thus, any assumptions that enable us to implement
bit commitment also lead to coin tossing. Some assumptions even allow for very
simple protocols: If we assume that Alice and Bob are located far apart and
faster-than-light communication is impossible, they can simply both flip a coin
themselves and send it over the channel. They then take the xor of the two bits
as the outcome of the coin flip. If Alice and Bob do not receive the other’s bit
within a certain time frame they reject this execution of the protocol and restart.
Since it takes the bit a specific time to travel over the channel, both parties can
be sure that it must have been sent before a certain time, i.e., before receiving
the other’s bit.
Many definitions of coin tossing are known in the literature, which exhibit sub-
tle differences especially whether aborts are allowed during the protocol. In the
quantum literature, strong coin tossing2 has been informally defined as follows:
1.3.5. Definition. A quantum strong coin tossing protocol with bias ε is a two-
party protocol, where Alice and Bob communicate and finally decide on a value
c ∈ {0, 1,⊥} such that
• If both parties are honest, then Pr[c = 0] = Pr[c = 1] = 1/2.
• If one party is honest, then for any strategy of the dishonest player Pr[c =
0] ≤ 1/2 + ε and Pr[c = 1] ≤ 1/2 + ε.
Sadly, strong coin tossing cannot be implemented perfectly with bias ε =
0 [LC98]. However, one might hope that one could still achieve an arbitrarily
small bias ε > 0. Many protocols have been proposed for quantum strong coin
tossing and subsequently been broken [MSC99, ZLG00]. Sadly, it was shown that
strong coin tossing cannot be implemented with an arbitrarily small bias, and
ε = 1/
√
2 − 1/2 ≈ 0.207 is the best we could hope to achieve [Kit02]. So far,
2Unfortunately, these names carry a slightly different meaning in the classical literature.
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quantum protocols for strong coin tossing with a bias of ε ≈ 0.42 [ATSVY00] and
finally ε = 1/4 [Amb01, SR02a, KN04, Col07] are known. No formal definition of
strong coin tossing in the quantum setting is known to date, that specifies how
to deal with an abort in the case when the protocol is executed multiple times.
To circumvent this problem, a slightly weaker primitive has been proposed,
which carries the name weak coin tossing in the quantum literature. Here, we
explicitly allow the dishonest party to bias the coin entirely in one direction, but
limit his ability to bias the coin the other way. This scenario corresponds to a
setting where, for example, Alice wins if the outcome is c = 0 and Bob if c = 1.
However, we do allow each player to give in and loose at will. Intuitively, this
setting makes more sense in all common practical examples when considering a
standalone run of such a protocol, where each player has a preferred outcome.
Informally, we define
1.3.6. Definition. A quantum weak coin tossing protocol with bias ε is a two-
party protocol, where Alice and Bob communicate and finally decide on a value
c ∈ {0, 1,⊥} such that
• If both parties are honest, then Pr[c = 0] = Pr[c = 1] = 1/2.
• If Alice is honest, then for any strategy of Bob
Pr[c = 1] ≤ 1/2 + ε.
• If Bob is honest, then for any strategy of Alice
Pr[c = 0] ≤ 1/2 + ε.
Weakening the definition in this way indeed helps us! It has been shown
that we can construct a quantum protocol for weak coin tossing that achieves
a bias of ε ≈ 0.239 [KN04], ε ≈ 0.207 [SR02b], ε ≈ 0.192 [Moc04], and ε ≈
0.167 [Moc05]. Very recently, however, a protocol with an arbitrarily small bias
has been suggested [Moc07b]! To date, there is also no formal definition of weak
coin tossing in the quantum setting.
Multiple players
Secure multi-party computation (SMP) concerns an analogous task to SFE, in-
volving n players P1, . . . , Pn, where Pj has a private input xj. Their goal is to
compute f(x1, . . . , xn), such that none of them can learn more about the input of
any other player than they can infer from f(x1, . . . , xn). Fortunately, the situa-
tion changes dramatically when extending the protocol to multiple players. SMP
can be implemented with unconditional security even classically, provided that
t < n/3 of the players are dishonest [Gol01]. If the adversary is not dishonest,
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but merely honest-but-curious, it is possible to increase t up to t < n/2 [Gol01].
We refer to [Cra99] for an overview of classical secure multi-party computation.
Quantumly, one can generalize secure multi-party computation to the follow-
ing setting. Each player Pj holds an input state ρi ∈ H (see Chapter 2 for details).
Let ρ ∈ H1 ⊗ . . . ⊗Hn denote the joint state of players P1, . . . , Pn. Then quan-
tum secure multi-party computation (QSMP) allows the players to compute any
quantum transformation U to obtain UρU †, where player Pj receives the quantum
state on Hj as his output. QSMP can be implemented securely if t < n/2 of the
players are dishonest [CGS02, CGS05].
Coin tossing has also been studied in the multi-party setting. Classically,
multi-party coin tossing forms part of secure multi-party computation [Gol01],
and can thus be implemented under the same assumptions. Quantumly, multi-
party coin tossing has been studied in [ABRD04].
1.3.3 Secret sharing
Another interesting problem concerns the sharing of a classical or quantum secret.
Imagine Alice holding an important piece of information, for example the launch
code to her personal missile silo. Alice would like to enable members of her
community to gain access, but wants to prevent a single individual from launching
a missile on his own. Secret sharing enables Alice to distribute some secret data
d among a set of n players, such that at least t > 1 players need to combine their
individual shares to reconstruct the original secret d. A trivial secret sharing
scheme for a bit d ∈ {0, 1} involving just two players is as follows: Alice picks
r ∈R {0, 1} and hands s1 = d ⊕ r to the first player, and s2 = r to the second
player. Clearly, if r is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}, none of the
individual players can gain any information about d. Yet, when combining their
individual shares they can compute s1 ⊕ s2 = d.
General secret-sharing schemes were introduced by Shamir [Sha79] and Blakey
[Bla79]. They have found a wide range of applications, most notably to construct
protocols for secure multi-party computation as described in Section 1.3.2. Many
classical secret sharing schemes are known today [MvOV97]. Quantum secret
sharing was first introduced in [HBB99] and shortly after in [CGL99], which
also formed a link between quantum secret sharing schemes and error correcting
codes. Quantumly, we can distinguish two types of secret sharing schemes: The
first allows to share a quantum secret, i.e., Alice holds a quantum state ρ and
wants to construct n quantum shares σ1, . . . , σn such that when t such shares are
combined ρ can be reconstructed [HBB99, CGL99, Got00]. The second allows us
to share classical secrets using quantum states that have very nice data-hiding
properties [DLT02, DHT03, EW02, HLS05]: it is not sufficient for n parties to
perform local measurements and communicate classically in order to reconstruct
the secret. To reconstruct the secret data they must communicate quantumly to
perform a coherent measurement on their states. It is an exciting open question
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whether such schemes can be used to implement quantum protocols for secure
multi-party computations with classical inputs that remain secure as long as the
dishonest players can only communicate classically, but not quantumly.
1.3.4 Anonymous transmissions
In all applications we considered so far, we were concerned with two aspects: ei-
ther, we wanted to protect protocol participants from being cheated by the other
players, or, we wanted to protect the secrecy of data from a third party as in
the setting of key distribution described in Section 1.1. In the problem of key
distribution, sender and receiver know each other, but are trying to protect their
data exchange from prying eyes. Anonymity, however, is the secrecy of identity.
Primitives to hide the sender and receiver of a transmission have received consid-
erable attention in classical computing. Such primitives allow any member of a
group to send and receive data anonymously, even if all transmissions can be mon-
itored. They play an important role in protocols for electronic auctions [SA99],
voting protocols and sending anonymous email [Cha81]. An anonymous channel
which is completely immune to any active attacks, would be a powerful prim-
itive. It has been shown how two parties can use such a channel to perform
key-exchange [AS83].
A considerable number of classical schemes have been suggested for anony-
mous transmissions. An unconditionally secure classical protocol was introduced
by Chaum [Cha88] in the context of the Dining Cryptographers Problem. Such
a protocol can also be considered an instance of secure multi-party computation
considered above.
Boykin [Boy02] considered a quantum protocol to send classical information
anonymously where the players distribute and test pairwise shared EPR pairs,
which they then use to obtain key bits. His protocol is secure in the presence
of noise or attacks on the quantum channel. In [CW05a], we presented a proto-
col for anonymous transmissions of classical data that achieves a novel property
that cannot be achieved classically: it is completely traceless. This property is
related, but stronger than the notion of incoercibility in secure multi-party pro-
tocols [CG96]. Informally, a protocol is traceless, if a player cannot be forced to
reveal his true input at the end of the protocol. Even when forced to hand out his
input, output and randomness used during the course of the protocol, a player is
able to generate fake input that is consistent with all other data gathered from
the run of the protocol. The protocols suggested in [Boy02] are not traceless, but
can be modified to exhibit this property. It would be interesting to see whether it
is possible to make general protocols for secure multi-party computation similarly
traceless.
The first protocol for the anonymous transmission of qubits was constructed
in [CW05a]. Whereas the anonymous transmissions of classical bits can be im-
plemented via secure multi-party computation, the scenario is different when we
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wish to transmit qubits: as we will see in Chapter 2, qubits cannot be copied.
Thus we cannot expect each player to obtain a copy of the output. New protocols
for creating anonymous entanglement and anonymously transmitting qubits have
since been suggested in [BS05, BBF+].
1.3.5 Other protocols
Besides the protocols above, a variety of other primitives making use of particular
quantum effects have been proposed. One of the oldest suggested applications
is the one of quantum money that is resistant to copying [Wie83], also proposed
as unforgeable subway tokens [BBBW82]. Quantum seals [BP03, Cha03, SS05]
employ the notion of cheat sensitivity in order to provide data with a seal that
is “broken” once the data is extracted. That is, we can detect whether the data
has been read. Perfect quantum seals that allow us to detect tampering with
certainty have been shown to be impossible [BPDM05]. Nevertheless, non-trivial
constructions are can be implemented.
Furthermore, quantum signature schemes [GC01] have been proposed which
exhibit unconditional security: here Bob can verify Alice’s signature using a public
key given to him ahead of time. Sadly, such a scheme slowly consumes the
necessary public key. Finally, protocols have been suggested for the encryption
of quantum data which allow n qubits to be encoded using a 2n bit key achieving
perfect secrecy [BR03, AMTdW00]. Much smaller keys are possible, if we allow
for small imperfections [DN06, AS04]. Such encryption schemes have also been
used to allow for private circuit evaluation [Chi05]: Here, Alice encrypts her
quantum state before handing it to Bob who is capable of running a certain
quantum operation that Alice would like to apply. This allows Alice to let her
quantum operations be performed by Bob without revealing her quantum input.
1.4 Challenges
As we saw in Section 1.2.3, introducing quantum elements into cryptography leads
to interesting new effects. Much progress has been made to exploit these quantum
effects, although many open questions remain. In particular, not much is known
about how well quantum protocols compose. That is, when we use one protocol as
a building block inside a larger application, does the protocol still remain secure as
expected? Recall from Section 1.2.3 that especially our ability to delay quantum
measurements has a great influence on composition. Fortunately, quantum key
distribution has been shown composable [BOHL+05, Ren05, RK05]. However,
composability remains a particularly tricky question in protocols where we are
not faced with an external eavesdropper, but where the players themselves are
dishonest. Composability of quantum protocols was first considered in [vdG98],
followed by [CGS02] who addressed the composability of QSMP, and the general
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composability frameworks of [Unr04, BOM04] applied to QKD [BOHL+05]. Great
care must also be taken when composing quantum protocols in the bounded
quantum storage model [WW07]. Even though these composability frameworks
exist, very few protocols have been proven secure when composed.
Secondly, we need to consider what happens if an adversary is allowed to
store even small amounts of quantum information. There are many examples
known where quantum memory can prove much more useful to an adversary than
classical memory [GKK+06], and we will encounter such examples in Chapters 3
and 5.
In addition, it is often assumed that the downfall of computational assump-
tions such as factoring is the only consequence that quantum computing has on
the security of classical protocols. Sadly, this is by no means the only problem.
Classical protocols where the security depends on the fact that different players
cannot communicate during the course of the protocol may be broken when the
players can share quantum entanglement and perform even a very limited set of
quantum operations, well within the reach of current day technology. We will
encounter such an example in Chapter 9.
Furthermore, we may conceive new primitives, unknown to the classical set-
ting. One such primitive is the distribution of shared quantum states in the
presence of dishonest players. Here, our goal is to create a protocol among n
players such that at the end of the protocol m ≤ n players share a specified state
ρ, where the dishonest players may apply any measurement to their share. It is
conceivable to extend the QSMP protocol of [CGS02] to address this problem,
yet, much more efficient protocols may be possible. Such a primitive would also
enable us to build up the resources needed by other protocols such as [CW05a].
Finally, it is an interesting question by itself, what cryptographic primitives
are possible in a quantum mechanical world. Conversely, it has even been shown
that the axioms governing quantum mechanics can in part be obtained from
the premise that perfect bit commitment is impossible [CBH03]. Perhaps such
connections may lead to novel insights.
1.5 Conclusion
Quantum cryptography beyond quantum key distribution is an exciting subject.
In this thesis, we will investigate several aspects that play an important role in
nearly all cryptographic applications in the quantum setting.
In part I, we will examine how to extract information from quantum states.
We first consider the problem of state discrimination. Here, our goal is to deter-
mine the identity of a state ρ within a finite set of possible states {ρ1, . . . , ρn}.
In Chapter 3, we will examine a special case of this problem that is of particular
relevance to quantum cryptography in the bounded quantum storage model: How
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well can we perform state discrimination if we are given additional information
after an initial quantum measurement, i.e., after a quantum memory bound is
applied? In Chapter 4, we address uncertainty relations, which play an impor-
tant role in nearly all cryptographic applications. We will prove tight bounds
for uncertainty relations for certain mutually unbiased measurements. We will
also present optimal uncertainty relations for anti-commuting measurements. Fi-
nally, in Chapter 5, we then examine a peculiar quantum effect known as locking
classical information in quantum states. Such effects are important in the secu-
rity of QKD, and also play a role in quantum string commitments which we will
encounter in part III. In particular, we address the following question: Can we
always obtain good locking effects for mutually unbiased measurements?
In part II, we turn to investigate quantum entanglement. In Chapter 7,
we show how to find optimal quantum strategies for two parties who cannot
communicate, but share quantum entanglement. Understanding such strategies
plays an important part in understanding the effect of entanglement in otherwise
classical protocols. In Chapter 8, we then present some initial weak result on
the amount of entanglement such strategies require. Finally, in Chapter 9, we
show how the security of classical protocols can be affected considerably in the
presence of entanglement.
In part III, we investigate two cryptographic problems directly. In Chap-
ter 10, we first consider commitments: Quantumly, one may hope that committing
to an entire string of bits at once, and allowing Alice and Bob a limited ability
to cheat, may still be within the realm of possibilities. This does not contradict
that bit commitment itself is impossible. Unfortunately, we will see that for any
reasonable security measure, string commitments are also impossible. However,
non-trivial protocols do become possible for very weak notions of security.
In Chapter 11, we then introduce the model of noisy-quantum storage that in
spirit is very similar to the setting of bounded-quantum storage: Here we assume
that the adversary’s quantum operations and storage are subject to noise. We
show that oblivious transfer can be implemented securely in this model. We give
an explicit tradeoff between the amount of noise and the security of our protocol.

Part II
Information in quantum states
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Chapter 2
Introduction
To investigate the limitations and possibilities of cryptographic protocols in a
physical world, we must familiarize ourselves with its physical theory: quantum
mechanics. What are quantum states and what sets them apart from the classical
scenario? Here, we briefly recount the most elementary facts that will be necessary
for the remainder of this text. We refer to [Per93] for a more gentle introduction
to quantum mechanics, to Appendix A for linear algebra prerequisites, and to the
symbol index on page 249 for unfamiliar notation. In later chapters, we examine
some of the most striking aspects of quantum mechanics, such as uncertainty
relations and entanglement in more detail.
2.1 Quantum mechanics
2.1.1 Quantum states
A d-dimensional quantum state is a positive semidefinite operator ρ of norm
1 (i.e., ρ has no negative eigenvalues and Tr(ρ) = 1) living in a d-dimensional
Hilbert space1 H. We commonly refer to ρ as a density operator or density matrix.
A special case of a quantum state is a pure state, which has the property that
rank(ρ) = 1. That is, there exists some vector |Ψ〉 ∈ H such that we can write
ρ = |Ψ〉〈Ψ|, where |Ψ〉〈Ψ| is a projector onto the vector |Ψ〉. If {|0〉, . . . , |d− 1〉}
is a basis for H, we can thus write |Ψ〉 =∑d−1j=0 αj|j〉 for some coefficients αj ∈ C.
Note that our normalization constraint implies that Tr(ρ) =
∑
j |αj|2 = 1. We
also say that |Ψ〉 is in a superposition of vectors |0〉, . . . , |d − 1〉. Clearly, for a
pure state we have that ρ2 = ρ and thus Tr(ρ2) = 1.
Let’s first look at an example of pure states. Suppose we consider a d =
2 dimensional quantum system H, also called a qubit. We call {|0〉, |1〉} the
1A complete vector space with an inner product. Here, we always consider a vector space
over the complex numbers.
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computational basis, where
|0〉 =
(
1
0
)
and |1〉 =
(
0
1
)
.
Any pure qubit state can then be written as |Ψ〉 = α|0〉+ β|1〉 for some α, β ∈ C
with |α|2+ |β|2 = 1. We take an encoding of ’0’ or ’1’ in the computational basis
to be |0〉 or |1〉 respectively, and use the subscript ’+’ to refer to an encoding in
the computational basis. An alternative choice of basis would be the Hadamard
basis , given by vectors {|+〉, |−〉}, where
|+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) and |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉).
We use ’×’ to refer to an encoding in the Hadamard basis. We will often consider
systems consisting of n qubits. If H is a 2-dimensional Hilbert space correspond-
ing to a single qubit, the system of n qubits is given by the n-fold tensor product
H⊗n with dimension d = 2n. A basis for this larger Hilbert space can easily be
found by forming the tensor products of the basis vectors of a single qubit. For
example, the computational basis for an n-qubit system is given by the basis vec-
tors {|x1〉⊗ . . .⊗ |xn〉 | xj ∈ {0, 1}, j ∈ [n]} where [n] = {1, . . . , n}. We will often
omit the tensor product and use the shorthand |x1 . . . xn〉 = |x1〉 ⊗ . . .⊗ |xn〉.
If ρ is not pure, then ρ is a mixed state and can be written as a mixture of pure
states. That is, for any state ρ there exist λj ≥ 0 with
∑
j λj = 1 and vectors
|Ψj〉 such that
ρ =
∑
j
λj|Ψj〉〈Ψj|.
Since ρ is Hermitian, we can take λj and |Ψj〉 to be the eigenvalues and eigenvec-
tors of ρ respectively. We thus have for any quantum state that Tr(ρ2) ≤ 1, where
equality holds if and only if ρ is a pure state. We can also consider a mixture of
quantum states, pure or mixed. Suppose we have a physical system whose state
ρx depends on some value x ∈ X of a classical random variable X drawn from X
according to a probability distribution PX . For anyone who does not know the
value of X (but does know the distribution PX), the state of the system is given
as
ρ =
∑
x
PX(x)ρx.
We also call the set E = {(PX(x), ρx) | x ∈ X} an ensemble, that gives rise to
the density matrix ρ. We generally use the common shorthand E = {PX(x), ρx}.
Clearly, for any state ρ we can take its eigendecomposition as above to find one
possible ensemble that gives rise to ρ. With this interpretation in mind, it is now
intuitive why we wanted ρ ≥ 0 and Tr(ρ) = 1: the first condition ensures that ρ
has no negative eigenvalues and hence all probabilities λj are non-negative. The
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second condition ensures that the resulting distribution in indeed normalized. We
will use S(H) and B(H) to denote the set of all density matrices and the set of
all bounded operators on a system H respectively.
Let’s look at a small example illustrating the concept of mixed quantum states.
The density matrices corresponding to |0〉 and |1〉 are ρ0+ = |0〉〈0| and ρ1+ =
|1〉〈1|, and the density matrices corresponding to |+〉 and |−〉 are given by ρ0× =
|+〉〈+| and ρ1× = |−〉〈−|. Let’s suppose we are now told that we are given a ’0’
but encoded in either the computational or Hadamard basis, each with probability
1/2. Our quantum state corresponding to this encoding of ’0’ is now
ρ0 =
1
2
(ρ0+ + ρ0×).
The state corresponding to an encoding of ’1’ is similarly given by
ρ1 =
1
2
(ρ1+ + ρ1×).
It is important to note that the same density matrix can be generated by two
different ensembles. As a simple example, consider the matrix ρ = (2/3)|0〉〈0| +
(1/3)|1〉〈1|. Clearly, ρ ≥ 0 and Tr(ρ) = 1 and thus ρ forms a valid one qubit quan-
tum state. However, E1 = {(2/3, |0〉), (1/3, |1〉)} and E2 = {(1/2, |φ0〉), (1/2, |φ1〉)}
with |φ0〉 =
√
2/3|0〉+√1/3|1〉 and |φ1〉 =√2/3|0〉 −√1/3|1〉 both give rise to
ρ:
ρ =
2
3
|0〉〈0|+ 1
3
|1〉〈1| = 1
2
|φ0〉〈φ0|+ 1
2
|φ1〉〈φ1|.
Classical vs. Quantum
Quantum states exhibit an important property known as “no-cloning”: very much
unlike classical states, we cannot create a copy of an arbitrary quantum state!
This is only possible with a small probability. We refer to [SIGA05] for an excel-
lent overview of known results.
In the following, we call an ensemble classical if all states ρx commute. This
is an interesting special case, we discuss in more detail below.
2.1.2 Multipartite systems
We frequently need to talk about a quantum state shared by multiple players
in a protocol. Let H1, . . . ,Hn denote the Hilbert spaces corresponding to the
quantum systems of players 1 up to n. As outlined in the case of multiple qubits
above, the joint system H1⊗ . . .⊗Hn of all players is formed by taking the tensor
product. For example, suppose that we have only two players, Alice and Bob. Let
HA and HB be the Hilbert spaces corresponding to Alice’s and Bob’s quantum
systems respectively. Any bipartite state ρAB shared by Alice and Bob is a state
living in the joint system HA ⊗ HB. Bipartite states can exhibit an interesting
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property called entanglement, which we investigate in Chapter 6. In short, if
|Ψ〉 ∈ HA ⊗HB is a pure state, we say that |Ψ〉 is separable if and only if there
exist states |ΨA〉 ∈ HA and |ΨB〉 ∈ HB such that |Ψ〉 = |ΨA〉⊗|ΨB〉. A separable
pure state is also called a product state. A state that is not separable is called
entangled. An example of an entangled pure state is the so-called EPR-pair
1
2
(|00〉+ |11〉).
For mixed states the definition is slightly more subtle. Let ρ ∈ S(HA⊗HB) be a
mixed state. Then ρ is called a product state if there exist ρA ∈ HA and ρB ∈ HB
such that ρ = ρA⊗ρB. The state ρ is called separable, if there exists an ensemble
E = {pj, |Ψj〉} such that |Ψj〉 = |ΨAj 〉⊗ |ΨBj 〉 with |ΨAj 〉 ∈ HA and |ΨBj 〉 ∈ HB for
all j, such that
ρ =
∑
j
pj|Ψj〉〈Ψj| =
∑
j
pj|ΨAj 〉〈ΨAj | ⊗ |ΨBj 〉〈ΨBj |.
Intuitively, if ρ is separable then ρ corresponds to a mixture of separable pure
states according to a classical joint probability distribution {pj}. We return to
such differences in Chapter 6. From a cryptographic perspective, it is for now
merely important to note that if the state ρAB shared between Alice and Bob is a
pure state, then ρAB is not entangled with any third system HC held by Charlie.
That is, ρAB does not depend on any classical random variable X held by Charlie
whose value is unknown to Alice and Bob. An important consequence is that the
outcomes of any measurement (see below) that Alice and Bob may perform on
ρAB are therefore independent of X, and hence secret with respect to Charlie.
Given a quantum state in a combined, larger, system, what can we say
about the state of the individual systems? For example, given a state ρAB
shared between Alice and Bob, the reduced state of Alice’s system alone is given
by ρA = TrB(ρ
AB), where TrB is the partial trace over Bob’s system. The
partial trace operation TrB : B(HA ⊗ HB) → B(HA) is thereby defined as
the unique linear operator that for all A ∈ B(HA) and all B ∈ B(HB) maps
TrB(A⊗B) = ATr(B). We also say that we trace out Bob’s system from ρAB to
obtain ρA. Furthermore, given any state ρA ∈ HA, we can always find a second
system HB and a pure state |Ψ〉 ∈ HA ⊗ HB such that ρA = TrB(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|). We
call |Ψ〉 a purification of ρA.
Classical vs. Quantum
In the quantum world, we encounter a particular effect known as entanglement.
Intuitively, entanglement leads to very strong correlations among Alice and Bob’s
system, which we will examine in detail in Chapter 6.
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2.1.3 Quantum operations
Unitary evolution
The evolution of any closed quantum system is described by a unitary evolution
U that maps
ρ→ UρU †.
It is important to note that unitary operations are reversible: We can always apply
an additional unitary V = U † to retrieve the original state since V (UρU †)V † =
U †UρU †U = ρ. In particular, we often make use of the following single qubit
unitaries known as the Pauli matrices
σx =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, σy =
(
0 −i
i 0
)
, σz =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
.
Note that σy = iσxσz. Furthermore, we also use the Hadamard, and the K-
transform given by
H =
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
and K =
1√
2
(
1 i
i 1
)
.
Note that K = (I+ iσx)/
√
2.
Measurements
Besides unitary operations, we can also perform measurements on the quantum
state. A quantum measurement of a state ρ ∈ S(H) is a set of operators {Mm}
acting on S(H), satisfying ∑mM †mMm = I. We will call operators Mm measure-
ment operators. The probability of obtaining outcome m when measuring the
state ρ is given by
Pr[m] = Tr(M †mMmρ).
Conditioned on the event that we obtained outcome m, the post-measurement
state of the system is now
ρm =
MmρM
†
m
Tr(M †mMmρ)
.
Most measurements disturb the quantum state and hence ρm generally differs
from ρ. We will discuss this effect in more detail below. Note that we have∑
m Pr[m] = Tr
((∑
mM
†
mMm
)
ρ
)
= 1, and hence the distribution over outcomes
{m} is appropriately normalized.
A special case of a quantum measurement is a projective measurement , where
all measurement operatorsMm are orthogonal projectors which we write as Pm =
Mm = M
†
mMm. Projective measurements are also described via an observable
A =
∑
mmPm, wherem ∈ R. Note that A is a Hermitian matrix with eigenvalues
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{m}. For any given basis B = {|x1〉, . . . , |xd〉} we speak of measuring in the
basis B to indicate that we perform a projective measurement given by operators
Pk = |xk〉〈xk| with k ∈ [d].
If we are only interested in the measurement outcome, but do not care about
the post-measurement state, it is often simpler to make use of the POVM (positive
operator valued measure) formalism. A POVM is a set of Hermitian operators
{Em} such that
∑
mEm = I and for all m we have Em ≥ 0. Evidently, from a
general measurement we can obtain a POVM by letting Em = M
†
mMm. We now
have
Pr[m] = Tr(Emρ).
The advantage of this approach is that we can easily solve optimization prob-
lems involving probabilities Pr[m] over the operators Em, instead of considering
the individual operators Mm. Since Em ≥ 0 such problems can be solved using
semidefinite programming, which we describe in Appendix A. Finally, it is im-
portant to note that quantum measurements do not always commute: it matters
crucially in which order we execute them. Indeed, as we will see later it is this
property that leads to all the interesting quantum effects we will consider.
Let’s consider a small example. Suppose we are given a pure quantum state
|Ψ〉 =√2/3|0〉+√1/3|1〉. When measuring |Ψ〉 in the computational basis, we
perform a measurement determined by operators P0 = |0〉〈0| and P1 = |1〉〈1|.
Evidently, we have
Pr[0] = Tr(P0|Ψ〉〈Ψ|) = 〈Ψ|P0|Ψ〉 = 2
3
,
and
Pr[1] = Tr(P1|Ψ〉〈Ψ|) = 〈Ψ|P1|Ψ〉 = 1
3
.
If we obtained outcome ’0’, the post-measurement state is given by
ρ0 =
P0|Ψ〉〈Ψ|P0
Pr[0]
= |0〉〈0|.
Similarly, if we obtained outcome ’1’, the post-measurement state is
ρ1 =
P1|Ψ〉〈Ψ|P1
Pr[1]
= |1〉〈1|.
Quantum channel
The most general way to describe an operation is by means of a CP (completely
positive) map Λ : HA → HB, whereHA andHB denote the in and output systems
respectively. We also call Λ a channel. Any channel Λ can be written as Λ(ρ) =∑
m VmρV
†
m where Vm is a linear operator fromHA toHB, and
∑
m V
†
mVm ≤ I. Vm
is also referred to as a Kraus operator . Λ is trace preserving if
∑
m V
†
mVm = I. Any
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quantum operation can be expressed by means of a CPTP (completely positive
trace preserving) map . We sometimes also refer to such a map as a superoperator ,
a quantum channel, or a (measurement) instrument , if we think of a POVM with
elements {Vm}. A channel is called unital , if in addition
∑
m VmV
†
m = I: we then
have Λ(I) = I.
We give two simple examples. Consider the unitary evolution U of a state ρ:
here we have Λ(ρ) = UρU †. When we perform our single qubit measurement in
the computational basis described above, and ignore the measurement outcome,
we implement the channel Λ(ρ) = P0ρP0 + P1ρP1. Since P0 and P1 form a
measurement and are projectors we also have that P0P
†
0 + P1P
†
1 = I and hence
the channel is unital.
Any quantum channel can be described by a unitary transformation on the
original and an ancilla system, where the ancilla system is traced out to recover
the original operation. More precisely, given a channel Λ : HA → HB we can
choose a Hilbert space HC identical to HB, a pure state ρˆ ∈ S(HB ⊗ HC) and
a unitary matrix UΛ acting on HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HC such that for any ρ ∈ S(HA)
Λ(ρ) = TrA,CUΛ(ρ⊗ ρˆ)U †Λ. This is all that we need here, and we refer to [Hay06]
for detailed information.
Of particular interest, especially with regard to constructing cheat-sensitive
protocols, is the following statement which specifies which operations leave a
given set of states invariant. Clearly, any cheating party may always perform
such operations without being detected. It has been shown that
2.1.1. Lemma. (HKL) [HKL03] Let Λ : H → H be a unital quantum channel
with Λ(ρ) =
∑
m VmρV
†
m, and let S be a set of quantum states. Then
∀ρ ∈ S,Λ(ρ) = ρ if and only if ∀m∀ρ ∈ S, [Vm, ρ] = 0.
Indeed, the converse direction is easy to see. If we have that for all m and
for all ρ ∈ S [Vm, ρ] = 0, then Λ(ρ) =
∑
m VmρV
†
m =
∑
m VmV
†
mρ = ρ, since
Λ is unital. If a quantum channel is not of this form, i.e. it does not leave
the state invariant, we also say that it disturbs the state. The statement above
has interesting consequences: consider an ensemble of states E = {px, ρx} with
ρx ∈ H, and suppose that there exists a decomposition H =
⊕
jHj such that
for all x we have ρx =
∑
j ΠjρxΠj where Πj is a projector onto Hj. If we
perform the measurement given by operators {Πj} then (ignoring the outcome)
the states ρx are invariant under such a measurement, since clearly [Πj, ρx] = 0
for all j and x. The outcome of the measurement tells us which Hj we reside
in. However, Lemma 2.1.1 tells us a lot more: We will see in Chapter 3.5.1
that if the measurement operators from a projective measurement commute with
all the states ρx, they are in fact of this very form (see also Appendix B). In
the following, we call the information about which Hj we reside in the classical
information of the ensemble E . Any attempt to gain more information, i.e. by
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performing measurements which do not satisfy these commutation properties,
necessarily leads to disturbance and can be detected.
An adversary can thus always extract this classical information without affect-
ing the quantum state. Looking back at Chapter 1, we can now see that for unital
adversary channels we can define an honest-but-curious player to be honest-but-
curious with regard to the classical information, and honest with regard to the
quantum information: he may extract, copy and memorize the classical infor-
mation as desired. However, if he wants to leave the protocol execution itself
unaltered, he cannot perform any other measurements and must thus be honest
on the remaining quantum part of the ensemble.
Classical vs. Quantum
Clearly, Lemma 2.1.1 also tells us that if all the states ρx in our ensemble com-
mute, i.e. the ensemble is classical as defined above, then we can always perform
a measurement in their common eigenbasis “for free”. Furthermore, if our en-
semble is classical we have dim(Hj) = 1, i.e. Hj itself is also classical: it is
just a scalar. We thus see that such an ensemble has no quantum properties:
we can extract and copy information at will. Informally, we may think of the
different states within the ensemble as different classical probability distributions
over their common eigenstates. We will return to this idea shortly.
Furthermore, we can look at measurements or observables themselves. Note
again from the above that since a quantum measurement may disturb a state, it
matters in which order measurements are executed. That is, quantum operations
do not commute. It is this fact that leads to all the interesting effects we observe:
uncertainty relations, locking and Bell inequality violations using quantum entan-
glement are all consequences of the existence of non-commuting measurements in
the quantum world. This lies in stark contrast to the classical world, where all
our measurement do commute, and we therefore do not encounter such effects.
2.2 Distinguishability
How can we distinguish several quantum states? Suppose we are given states
ρX where X is a random variable drawn according to a probability distribution
PX over some finite set X . Our goal is now to determine the value of X given
an unknown state ρ ∈ {ρx | x ∈ X}. Cryptographically, this gives an intuitive
measure on how well we can guess the value of X. The problem of finding the
optimal distinguishing measurement is called state discrimination, where optimal
refers to finding the measurement that maximizes the probability of successfully
guessingX. For two states, the optimal guessing probability is particularly simple
to evaluate. To this end, we first need to introduce the trace distance, and the
trace norm:
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2.2.1. Definition. The trace distance of two states ρ0 and ρ1 is given by
D(ρ0, ρ1) =
1
2
||ρ0 − ρ1||1,
where ||A||1 = Tr(
√
A†A) is the trace norm of A.
Alternatively, the trace distance may also be expressed as [Hay06]
D(ρ0, ρ1) = max
M
Tr(M(ρ0 − ρ1)),
where the maximization is taken over all M ≥ 0. Indeed, D is really a “distance”
measure, as it is clearly a metric on the space of density matrices: We have
D(ρ0, ρ1) = 0 if and only if ρ0 = ρ1, and evidently D(ρ0, ρ1) = D(ρ1, ρ0). Finally,
the triangle inequality holds:
D(ρ0, ρ1) = max
M
Tr(M(ρ0 − ρ1)) = max
M
(Tr(M(ρ0 − σ)) + Tr(M(σ − ρ1)))
≤ D(ρ0, σ) +D(σ, ρ1).
When considering single qubits (such as for example in Chapter 11) it is often
intuitive to note that for a single qubit, the trace distance has a particularly
simple form. Note that I, σx, σy and σz form a basis for the space of 2 × 2
complex matrices. Since we have Tr(ρ) = 1 for any quantum state, we can thus
write any single qubit state as
ρ =
I+ ~r · ~σ
2
=
I+ rxσx + ryσy + rzσz
2
where ~σ = (σx, σy, σz) and ~r = (rx, ry, rz) is the Bloch vector as given in Figure 2.1.
For τ = (I+ ~t · ~σ)/2 with ~t = (tx, ty, tz) we then have
D(ρ, τ) =
1
2
||ρ− τ ||1 = 1
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈{x,y,z}
(rj − tj)σj
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
=
1
2
√ ∑
j∈{x,y,z}
(rj − tj)2,
where we used the fact that all Pauli matrices anti-commute. Thus, the trace dis-
tance between ρ and τ is exactly half the Euclidean distance of the corresponding
Bloch vectors.
Using the trace distance, we can address the problem of distinguishing two
quantum states:
2.2.2. Theorem (Helstrom [Hel67]). Suppose we are given states ρ0 with
probability q, and ρ1 with probability 1 − q. Then the probability to determine
whether the state was ρ0 and ρ1 is at most
p =
1
2
[1 + ||qρ0 − (1− q)ρ1||1] .
The measurement that achieves p is given by M0, and M1 = I−M0, where M0 is
the projector onto the positive eigenspace of qρ0 − (1− q)ρ1.
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θ
φ
▶
▶
▶
|0>
|1>
|ψ>
x
y
z
Figure 2.1: Bloch vector (rx, ry, rz) = (cosψ sin θ, sinψ sin θ, cos θ)
For q = 1/2, this gives us p = 1/2 + D(ρ0, ρ1)/2. Indeed, it is easy to see
why such M0 and M1 form the optimal measurement. Note that here we are only
interested in finding a POVM. To find the optimal POVM we must solve the
following optimization problem for variables M0 and M1:
maximize qTr(M0ρ0) + (1− q)Tr(M1ρ1)
subject to M0,M1 ≥ 0,
M0 +M1 = I.
We can rewrite our target function as
qTr(M0ρ0) + (1− q)Tr(M1ρ1) = qTr(M0ρ0) + (1− q)Tr((I−M0)ρ1)
= Tr(M0(qρ0 − (1− q)ρ1)) + 1− q
= Tr
M0
∑
λj≥0
λj|uj〉〈uj|

+Tr
M0
∑
λj<0
λj|uj〉〈uj|
+ 1− q,
where qρ0− (1− q)ρ1 =
∑
j λj|uj〉〈uj|. Hence, to maximize the above expression,
we need to choose M0 =
∑
λj≥0 |uj〉〈uj|.
Unfortunately, computing the optimal measurement to distinguish more than
two states is generally not so easy. Yuen, Kennedy and Lax [YKL75] first showed
that this problem can be solved using semidefinite programming, a technique
we describe in Appendix A. This technique has since been refined to address
other variants such as unambiguous state discrimination where we can output
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“don’t know”, but are never allowed to make a mistake [Eld03]. Evidently, we
can express the optimization problem for any state discrimination problem as
maximize
∑
x PX(x)Tr(Mxρx)
subject to ∀x ∈ X ,Mx ≥ 0,∑
x∈X Mx = I.
In Chapter 3, we will use the above formulation. We also show how to address
a variant of this problem, where we receive additional classical information after
performing the measurement.
Closely related to the trace distance is the notion of fidelity.
2.2.3. Definition. The fidelity of states ρ and σ is given by
F (ρ, σ) = Tr
√
ρ1/2σρ1/2.
Note that if ρ = |Ψ〉〈Ψ| is a pure state, this becomes
F (|Ψ〉, σ) =
√
〈Ψ|σ|Ψ〉.
The fidelity is closely related to the trace distance. In particular, we have that
for any states ρ and σ
1− F (ρ, σ) ≤ D(ρ, σ) ≤
√
1− F (ρ, σ)2.
A proof can be found in [NC00, Section 9.2.3]. If ρ = |Ψ〉〈Ψ| is a pure state, the
lower bound can be improved to
1− F (|Ψ〉, σ)2 ≤ D(|Ψ〉, σ).
Many other distance measures of quantum states are known, which may be a
more convenient choice for particular problems. We refer to [Fuc95, Hay06] for
an overview.
Classical vs. Quantum
Suppose again we are given a classical ensemble of states ρ and σ. That is, both
operators commute and hence have a common eigenbasis {|u1〉, . . . , |ud〉}. We can
thus write ρ =
∑
j λj|uj〉〈uj| and σ =
∑
j γj|uj〉〈uj|, which allows us to write the
trace distance of ρ and σ as
D(ρ, σ) =
||∑j(λj − γj)|uj〉〈uj|||1
2
=
1
2
∑
j
|λj − γj| = D(λj, γj),
where D(λj, γj) is the classical variational distance between the distributions
{λj} and {γj}. Again, we see that there is nothing quantum in this setting. We
can view ρ and σ as two different probability distributions over the set {|uj〉}.
Similarly, it is easy to see that
F (ρ, σ) = Tr
√∑
j
λjγj|uj〉〈uj| =
∑
j
√
λjγj = F (λj, γj),
where F (λj, γj) is the classical fidelity of the distributions {λj} and {γj}.
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2.3 Information measures
2.3.1 Classical
We also need the following ways of measuring information. Let X be a random
variable distributed over a finite set X according to probability distribution PX .
The Shannon entropy of X is then given by
H(X) = −
∑
x∈X
PX(x) logPX(x).
Intuitively, the Shannon entropy measures how much information we gain on
average by learning X. A complementary view point is that H(X) quantifies the
amount of uncertainty we have about X before the fact. We will also use H(PX),
if our discussion emphasizes a certain distribution PX . If |X | = 2, we also use
the term binary entropy and use the shorthand
h(p) = −p log p− (1− p) log(1− p).
Let Y be a second random variable distributed over a finite set Y according to
distribution PY . The joint entropy of X and Y can now be expressed as
H(X, Y ) = −
∑
x∈X ,y∈Y
PXY (x, y) logPXY (x, y),
where PXY is the joint distribution over X × Y . Furthermore, we can quantify
the uncertainty about X given Y by means of the conditional entropy
H(X|Y ) = H(X, Y )−H(Y ).
To quantify the amount of information X and Y may have in common we use
the mutual information
I(X, Y ) = H(X) +H(Y )−H(X, Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y ).
Intuitively the mutual information captures the amount of information we gain
about X by learning Y . The Shannon entropy has many interesting properties,
summarized, for example, in [NC00, Theorem 11.3], but we do not require them
here. In Chapter 5, we only need the classical mutual information of a bipartite
quantum state ρAB, which is the maximum classical mutual information that can
be obtained by local measurements MA ⊗MB on the state ρAB [THLD02]:
Ic(ρAB) = max
MA⊗MB
I(A,B), (2.1)
where A and B are the random variables corresponding to Alice’s and Bob’s
measurement outcomes respectively.
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In a cryptographic setting, the Shannon entropy is not always a desirable
measure as it merely captures our uncertainty about X on average. Often, the
Re´nyi entropy allows us to make stronger statements The Re´nyi entropy [Re´n60]
of order α is defined as
Hα(X) =
1
1− α log
[∑
x∈X
PX(x)
α
]
.
Indeed, the Shannon entropy forms a special case of the Re´nyi entropy by taking
the limit α → 1, i.e., H1(·) = H(·), where we omit the subscript. Of particular
importance is the min-entropy , for α→∞:
H∞(X) = − log
(
max
x∈X
PX(x)
)
,
and the collision entropy
H2(X) = − log
∑
x∈X
PX(x)
2.
We have
log |X | ≥ H(X) ≥ H2(X) ≥ H∞(X).
Intuitively, the min-entropy is determined by the highest peak in the distribution
and most closely captures the notion of “guessing” x. Consider the following
example: Let X = {0, 1}n and let x0 = 0, . . . , 0 be the all 0 string. Suppose that
PX(x0) = 1/2 + 1/(2
n+1) and PX(x) = 1/(2
n+1) for x 6= x0, i.e., with probability
1/2 we choose x0 and with probability 1/2 we choose one string uniformly at
random. Then H(X) ≈ n/2, whereas H∞(X) = 1! If x would correspond to an
encryption key used to encrypt an n bit message, we would certainly not talk
about security if we can guess the key with probability 1/2! Yet, the Shannon
entropy is quite high. We refer to [Cac97] for an in-depth discussion of security
measures in classical cryptography.
2.3.2 Quantum
Similar to the Shannon entropy, the von Neumann entropy of a quantum states
ρ is given by
S(ρ) = −Tr(ρ log ρ).
Taking the eigendecomposition of ρ =
∑
x λx|x〉〈x| we can also write
S(ρ) = −
∑
x
λx log λx,
which corresponds to the Shannon entropy arising from measuring ρ in the basis
given by {|x〉〈x|}. We refer to [NC00, Section 11.3] for the properties of the von
Neumann entropy.
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Here, we will only be concerned with the accessible information [Per93, Eq.
(9.75)] of an ensemble E = {px, ρx} which we encounter again in Chapter 5.
Iacc(E) = max
M
(
−
∑
x
px log px+
∑
j
∑
x
pxαjTr(Mjρx) log
pxTr(Mjρx)
Tr(Mjρ)
)
,
where ρ =
∑
x pxρx and the maximization is taken over all POVMs M = {Mj}.
It has been shown that we can take all POVM elements to be of rank 1 [Dav78].
However, maximizing this quantity still remains a hard task [Per93]. Some upper
and lower bounds are known [Fuc95], but sadly none of them are generally very
strong. The most well-known upper bound is given by the Holevo quantity , which
is given by
χ(ρ) = S(ρ)−
∑
x
pxS(ρx).
Holevo’s theorem [NC00] states that
Iacc(E) ≤ χ(ρ). (2.2)
Classical vs. Quantum
Equality in Eq. (2.2) is achieved if all states ρx have a common eigenbasis (i.e.,
all ρx commute). Hence, for classical ensembles we do not have a gap between
these two quantities. The fact that quantumly we can obtain such a gap leads
to a peculiar effect known as locking classical information in quantum states
in Chapter 5. However, even if the states ρx do not commute, we can still
extract the “classical information” of the ensemble: Suppose for all ρx ∈ H
from our ensemble there exists a decomposition H = ⊕jHj such that for all
x, ρx =
∑
j ΠjρxΠj, where Πj is a projector onto Hj. That is, there exists
a way to simultaneously block-diagonalize all states. Note that for any mea-
surement maximizing the accessible information above, we can find an equiva-
lent measurement with measurement operators Mˆ =
∑
j ΠjMΠj, since evidently,
Tr(Mˆρx) =
∑
j Tr(ΠjMΠjρx) = Tr(Mρx). Intuitively, this means that we can
always first determine which block we are in “for free”, followed by our original
measurement constrained to this block. Note that [Πj, ρx] = 0 for all Πj and ρx.
Hence, looking back at Section 2.1.3 this is not so surprising: the measurement
leaves our states invariant. In general, such commutation relations lead to inter-
esting structural consequences which we examine in more detail in Appendix B
and also exploit in Chapter 3. Finally, it will be useful in Chapter 10 that the
accessible information is additive [Hol73, DLT02]: For m independent draws of
an ensemble E of separable states (see Chapter 6), i.e., we choose m states from
m identical ensembles independently, we have Iacc(E⊗m) = mIacc(E).
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2.4 Mutually unbiased bases
In the following chapters, we will be particularly concerned with measurements in
mutually unbiased bases (MUBs). MUBs were initially introduced in the context
of state estimation [WF89], but feature in many other problems in quantum
information. The following definition closely follows the one given in [BBRV02].
2.4.1. Definition. [MUBs] Let B1 = {|b11〉, . . . , |b1d〉} and B2 = {|b21〉, . . . , |b2d〉}
be two orthonormal bases in Cd. They are said to be mutually unbiased if
|〈b1k|b2l 〉| = 1/
√
d, for every k, l ∈ [d]. A set {B1, . . . ,Bm} of orthonormal bases
in Cd is called a set of mutually unbiased bases if each pair of bases is mutually
unbiased.
As an example, consider the computational and the Hadamard basis defined
above, and note that we can write |+〉 = H|0〉 and |−〉 = H|1〉. We then have
for x ∈ {0, 1}n that
|〈x|H⊗n|x〉|2 = 1
2n
.
Hence, the computational and the Hadamard basis are mutually unbiased in
dimension d = 2n.
We use N(d) to denote the maximal number of MUBs in dimension d. In
any dimension d, we have that N(d) ≤ d + 1 [BBRV02]. If d = pk is a prime
power, we have that N(d) = d+1 and explicit constructions are known [BBRV02,
WF89]. If d = s2 is a square, N(d) ≥ MOLS(s) where MOLS(s) denotes the
number of mutually orthogonal s× s Latin squares [WB05]. In general, we have
N(nm) ≥ min{N(n),N(m)} for all n,m ∈ N [Zau99, KR03]. It is also known
that in any dimension, there exists an explicit construction for 3 MUBs [Gra04].
Unfortunately, not much else is known. For example, it is still an open problem
whether there exists a set of 7 MUBs in dimension d = 6. We say that a unitary
Ut transforms the computational basis into the t-th MUB Bt = {|bt1〉, . . . , |btd〉}
if for all k ∈ [d] we have |btk〉 = Ut|k〉. In the next two chapters, we will be
particularly concerned with two specific constructions of mutually unbiased bases.
There exists a third construction based on Galois rings [KR04], which we do not
consider here.
2.4.1 Latin squares
First, we consider MUBs based on mutually orthogonal Latin squares [WB05].
Informally, an s × s Latin square over the symbol set [s] is an arrangement of
elements of [s] into an s× s square such that in each row and each column every
element occurs exactly once. Let Lij denote the entry in a Latin square in row i
and column j. Two Latin squares L and L′ are called mutually orthogonal if and
only if {(Li,j, L′i,j)|i, j ∈ [s]} = {(u, v)|u, v ∈ [s]}. Intuitively, this means that if
we place one square on top of the other, and look at all pairs generated by the
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overlaying elements, all possible pairs occur. An example is given in Figures 2.2
and 2.3 below. From any s × s Latin square we can obtain a basis for Cs ⊗ Cs.
First, we construct s of the basis vectors from the entries of the Latin square
itself. Let
|v1,`〉 = 1√
s
∑
i,j∈[s]
ELi,j(`)|i, j〉,
where EL is a predicate such that ELi,j(`) = 1 if and only if Li,j = `. Note
that for each ` we have exactly s pairs i, j such that Ei,j(`) = 1, because each
element of [s] occurs exactly s times in the Latin square. Secondly, from each
such vector we obtain s − 1 additional vectors by adding successive rows of an
s×s complex Hadamard matrix H = (hij) as coefficients to obtain the remaining
|vt,j〉 for t ∈ [s], where hij = ωij with i, j ∈ {0, . . . , s − 1} and ω = e2pii/s. Two
additional MUBs can then be obtained in the same way from the two non-Latin
squares where each element occurs for an entire row or column respectively. From
each mutually orthogonal Latin square and these two extra squares which also
satisfy the above orthogonality condition, we obtain one basis. This construction
therefore gives MOLS(s) + 2 many MUBs. It is known that if s = pk is a prime
power itself, we obtain pk+1 ≈ √dMUBs from this construction. Note, however,
that there do exist many more MUBs in prime power dimensions, namely d+ 1.
If s is not a prime power, it is merely known that MOLS(s) ≥ s1/14.8 [WB05].
1 2 3
2 3 1
3 1 2
Figure 2.2: Latin Square (LS)
1 2 3
3 1 2
2 3 1
Figure 2.3: Mutually Orthogonal LS
As an example, consider the 3×3 Latin square depicted in Figure 2.2 and the
3× 3 complex Hadamard matrix
H =
 1 1 11 ω ω2
1 ω2 ω
 ,
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where ω = e2pii/3. First, we obtain vectors
|v1,1〉 = 1√
3
(|1, 1〉+ |2, 3〉+ |3, 2〉)
|v1,2〉 = 1√
3
(|1, 2〉+ |2, 1〉+ |3, 3〉)
|v1,3〉 = 1√
3
(|1, 3〉+ |2, 2〉+ |3, 1〉).
With the help of H we obtain 3 additional vectors from the ones above. From
the vector |v1,1〉, for example, we obtain
|v1,1〉 = 1√
3
(|1, 1〉+ |2, 3〉+ |3, 2〉)
|v2,1〉 = 1√
3
(|1, 1〉+ ω|2, 3〉+ ω2|3, 2〉)
|v3,1〉 = 1√
3
(|1, 1〉+ ω2|2, 3〉+ ω|3, 2〉).
This gives us basis B = {|vt,`〉|t, ` ∈ [s]} for s = 3. The construction of another
basis follows in exactly the same way from a mutually orthogonal Latin square.
The fact that two such squares L and L′ are mutually orthogonal ensures that the
resulting bases will be mutually unbiased. Indeed, suppose we are given another
such basis, B′ = {|ut,`〉|t, ` ∈ [s]} belonging to L′. We then have for any `, `′ ∈ [s]
that |〈u1,`′|v1,`〉|2 = |(1/s)
∑
i,j∈[s]E
L′
i,j(`
′)ELi,j(`)|2 = 1/s2, as there exists exactly
only one pair `, `′ ∈ [s] such that EL′i,j(`′)ELi,j(`) = 1. Clearly, the same argument
holds for the additional vectors derived from the complex Hadamard matrix.
2.4.2 Generalized Pauli matrices
The second construction we consider is based on the generalized Pauli matrices
Xd and Zd [BBRV02], defined by their actions on the computational basis C =
{|0〉, . . . , |d− 1〉} as follows:
Xd|k〉 = |k + 1 mod d〉
Zd|k〉 = ωk|k〉, ∀|k〉 ∈ C,
where ω = e2pii/d. We say that (Xd)
a1 (Zd)
b1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ (Xd)aN (Zd)bN for ak, bk ∈
{0, . . . , d− 1} and k ∈ [N ] is a string of Pauli matrices.
If d is a prime, it is known that the d + 1 MUBs constructed first by Woot-
ters and Fields [WF89] can also be obtained as the eigenvectors of the matrices
Zd, Xd, XdZd, XdZ
2
d , . . . , XdZ
d−1
d [BBRV02]. If d = p
k is a prime power, consider
all d2−1 possible strings of Pauli matrices excluding the identity and group them
into sets C1, . . . , Cd+1 such that |Ci| = d − 1 and Ci ∩ Cj = {I} for i 6= j and
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all elements of Ci commute. Let Bi be the common eigenbasis of all elements of
Ci. Then B1, . . . , Bd+1 are MUBs [BBRV02]. A similar result for d = 2
k has also
been shown in [LBZ02]. A special case of this construction are the three mutually
unbiased bases in dimension d = 2k given by the unitaries I⊗k,H⊗k and K⊗k (as
defined on page 29) applied to the computational basis.
2.5 Conclusion
We summarized the most important elements of quantum theory that we need
here. We refer to [Per93, NC00, Hay06] for more information about each topic.
In Chapters 4 and 6 we investigate the two most striking aspects of quantum
theory in detail: uncertainty relations and entanglement. But first, let’s examine
the case of state discrimination with additional post-measurement information.
Chapter 3
State discrimination
with post-measurement information
In this chapter, we investigate an extension of the traditional state discrimination
problem we encountered in Chapter 2.2: what if we are given some additional in-
formation after the measurement? Imagine that you are given a string x encoded
in an unknown basis chosen from a known set of bases. You may perform any
measurement, but you can only store at most q qubits of quantum information
afterwards. Later on, you are told which basis was used. How well can you com-
pute a function f of x, given the initial measurement outcome, the q qubits and
the additional basis information?
3.1 Introduction
This question is of central importance for protocols in the bounded quantum
storage model [DFSS05], which we encountered in Chapter 1. The security of such
protocols rests on the realistic assumption that a dishonest player cannot store
more than q qubits for long periods of time. In this model, even bit commitment
and oblivious transfer can be implemented securely which is otherwise known to
be impossible as we saw in Chapter 1. We formalize this general setting as a
state discrimination problem: Here, we are given additional information about
the state after the measurement or, more generally, after a quantum memory
bound is applied. We prove general bounds on the success probability for any
balanced function. We also show that storing just a single qubit allows you to
compute any Boolean function perfectly when two bases are used. However, we
also construct three bases for which you need to keep all qubits.
In general, we consider the following problem: Take an ensemble of quantum
states, E = {pyb, ρyb}, with double indices yb ∈ Y × B, and an integer q ≥ 0.
Suppose Alice sends Bob the state ρyb, where she alone knows indices y and b.
Bob can perform any measurement on his system, but afterwards store at most
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Alice Bob
1: choose x ε {0,1}, b ε {+,x}
   
2:
|xb>
3: b
store: ρsmall + classical
|xb>
process: ρbig
compute: y = f(x)
Figure 3.1: Using post-measurement information.
q qubits, and an unlimited amount of classical information. Afterwards, Alice
tells him b. Bob’s goal is now to approximate y as accurately as possible, which
means that he has to make a guess Yˆ that maximizes the success probability
Psucc =
∑
yb pyb Pr[Yˆ = y|state ρyb]. For |B| = 1, i.e., no post-measurement in-
formation is available, q is irrelevant and Bob’s task is to discriminate among
states ρy. This is the well-known state discrimination problem, which we en-
countered in Chapter 2.2, a problem studied since the early days of quantum
information science. A particular case that isolates the aspect of the timing
between measurements and side-information is one where for each fixed b, the
states ρyb are mutually orthogonal: if Bob knew b, he could actually compute
y perfectly. A special case of this problem is depicted in Figure 3.1. Here, Al-
ice picks a string x ∈R {0, 1}n, and a basis b ∈ {+,×}. She then encodes the
string in the chosen basis and sends the resulting state to Bob. Bob’s goal is
now to determine y = f(x) for a fixed function f . The states in this particular
problem are thus of the form ρyb =
∑
x∈f−1(y) PX|B=b(x)Ub|x〉〈x|U †b , for a function
f : X → Y , and a set of mutually unbiased bases (MUBs) B, given by the uni-
taries U0 = I, U1, . . . , U|B|−1 on a Hilbert space with basis {|x〉 : x ∈ X}, where
the string x and a basis b are drawn from the distribution PX,B. We mostly focus
on this special case.
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This problem also has an interpretation in terms of communication complexity.
Suppose Alice is given b, and Bob is given the state ρyb. If classical communication
is free, what is the minimum number of qubits Bob needs to send to Alice such
that Alice learns y? Note that Bob needs to send exactly q qubits if and only
if there exists a strategy for Bob to compute y in our task, while storing only q
qubits.
3.1.1 Outline
In the following, we will close in on our problem in several stages. First, we briefly
recall the case of state discrimination without any post-measurement information
in Section 3.3. This enables us to draw comparisons later.
Second, in Section 3.4 we assume that Bob does receive post-measurement
information, but has no quantum memory at all, i.e. q = 0. His goal then is to
compute f(x) given the classical outcome obtained by measuring Ub|x〉 and the
later announcement of b. Clearly, a trivial strategy for Bob is to simply guess
the basis, measure to obtain some string xˆ and take yˆ = f(xˆ) as his answer. We
thus want to find a better strategy. In particular, we will see that for any number
of MUBs, any number of function outcomes, and any balanced f , Bob has a
systematic advantage over guessing the basis, independent of |X |. Furthermore,
we show that for any Boolean f , Bob can succeed with probability at least Psucc ≥
1/2 + 1/(2
√
2) even if he cannot store any qubits at all. The latter result is
relevant to the question of whether deterministic privacy amplification is possible
in the protocols of [DFSS05]. Here, Alice uses two MUBs, and secretly chooses a
function from a set of predetermined functions. She later tells Bob which function
he should evaluate, together with the basis information b. Is it possible to use a
fixed Boolean function instead? Our result shows that this is not possible.
It is interesting to consider when post-measurement information is useful for
Bob, and how large his advantage is compared to the case where he does not
receive any post-measurement information. To this end, we show how to phrase
our problem as a semidefinite program (SDP), in the case where Bob has no
quantum memory. In Section 3.4.2, we examine in detail the specific functions
XOR and AND, for which we prove optimal bounds on Bob’s success probability.
In particular, the XOR on uniformly distributed strings of length n with two or
three MUBs provides an extreme example of the usefulness of post-measurement
information: We show that for the XOR function with n odd, Psucc = 1/2 +
1/(2
√
2). This is the same as Bob can achieve without the extra basis information.
For even n, Psucc = 1 with the additional basis information. Here, Psucc jumps
from 3/4 (without) to certainty (with basis information). The advantage that
Bob gains can thus be maximal: without the post-measurement information, he
can do no better than guessing the basis. However, with it, he can compute
y = f(x) perfectly. For even n, this was also observed in [DFSS05]. However,
our analysis for odd n shows that the strategy for even n does not work for
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any linear function as claimed in [DFSS05]. It remains an interesting question
to find general conditions on the ensemble of states that determine how useful
post-measurement information can be. We return to this question in Chapter 6.4.
Finally, we address the case where Bob does have quantum memory available.
The question we are then interested in is: How large does this memory have to
be so that Bob can compute y perfectly? In Section 3.5.1, we derive general
conditions that determine when q qubits are sufficient. Our conditions impose
a restriction on the rank of Bob’s measurement operators and require that all
such operators commute with the projector onto the support of ρyb, for all y
and b. In particular, we give a general algebraic framework that allows us to
determine q for any number of bases, functions and outcomes, in combination
with an algorithm given in [KI02]. In Sections 3.5.2 and 3.5.3, we then consider
two specific examples: First, we show that for any Boolean f and any two bases,
storing just a single qubit is sufficient for Bob to compute f(x) perfectly. The
latter result again has implications to protocols in the bounded quantum storage
model: for all existing protocols, deterministic privacy amplification is indeed
hopeless. It turns out that part of this specific example also follows from known
results derived for non-local games as we will discuss below. Surprisingly, things
change dramatically when we are allowed to use three bases: We show how to
construct three bases, such that for any balanced f Bob needs to keep all qubits
in order to compute f(x) perfectly!
3.1.2 Related work
In Chapter 2.2, we already examined the traditional setting of state discrimina-
tion without post-measurement information. Some of the tools we need below
have found use in this setting as well. Many convex optimization problems can
be solved using semidefinite programming. We refer to Appendix A for a in-
troduction. Eldar [Eld03] and Eldar, Megretski and Verghese [EMV03] used
semidefinite programming to solve state discrimination problems, which is one
of the techniques we also use here. The square-root measurement [HW94] (also
called pretty good measurement) is an easily constructed measurement to dis-
tinguish quantum states, however, it is only optimal for very specific sets of
states [EF01, EMV04]. Mochon constructed specific pure state discrimination
problems for which the square-root measurement is optimal [Moc07a]. We use
a variant of the square-root measurement as well. Furthermore, our problem is
related to the task of state filtering [BHH03, BHH05, BH05] and state classifica-
tion [WY06]. Here, Bob’s goal is to determine whether a given state is either one
specific state or one of several other possible states, or, more generally, which sub-
set of states a given state belongs to. Our scenario differs, because we deal with
mixed states and Bob is allowed to use post-measurement information. Much
more is known about pure state discrimination problems and the case of unam-
biguous state discrimination where we are not allowed to make an error. Since
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we concentrate on mixed states, we refer to [BHH04] for an excellent survey on
the extended field of state discrimination.
Regarding state discrimination with post-measurement information, special
instances of the general problem have occurred in the literature under the heading
“mean king’s problem” [AE01, KR05], where the stress was on the usefulness of
entanglement. Furthermore, it should be noted that prepare-and-measure quan-
tum key distribution schemes of the BB84 type also lead to special cases of this
problem: When considering optimal individual attacks, the eavesdropper is faced
with the task of extracting maximal information about the raw key bits, encoded
in an unknown basis, that she learns later during basis reconciliation.
Our result that one qubit of storage suffices for any Boolean function f demon-
strates that storing quantum information can give an adversary a great advantage
over storing merely classical information. It has also been shown in the context of
randomness extraction with respect to a quantum adversary that storing quantum
information can sometimes convey much more power to the adversary [GKK+06].
3.2 Preliminaries
3.2.1 Notation and tools
We need the following notions. The Bell basis is given by the vectors |Φ±〉 =
(|00〉 ± |11〉)/√2 and |Ψ±〉 = (|01〉 ± |10〉)/√2. Furthermore, let f−1(y) = {x ∈
X |f(x) = y}. We say that a function f is balanced if and only if any element in
the image of f is generated by equally many elements in the pre-image of f , i.e.
there exists a k ∈ N such that ∀y ∈ Y : |f−1(y)| = k.
3.2.2 Definitions
We now give a more formal description of our problem. Let Y and B be finite
sets and let PY B = {pyb} be a probability distribution over Y × B. Consider an
ensemble of quantum states E = {pyb, ρyb}. We assume that Y , B, E and PY B
are known to both Alice and Bob. Suppose now that Alice chooses yb ∈ Y × B
according to probability distribution PY B, and sends ρyb to Bob. We can then
define the tasks:
3.2.1. Definition. State discRimination (STAR(E)) is the following task for
Bob. Given ρyb, determine y. He can perform any measurement on ρyb immedi-
ately upon receipt.
3.2.2. Definition. State discRimination with Post-measurement Information
(PI q-STAR(E)) is the following task for Bob. Given ρyb, determine y, where
Bob can use the following sources of information in succession:
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1. First, he can perform any measurement on ρyb immediately upon reception.
Afterwards, he can store at most q qubits of quantum information about
ρyb, and an unlimited amount of classical information.
2. After Bob’s measurement, Alice announces b.
3. Then, he may perform any measurement on the remaining q qubits depend-
ing on b and the measurement outcome obtained in step 1.
We also say that Bob succeeds at STAR(E) or PIq-STAR(E) with probability p
if and only if p is the average success probability p =
∑
yb pyb Pr[Yˆ = y|state ρyb],
where Pr[Yˆ = y|state ρyb] is the probability that Bob correctly determines y given
ρyb in the case of STAR, and in addition using information sources 1, 2 and 3 in
the case of PI-STAR.
Here, we are interested in the following special case: Consider a function
f : X → Y between finite sets, and a set of mutually unbiased bases B as
defined in Chapter 2, generated by a set of unitaries U0, U1, . . . , U|B|−1 acting on
a Hilbert space with basis {|x〉 | x ∈ X}. Take |Φxb 〉 = Ub|x〉. Let PX and
PB be probability distributions over X and B respectively. We assume that f ,
X , Y , B, PX , PB, and the set of unitaries {Ub|b ∈ B} are known to both Alice
and Bob. Suppose now that Alice chooses x ∈ X and b ∈ B independently
according to probability distributions PX and PB respectively, and sends |Φxb 〉 to
Bob. Bob’s goal is now to compute y = f(x). We thus obtain an instance of
our problem with states ρyb =
∑
x∈f−1(y) PX(x)|Φxb 〉〈Φxb |. We write STAR(f) and
PIq-STAR(f) to denote both problems in this special case. We concentrate on
the case of mutually unbiased bases, as this case is most relevant to our initial
goal of analyzing protocols for quantum cryptography in the bounded storage
model [DFSS05].
Here, we make use of the basis set B = {+,×,}, where B+ = {|0〉, |1〉} is
the computational basis, B× = { 1√2(|0〉 + |1〉), 1√2(|0〉 − |1〉)} is the Hadamard
basis, and B = { 1√2(|0〉 + i|1〉), 1√2(|0〉 − i|1〉)} is what we call the K-basis.
The unitaries that give rise to these bases are U+ = I, U× = H and U = K
with K = (I + iσx)/
√
2 respectively. Recall from Chapter 2 that the Hadamard
matrix is given by H = 1√
2
(σx + σz), and that σx, σz and σy are the well-known
Pauli matrices. We generally assume that Bob has no a priori knowledge about
the outcome of the function and about the value of b. This means that b is
chosen uniformly at random from B, and, in the case of balanced functions, that
Alice chooses x uniformly at random from X . More generally, the distribution is
uniform on all f−1(y) and such that each value y ∈ Y is equally likely.
3.2.3 A trivial bound: guessing the basis
Note that a simple strategy for Bob is to guess the basis, and then measure. This
approach leads to a lower bound on the success probability for both STAR and
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PI-STAR. In short:
3.2.3. Lemma. Let PX(x) =
1
2n
for all x ∈ {0, 1}n. Let B denote the set of
bases. Then for any balanced function f : X → Y Bob succeeds at STAR(f) and
PI0-STAR(f) with probability at least
pguess =
1
|B| +
(
1− 1|B|
)
1
|Y| .
Our goal is to beat this bound. We show that for PI-STAR, Bob can indeed do
much better.
3.3 No post-measurement information
We first consider the standard case of state discrimination. Here, Alice does not
supply Bob with any additional post-measurement information. Instead, Bob’s
goal is to compute y = f(x) immediately. This analysis enables us to gain
interesting insights into the usefulness of post-measurement information later.
3.3.1 Two simple examples
We now examine two simple one-qubit examples of a state discrimination problem,
which we make use of later on. Here, Bob’s goal is to learn the value of a bit
which has been encoded in two or three mutually unbiased bases while he does
not know which basis has been used.
3.3.1. Lemma. Let x ∈ {0, 1}, PX(x) = 12 and f(x) = x. Let B = {+,×} with
U+ = I and U× = H. Then Bob succeeds at STAR(f) with probability at most
p =
1
2
+
1
2
√
2
.
There exists a strategy for Bob that achieves p.
Proof. The probability of success follows from Theorem 2.2.2 with ρ0 =
1
2
(|0〉〈0|+H|0〉〈0|H), ρ1 = 12(|1〉〈1|+H|1〉〈1|H) and q = 1/2. 2
3.3.2. Lemma. Let x ∈ {0, 1}, PX(x) = 12 and f(x) = x. Let B = {+,×,} with
U+ = I, U× = H and U = K. Then Bob succeeds at STAR(f) with probability
at most
p =
1
2
+
1
2
√
3
.
There exists a strategy for Bob that achieves p.
Proof. The proof is identical to that of Lemma 3.3.1 using ρ0 =
1
3
(|0〉〈0| +
H|0〉〈0|H +K|0〉〈0|K†), ρ1 = 13(|1〉〈1|+H|1〉〈1|H +K|1〉〈1|K†), and q = 1/2. 2
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3.3.2 An upper bound for all Boolean functions
We now show that for any Boolean function f and any number of mutually
unbiased bases, the probability that Bob succeeds at STAR(f) is very limited.
3.3.3. Theorem. Let |Y| = 2 and let f be a balanced function. Let B be a set of
mutually unbiased bases. Then Bob succeeds at STAR(f) with probability at most
p =
1
2
+
1
2
√|B| .
In particular, for |B| = 2 we obtain (1+ 1/√2)/2 ≈ 0.853; for |B| = 3, we obtain
(1 + 1/
√
3)/2 ≈ 0.789.
Proof. The probability of success is given by Theorem 2.2.2 where for y ∈ {0, 1}
ρy =
1
2n−1|B|
|B|−1∑
b=0
Pyb,
with Pyb =
∑
x∈f−1(y) Ub|x〉〈x|U †b . Using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality we can
show that
‖ρ0 − ρ1‖21 = [Tr(|ρ0 − ρ1|I)]2 ≤ Tr[(ρ0 − ρ1)2]Tr[I2] = 2nTr[(ρ0 − ρ1)2], (3.1)
or
‖ρ0 − ρ1‖1 ≤
√
2nTr[(ρ0 − ρ1)2].
A simple calculation shows that
Tr[(ρ0 − ρ1)2] = 4
2n|B| .
The theorem follows from the previous equation, together with Theorem 2.2.2
and Eq. (3.1). 2
3.3.3 AND function
One of the simplest functions to consider is the AND function. Recall, that we
always assume that Bob has no a priori knowledge about the outcome of the
function. In the case of the AND, this means that we are considering a very
specific prior: with probability 1/2 Alice will choose the only string x for which
AND(x) = 1. Without any post-measurement information, Bob can already
compute the AND quite well.
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3.3.4. Theorem. Let PX(x) = 1/(2(2
n − 1)) for all x ∈ {0, 1}n \ {1 . . . 1} and
PX(1 . . . 1) =
1
2
. Let B = {+,×} with U+ = I⊗n, U× = H⊗n and PB(+) =
PB(×) = 1/2. Then Bob succeeds at STAR(AND) with probability at most
p =
{
1
2
+ 1
2
√
2
if n = 1,
1− 1
2(2n−1) if n ≥ 2.
(3.2)
There exists a strategy for Bob that achieves p.
Proof. Let |c1〉 = |1〉⊗n and |h1〉 = [H|1〉]⊗n. Eq. (3.2) is obtained by substi-
tuting
ρ0 =
1
2
[
I− |c1〉〈c1|
2n − 1 +
I− |h1〉〈h1|
2n − 1
]
,
ρ1 =
|c1〉〈c1|+ |h1〉〈h1|
2
,
and q = 1/2 in Theorem 2.2.2. 2
In Theorem 3.4.3, we show an optimal bound for the case that Bob does
indeed receive the extra information. By comparing the previous equation with
Eq. (3.4) later on, we can see that for n = 1 announcing the basis does not help.
However, for n > 1 we will observe an improvement of [2(2n + 2n/2 − 2)]−1.
3.3.4 XOR function
The XOR function provides an example of a Boolean function where we observe
both the largest advantage as well as the smallest advantage in receiving post-
measurement information: For strings of even length we show that without the
extra information Bob can never do better than guessing the basis. For strings
of odd length, however, he can do quite a bit better. Interestingly, it turns out
that in this case the post-measurement information is completely useless to him.
We first investigate how well Bob does at STAR(XOR) for two bases:
3.3.5. Theorem. Let PX(x) =
1
2n
for all x ∈ {0, 1}n. Let B = {+,×} with
U+ = I⊗n, U× = H⊗n and PB(+) = PB(×) = 1/2. Then Bob succeeds at
STAR(XOR) with probability at most
p =
{
3
4
if n is even,
1
2
(
1 + 1√
2
)
if n is odd.
There exists a strategy for Bob that achieves p.
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Proof. Our proof works by induction on n. The case of n = 1 was addressed in
Lemma 3.3.1. Now, consider n = 2: Let σ
(2)
0 =
1
2
(ρ
(2)
0+ + ρ
(2)
0×) and σ
(2)
1 =
1
2
(ρ
(2)
1+ +
ρ
(2)
1×), where ρ
(2)
0+ and ρ
(2)
1+ are defined as ρ
(n)
yb =
1
2n−1
∑
x∈{0,1}n,x∈XOR−1(y) Ub|x〉〈x|U †b
with y ∈ {0, 1} and b ∈ B = {+,×}. A straightforward calculation shows that
‖σ(2)0 − σ(2)1 ‖1 = 1.
We now show that the trace distance does not change when we go from strings
of length n to strings of length n+ 2: Note that we can write
ρ
(n+2)
0+ =
1
2
(ρ
(n)
0+ ⊗ ρ(2)0+ + ρ(n)1+ ⊗ ρ(2)1+)
ρ
(n+2)
0× =
1
2
(ρ
(n)
0× ⊗ ρ(2)0× + ρ(n)1× ⊗ ρ(2)1×)
ρ
(n+2)
1+ =
1
2
(ρ
(n)
0+ ⊗ ρ(2)1+ + ρ(n)1+ ⊗ ρ(2)0+)
ρ
(n+2)
1× =
1
2
(ρ
(n)
0× ⊗ ρ(1)1× + ρ(n)1× ⊗ ρ(2)0×).
(3.3)
Let σ
(n)
0 =
1
2
(ρ
(n)
0+ + ρ
(n)
0× ) and σ
(n)
1 =
1
2
(ρ
(n)
1+ + ρ
(n)
1× ). A small calculation shows that
σ
(n+2)
0 − σ(n+2)1 =
1
8
[
(ρ
(n)
0+ + ρ
(n)
0× − ρ(n)1+ − ρ(n)1× )⊗ |Φ+〉〈Φ+|
− (ρ(n)0+ + ρ(n)0× − ρ(n)1+ − ρ(n)1× )⊗ |Ψ−〉〈Ψ−|
+ (ρ
(n)
0+ + ρ
(n)
1× − ρ(n)1+ − ρ(n)0× )⊗ |Φ−〉〈Φ−|
− (ρ(n)0+ + ρ(n)1× − ρ(n)1+ − ρ(n)0× )⊗ |Ψ+〉〈Ψ+|
]
We then get that
‖σ(n+2)0 − σ(n+2)1 ‖1 =
1
2
(
‖σ(n)0 − σ(n)1 ‖1 + ‖σ˜(n)0 − σ˜(n)1 ‖1
)
,
where σ˜
(n)
0 =
1
2
(ρ
(n)
0++ρ
(n)
1× ) and σ˜
(n)
1 =
1
2
(ρ
(n)
1++ρ
(n)
0× ). Consider the unitary U = σ
⊗n
x
if n is odd, and U = σ⊗n−1x ⊗I if n is even. It is easy to verify that σ(n)0 = Uσ˜(n)0 U †
and σ
(n)
1 = Uσ˜
(n)
1 U
†. We thus have that ‖σ(n)0 − σ(n)1 ‖1 = ‖σ˜(n)0 − σ˜(n)1 ‖1 and
therefore
‖σ(n+2)0 − σ(n+2)1 ‖1 = ‖σ(n)0 − σ(n)1 ‖1.
It then follows from Helstrom’s Theorem 2.2.2 that the maximum probability
to distinguish σ
(n+2)
0 from σ
(n+2)
1 and thus compute the XOR of the n+ 2 bits is
given by
1
2
+
‖σ(n)0 − σ(n)1 ‖1
4
,
which gives the claimed result. 2
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A similar argument is possible, if we use three mutually unbiased bases. Intu-
itively, one might expect Bob’s chance of success to drop as we had more bases.
Interestingly, however, we obtain the same bound of 3/4 if n is even.
3.3.6. Theorem. Let PX(x) =
1
2n
for all x ∈ {0, 1}n. Let B = {+,×,} with
U+ = I⊗n, U× = H⊗n, and U = K⊗n with PB(+) = PB(×) = PB() = 1/3.
Then Bob succeeds at STAR(XOR) with probability at most
p =
{
3
4
if n is even,
1
2
(
1 + 1√
3
)
if n is odd.
There exists a strategy for Bob that achieves p.
Proof. Our proof is very similar to the case of only 2 mutually unbiased
bases. The case of n = 1 follows from Lemma 3.3.2. This time, we have for
n = 2: σ
(2)
0 =
1
3
(ρ
(2)
0+ + ρ
(2)
0× + ρ
(2)
0) and σ
(2)
1 =
1
3
(ρ
(2)
1+ + ρ
(2)
1× + ρ
(2)
1). We have
‖σ(2)0 − σ(2)1 ‖1 = 1.
We again show that the trace distance does not change when we go from
strings of length n to strings of length n + 2. We use the definitions from Eq.
(3.3) and let
ρ
(n+2)
0 =
1
2
(ρ
(n)
0 ⊗ ρ(2)0 + ρ(n)1 ⊗ ρ(2)1),
ρ
(n+2)
1 =
1
2
(ρ
(n)
0 ⊗ ρ(2)1 + ρ(n)1 ⊗ ρ(2)0).
We can compute
σ
(n+2)
0 − σ(n+2)1 =
1
4
[
(σ¯
(n)
1 − σ¯(n)0 )⊗ |Φ+〉〈Φ+|
− (σˆ(n)1 − σˆ(n)0 )⊗ |Ψ−〉〈Ψ−|
+ (σ˜
(n)
1 − σ˜(n)0 )⊗ |Φ−〉〈Φ−|
− (σ(n)1 − σ(n)0 )⊗ |Ψ+〉〈Ψ+|
]
,
where σ¯
(n)
1 = (ρ
(n)
0+ + ρ
(n)
0× + ρ
(n)
1 )/3, σ¯
(n)
0 = (ρ
(n)
1+ + ρ
(n)
1× + ρ
(n)
0 )/3, σˆ
(n)
1 = (ρ
(n)
0+ +
ρ
(n)
1× + ρ
(n)
0 )/3, σˆ
(n)
0 = (ρ
(n)
1+ + ρ
(n)
0× + ρ
(n)
1 )/3, σ˜
(n)
0 = (ρ
(n)
1+ + ρ
(n)
0× + ρ
(n)
0 )/3, and
σ˜
(n)
0 = (ρ
(n)
0+ + ρ
(n)
1× + ρ
(n)
1 )/3. Consider the unitaries U¯ = σ
⊗n
y , Uˆ = σ
⊗n
x , and
U˜ = σ⊗nz if n is odd, and U¯ = σ
⊗n−1
y ⊗ I, Uˆ = σ⊗n−1x ⊗ I, and U˜ = σ⊗n−1z ⊗ I if n
is even. It is easily verified that σ
(n)
0 = U¯ σ¯
(n)
0 U¯
†, σ(n)1 = U¯ σ¯
(n)
1 U¯
†, σ(n)0 = Uˆ σˆ
(n)
0 Uˆ
†,
σ
(n)
1 = Uˆ σˆ
(n)
1 Uˆ
†, σ(n)0 = U˜ σ˜
(n)
0 U˜
†, and σ(n)1 = U˜ σ˜
(n)
1 U˜
†. We then get that
‖σ(n+2)0 − σ(n+2)1 ‖1 = ‖σ(n)0 − σ(n)1 ‖1,
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from which the claim follows. 2
Surprisingly, if Bob does have some a priori knowledge about the outcome of
the XOR the problem becomes much harder for Bob. By expressing the states in
the Bell basis and using Helstrom’s result, it is easy to see that if Alice chooses
x ∈ {0, 1}2 such that with probability q, XOR(x) = 0, and with probability
(1−q), XOR(x) = 1, Bob’s probability of learning XOR(x) correctly is minimized
for q = 1/3. In that case, Bob succeeds with probability at most 2/3, which can
be achieved by the trivial strategy of ignoring the state he received and always
outputting 1. This is an explicit example where making a measurement does not
help in state discrimination. It has previously been noted by Hunter [Hun03] that
such cases can exist in mixed-state discrimination.
3.4 Using post-measurement information
We are now ready to advance to the core of our problem. We first consider
the case where Bob does receive post-measurement information, but still has
no quantum memory at his disposal. Consider an instance of PI0-STAR with a
function f : X → Y and m = |B| bases, and some priors PX and PB on the sets X
and B. If Bob cannot store any quantum information, all his nontrivial actions are
contained in the first measurement, which must equip him with possible outputs
oi ∈ Y for each basis i = 1, . . . ,m. In other words, his most general strategy is a
POVM with |Y|m outcomes, each labeled by the strings o1, . . . , om for oi ∈ Y and
m = |B|. Once Alice has announced b, Bob outputs Yˆ = ob. Here we first prove
a general lower bound on the usefulness of post-measurement information that
beats the guessing bound. Then, we analyze in detail the AND and the XOR
function on n bits.
3.4.1 A lower bound for balanced functions
We first give a lower bound on Bob’s success probability for any balanced function
and any number of mutually unbiased bases, by constructing an explicit measure-
ment that achieves it. Without loss of generality, we assume in this section that
B = {0, . . . ,m−1}, as otherwise we could consider a lexicographic ordering of B.
3.4.1. Theorem. Let f : X → Y be a balanced function, and let PX and PB
be the uniform distributions over X and B respectively. Let the set of unitaries
{Ub|b ∈ B} give rise to |B| mutually unbiased bases, and choose an encoding
such that ∀x, x′ ∈ X : 〈x|x′〉 = δxx′. Then Bob succeeds at PI0-STAR(f) with
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probability at least
p = pguess +

|Y|−1
|Y|(|Y|+3) if m = 2,
4(|Y|2−1)
3|Y|(2+|Y|(|Y|+6)) if m = 3,
− 2
2|Y| +
2(|Y|+m−1)
|Y|2+3|Y|(m−1)+m2−3m+2 if m ≥ 4.
where pguess is the probability that Bob can achieve by guessing the basis as given
in Lemma 3.2.3. In particular, we always have p > pguess.
Proof. Our proof works by constructing a square-root type measurement that
achieves the lower bound. As explained above, Bob’s strategy for learning f(x)
is to perform a measurement with |Y|m possible outcomes, labeled by the strings
o1, . . . , om for oi ∈ Y and m = |B|. Once Alice has announced b, Bob outputs
f(x) = ob.
Take the projector Pyb =
∑
x∈f−1(y) |Φxb 〉〈Φxb | and ρyb = 1kPyb, where k =
|f−1(y)| = |X |/|Y|. LetMo1,...,om denote the measurement operator corresponding
to outcome o1, . . . , om. Note that outcome o1, . . . , om is the correct outcome for
input state ρyb if and only if ob = y. We can then write Bob’s probability of
success as
1
m|Y|
∑
o1,...,om∈Y
Tr
(
Mo1,...,om
(∑
b∈B
ρobb
))
.
We make use of the following measurement:
Mo1,...,om = S
− 1
2
(∑
b∈B
Pobb
)3
S−
1
2 , with S =
∑
o1,...,om∈Y
(∑
b∈B
Pobb
)3
.
Clearly, we have
∑
o1,...,om∈YMo1,...,om = I and ∀o1, . . . , om ∈ Y : Mo1,...,om ≥ 0 by
construction and thus we indeed have a valid measurement. We first show that
S = cmI:
S =
∑
o1,...,om∈Y
(∑
b∈B
Pobb
)3
=
∑
o1,...,om∈Y
∑
b,b′,b′′∈B
PobbPob′b′Pob′′b′′
=
∑
o1,...,om∈Y
(∑
b
Pobb + 2
∑
bb′,b6=b′
PobbPob′b′
+
∑
bb′,b6=b′
PobbPob′b′Pobb +
∑
bb′b′′,b6=b′,b6=b′′,b′ 6=b′′
PobbPob′b′Pob′′b′′
)
=
[
m|Y|m−1 + 2m(m− 1)|Y|m−2 +m(m− 1)|Y|m−2 +m(m− 1)(m− 2)|Y|m−3δ¯2m
]
I,
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where δ¯2m = 1−δ2m and we have used the definition that for any b, Pobb is a projec-
tor and
∑
x∈X |Φxb 〉〈Φxb | = I which gives
∑
oi∈Y Poibi =
∑
oi∈Y
∑
x∈f−1(y) |Φxb 〉〈Φxb | =
I. We can then write Bob’s probability of success using this particular measure-
ment as
1
cmkm|Y|
∑
o1,...,om∈Y
Tr
(∑
b∈B
Pobb
)4 .
It remains to evaluate this expression. Using the circularity of the trace, we
obtain∑
o1,...,om∈Y
Tr
(∑
b∈B
Pobb
)4
=
∑
o1,...,om∈Y
Tr
(∑
b
Pobb + 6
∑
bb′,b6=b′
PobbPob′b′
+ 4
∑
bb′b′′,b6=b′,b6=b′′,b′ 6=b′′
PobbPob′b′Pob′′b′′ + 2
∑
bb′b′′,b6=b′,b6=b′′,b′ 6=b′′
PobbPob′b′PobbPob′′b′′
+
∑
bb′b′′b˜,b6=b′,b6=b′′,b6=b˜,b′ 6=b′′,b′ 6=b˜,b′′ 6=b˜
PobbPob′b′Pob′′b′′Pob˜b˜
+
∑
bb′,b6=b′
PobbPob′b′PobbPob′b′

≥ [m|Y|m−1 + 6m(m− 1)|Y|m−2 + 6m(m− 1)(m− 2)|Y|m−3δ¯2m
+m(m− 1)(m− 2)(m− 3)|Y|t(m−4)δ¯2mδ¯3m
]
Tr(I) +m(m− 1)|Y|m−2k,
where we have again used the assumption that for any b, Pobb is a projector
and
∑
x∈X |Φxb 〉〈Φxb | = I with Tr(I) = |X |. For the last term we have used
the following: Note that Tr(PobbPob′b′) = k
2/|X |, because we assumed mutually
unbiased bases. Let r = rank(PobbPob′b′). Using Cauchy-Schwarz, we can then
bound Tr((PobbPob′b′)
2) =
∑r
i λi(PobbPob′b′)
2 ≥ k4/(|X |2r) ≥ k3/|X |2 = k/|Y|2,
where λi(A) is the i-th eigenvalue of a matrix A, by noting that r ≤ k since
rank(Pobb) = rank(Po′bb′) = k. Putting things together we obtain
p ≥ 1
cmm
[
Gm(1) +
(
6 +
1
|Y|
)
Gm(2) + 6Gm(3) +Gm(4)
]
,
where m = |B|, cm = Gm(1)+3Gm(2)+Gm(3) and function Gm : N→ N defined
as Gm(i) =
m!
(m−i)! |Y|m−i
∏i−1
j=2 δ¯mj. This expression can be simplified to obtain the
claimed result. 2
Note that we have only used the assumption that Alice uses mutually unbi-
ased bases in the very last step to say that Tr(PobbPob′b′) = k
2/|X |. One could
generalize our argument to other cases by evaluating Tr(PobbPob′b′) approximately.
In the special case m = |Y| = 2 (i.e. binary function, with two bases) we
obtain:
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3.4.2. Corollary. Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a balanced function and let
PX(x) = 2
−n for all x ∈ {0, 1}n. Let B = {0, 1} with U0 = I⊗n, U1 = H⊗n
and PB(0) = PB(1) = 1/2. Then Bob succeeds at PI0-STAR(f) with probability
p ≥ 0.85.
Observe that this almost attains the upper bound of ≈ .853 of Lemma 3.3.1 in
the case of no post-measurement information. In Section 3.5.2 we show that
indeed this bound can always be achieved when post-measurement information
is available.
It is perhaps interesting to note that our general bound depends only on the
number of function values |Y| and the number of basesm. The number of function
inputs |X | itself does not play a direct role.
3.4.2 Optimal bounds for the AND and XOR function
We now show that for some specific functions, the probability of success can even
be much larger. We hereby concentrate on the case where Alice uses two or three
mutually unbiased bases to encode her input. Our proofs thereby lead to explicit
measurements. In the following, we again assume that Bob has no a priori knowl-
edge of the function value. It turns out that the optimal measurement directly
lead us to the essential idea underlying our algebraic framework of Section 3.5.1.
AND function
3.4.3. Theorem. Let PX(x) = 1/(2(2
n − 1)) for all x ∈ {0, 1}n \ {1 . . . 1} and
PX(1 . . . 1) =
1
2
. Let B = {+,×} with U+ = I⊗n, U× = H⊗n and PB(+) =
PB(×) = 1/2. Then Bob succeeds at PI0-STAR(AND) with probability at most
p =
1
2
[
2 +
1
2n + 2n/2 − 2 −
1
2n − 1
]
. (3.4)
There exists a strategy for Bob that achieves p.
Proof. To learn the value of AND(x), Bob uses the same strategy as in
Section 3.4.1: he performs a measurement with 4 possible outcomes, labeled by
the strings o+, o× with o+, o× ∈ {0, 1}. Once Alice has announced her basis choice
b ∈ {+,×}, Bob outputs AND(x) = ob. Note that without loss of generality we
can assume that Bob’s measurement has only 4 outcomes, i.e. Bob only stores
2 bits of classical information because he will only condition his answer on the
value of b later on.
Following the approach in the last section, we can write Bob’s optimal prob-
ability of success as a semidefinite program:
maximize 1
4
∑
o+,o×∈{0,1}Tr[bo+o×Mo+o× ]
subject to ∀o+, o× ∈ {0, 1} :Mo+o× ≥ 0,∑
o+,o×∈{0,1}Mo+o× = I,
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where
b00 = ρ0+ + ρ0×, b01 = ρ0+ + ρ1×,
b10 = ρ1+ + ρ0×, b11 = ρ1+ + ρ1×,
with ∀y ∈ {0, 1}, b ∈ {+,×} : ρyb = 1|AND−1(y)|
∑
x∈AND−1(y) Ub|x〉〈x|U †B. Consider
H2, the 2-dimensional Hilbert space spanned by |c1〉 def= |1〉⊗n and |h1〉 def= |1×〉⊗n.
Let |c0〉 ∈ H2 and |h0〉 ∈ H2 be the state vectors orthogonal to |c1〉 and |h1〉
respectively. They can be expressed as:
|co〉 = (−1)
n+1|c1〉+ 2n/2|h1〉√
2n − 1 ,
|ho〉 = 2
n/2|c1〉+ (−1)n+1|h1〉√
2n − 1 .
Then Π‖ = |c0〉〈c0|+ |c1〉〈c1| = |h0〉〈h0|+ |h1〉〈h1| is a projector onto H2. Let Π⊥
be a projector onto the orthogonal complement of H2. Note that the bo+o× are
all composed of two blocks, one supported on H2 and the other on its orthogonal
complement. We can thus write
b00 =
2Π⊥
2n − 1 +
|c0〉〈c0|+ |h0〉〈h0|
2n − 1 ,
b01 =
Π⊥
2n − 1 +
[ |c0〉〈c0|
2n − 1 + |h1〉〈h1|
]
,
b10 =
Π⊥
2n − 1 +
[ |h0〉〈h0|
2n − 1 + |c1〉〈c1|
]
,
b11 = 0 +|c1〉〈c1|+ |h1〉〈h1|.
(3.5)
We give an explicit measurement that achieves p and then show that it is optimal.
Take
M00 = Π⊥
Mo+o× = λo+o×|ψo+o×〉〈ψo+o×|,
with λ01 = λ10 = (1 + η)
−1 where
η =
∣∣∣∣1−2β2+(−1)n+12β√1−β2√2n−12n/2 ∣∣∣∣ ,
|ψ01〉 = α|c0〉+ β|c1〉,
|ψ10〉 = α|h0〉+ β|h1〉,
with α and β real and satisfying α2+β2 = 1. We also set M11 = I−M00−M01−
M10. We take
β = (−1)n 1√
22n + 2
3
2
n+1 − 2n2+1
.
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Putting it all together, we thus calculate Bob’s probability of success:
p =
1
2
[
2 +
1
2n + 2n/2 − 2 −
1
2n − 1
]
.
We now show that this is in fact the optimal measurement for Bob. For this
we consider the dual of our semidefinite program above:
minimize Tr(Q)
subject to ∀o+, o× ∈ {0, 1} : Q ≥ bo+o×
4
.
Our goal is now to find a Q such that p = Tr(Q) and Q is dual feasible. We can
then conclude from the duality of SDP that p is optimal. Consider
Q = Π⊥
2(2n−1) +
1
4
(
2−21+n/2+23n/2
2−3·2n/2+23n/2
)
(|c1〉〈c1|+ |h1〉〈h1|)
−(−1)n 1
4(21−
n
2 +2n−3)(|c1〉〈h1|+ |c1〉〈h1|).
Now we only need to show that theQ above satisfies the constraints, i.e. ∀o+, o× ∈
{0, 1} : Q ≥ bo+o×/4. Let Q⊥ = Π⊥QΠ⊥ and Q‖ = Π‖QΠ‖. By taking a look at
Eq. (3.5) one can easily see that Q⊥ ≥ Π⊥bo+o×Π⊥4 , so that it is only left to show
that
Q‖ ≥
Π‖bo+o×Π‖
4
, for o+o× ∈ {0, 1}, o+o× 6= 00.
These are 2 × 2 matrices and this can be done straightforwardly. We thus have
Tr(Q) = p and the result follows from the duality of semidefinite programming.
2
It also follows that if Bob just wants to learn the value of a single bit, he can do
no better than what he could achieve without waiting for Alice’s announcement
of the basis b:
3.4.4. Corollary. Let x ∈ {0, 1}, PX(x) = 12 and f(x) = x. Let B = {+,×}
with U+ = I and U× = H. Then Bob succeeds at PI0-STAR(f) with probability
at most
p =
1
2
+
1
2
√
2
.
There exists a strategy for Bob that achieves p.
The AND function provides an intuitive example of how Bob can compute
the value of a function perfectly by storing just a single qubit. Consider the
measurement with elements {Π‖,Π⊥} from the previous section. It is easy to see
that the outcome ⊥ has zero probability if AND(x) = 1. Thus, if Bob obtains that
outcome he can immediately conclude that AND(x) = 0. If Bob obtains outcome
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‖ then the post-measurement states live in a 2-dimensional Hilbert space (H2),
and can therefore be stored in a single qubit. Thus, by keeping the remaining
state we can calculate the AND perfectly once the basis is announced. Our proof
in Section 3.5.2, which shows that in fact all Boolean functions can be computed
perfectly if Bob can store only a single qubit, makes use of a very similar effect
to the one we observed here explicitly.
XOR function
We now examine the XOR function. This will be useful in order to gain some
insight into the usefulness of post-measurement information later. For strings
of even length, there exists a simple strategy for Bob even when three mutually
unbiased bases are used.
3.4.5. Theorem. Let n ∈ N be even, and let PX(x) = 12n for all x ∈ {0, 1}n.
Let B = {+,×,} with U+ = I⊗n, U× = H⊗n and U = K⊗n, where K =
(I + iσx)/
√
2. Then there is a strategy where Bob succeeds at PI0-STAR(XOR)
with probability p = 1.
Proof. We first construct Bob’s measurement for the first 2 qubits, which allows
him to learn x1 ⊕ x2 with probability 1. Note that the 12 possible states that
Alice sends can be expressed in the Bell basis as follows:
|00〉 = 1√
2
(|Φ+〉+ |Φ−〉) H⊗2|00〉 = 1√
2
(|Φ+〉+ |Ψ+〉)
|01〉 = 1√
2
(|Ψ+〉+ |Ψ−〉) H⊗2|01〉 = 1√
2
(|Φ−〉+ |Ψ−〉)
|10〉 = 1√
2
(|Ψ+〉 − |Ψ−〉) H⊗2|10〉 = 1√
2
(|Φ−〉 − |Ψ−〉)
|11〉 = 1√
2
(|Φ+〉 − |Φ−〉) H⊗2|11〉 = 1√
2
(|Φ+〉 − |Ψ+〉)
K⊗2|00〉 = 1√
2
(|Φ−〉+ i|Ψ+〉)
K⊗2|01〉 = 1√
2
(i|Φ+〉+ |Ψ−〉)
K⊗2|10〉 = 1√
2
(i|Φ+〉 − |Ψ−〉)
K⊗2|11〉 = − 1√
2
(|Φ−〉 − i|Ψ+〉).
Bob now simply measures in the Bell basis and records his outcome. If Alice now
announces that she used the computational basis, Bob concludes that x1⊕x2 = 0
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if the outcome is one of |Φ±〉 and x1 ⊕ x2 = 1 otherwise. If Alice announces she
used the Hadamard basis, Bob concludes that x1 ⊕ x2 = 0 if the outcome was
one of {|Φ+〉, |Ψ+〉} and x1 ⊕ x2 = 1 otherwise. Finally, if Alice announces that
she used the  basis, Bob concludes that x1 ⊕ x2 = 0 if the outcome was one
of {|Φ−〉, |Ψ+〉} and x1 ⊕ x2 = 1 otherwise. Bob can thus learn the XOR of two
bits with probability 1. To learn the XOR of the entire string, Bob applies this
strategy to each two bits individually and then computes the XOR of all answers.
2
Analogously to the proof of Theorem 3.4.5, we obtain:
3.4.6. Corollary. Let n ∈ N be even, and let PX(x) = 12n for all x ∈ {0, 1}n.
Let B = {+,×} with U+ = I⊗n and U× = H⊗n. Then there is a strategy where
Bob succeeds at PI0-STAR(XOR) with probability p = 1.
Interestingly, there is no equivalent strategy for Bob if n is odd. In fact, as
we show in the next section, in this case the post-measurement information gives
no advantage to Bob at all.
3.4.7. Theorem. Let n ∈ N be odd, and let PX(x) = 12n for all x ∈ {0, 1}n. LetB = {+,×} with U+ = I⊗n, U× = H⊗n and PB(+) = PB(×) = 1/2. Then Bob
succeeds at PI0-STAR(XOR) with probability at most
p =
1
2
(
1 +
1√
2
)
.
There exists a strategy for Bob that achieves p.
Proof. Similar to the proof of the AND function, we can write Bob’s optimal
probability of success as the following semidefinite program in terms of the length
of the input string, n:
maximize 1
4
∑
o+,o×∈{0,1}Tr[b
(n)
o+o×Mo+o× ]
subject to ∀o+, o× ∈ {0, 1} :Mo+o× ≥ 0,∑
o+,o×∈{0,1}Mo+o× = I,
where
b(n)o+o× = ρ
(n)
o++ + ρ
(n)
o××,
and ρ
(n)
obb
= 1
2n−1
∑
x∈{0,1}n,x∈XOR−1(ob) Ub|x〉〈x|U
†
b . The dual can be written as
minimize 1
4
Tr(Q(n))
subject to ∀o+, o× ∈ {0, 1} : Q(n) ≥ b(n)o+o× .
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Our proof is now by induction on n. For n = 1, let Q(1) = 2pI. It is easy to
verify that ∀o+, o× ∈ {0, 1} : Q(1) ≥ b(1)o+o× and thus Q(1) is a feasible solution of
the dual program.
We now show that for n + 2, Q(n+2) = Q(n) ⊗ 1
4
I is a feasible solution to the
dual for n+ 2, where Q(n) is a solution for the dual for n. Note that the XOR of
all bits in the string can be expressed as the XOR of the first n− 2 bits XORed
with the XOR of the last two. Recall Eq. (3.3) and note that we can write
ρ
(2)
0+ =
1
2
(|00〉〈00|+ |11〉〈11|) = 1
2
(|Φ+〉〈Φ+|+ |Φ−〉〈Φ−|)
ρ
(2)
1+ =
1
2
(|01〉〈01|+ |10〉〈10|) = 1
2
(|Ψ+〉〈Ψ+|+ |Ψ−〉〈Ψ−|).
It is easy to see that ρ
(2)
0× = Hρ
(2)
0+H =
1
2
(|Φ+〉〈Φ+| + |Ψ+〉〈Ψ+|) and ρ(2)1× =
Hρ
(2)
1+H =
1
2
(|Φ−〉〈Φ−|+ |Ψ−〉〈Ψ−|). By substituting from the above equation we
then obtain
b
(n+2)
00 = ρ
(n+2)
0+ + ρ
(n+2)
0× =
1
4
(
(ρ
(n)
0+ + ρ
(n)
0× )⊗ |Φ+〉〈Φ+|+ (ρ(n)0+ + ρ(n)1× )⊗ |Φ−〉〈Φ−|
(ρ
(n)
1+ + ρ
(n)
0× )⊗ |Ψ+〉〈Ψ+|+ (ρ(n)1+ + ρ(n)1× )⊗ |Ψ−〉〈Ψ−|)
)
≤ 1
4
Q(n) ⊗ I,
where we have used the fact that Q(n) is a feasible solution for the dual for n and
that |Φ+〉〈Φ+|+ |Φ−〉〈Φ−|+ |Ψ+〉〈Ψ+|+ |Ψ−〉〈Ψ−| = I. The argument for b(n+2)01 ,
b
(n+2)
10 and b
(n+2)
11 is analogous. Thus Q
(n+2) satisfies all constraints.
Putting things together, we have for odd n that Tr(Q(n+2)) = Tr(Q(n)) =
Tr(Q(1)) and since the dual is a minimization problem we know that
p ≤ 1
4
Tr(Q(1)) = c
as claimed. Clearly, there exists a strategy for Bob that achieves p = c. He can
compute the XOR of the first n−1 bits perfectly, as shown in Theorem 3.4.6. By
Corollary 3.4.4 he can learn the value of the remaining n-th bit with probability
p = c. 2
We obtain a similar bound for three bases:
3.4.8. Theorem. Let n ∈ N be odd, and let PX(x) = 12n for all x ∈ {0, 1}n.
Let B = {+,×,} with U+ = I⊗n, U× = H⊗n and U = K⊗n, where K =
(I + iσx)/
√
2, with PB(+) = PB(×) = PB() = 1/3. Then Bob succeeds at
PI0-STAR(XOR) with probability at most
p =
1
2
(
1 +
1√
3
)
.
There exists a strategy for Bob that achieves p.
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Proof. The proof follows the same lines as Theorem 3.4.7. Bob’s optimal
probability of success is:
maximize
1
6
∑
o+,o×,o∈{0,1}
Tr[b(n)o+o×oMo+o×o ]
subject to ∀o+, o×, o ∈ {0, 1} ∈ {0, 1} :Mo+o×o ≥ 0,∑
o+,o×,o∈{0,1}
Mo+o×o = I,
where
b(n)o+o×o =
∑
b∈B
ρobb,
and
ρobb =
1
2n−1
∑
x∈XOR(ob)
Ub|x〉〈x|U †b .
The dual can be written as
minimize 1
6
Tr(Q(n))
subject to ∀o+, o×, o ∈ {0, 1} : Q(n) ≥ b(n)o+o×o .
Again, the proof continues by induction on n. For n = 1, let Q(1) = 3pI. It is
easy to verify that ∀o+, o×, o ∈ {0, 1} : Q(1) ≥ b(1)o+o×o and thus Q(1) is a feasible
solution of the dual program. The rest of the proof is done exactly in the same
way as in Theorem 3.4.7 using that
ρ
(2)
0 =
1
2
(|Φ−〉〈Φ−|+ |Ψ+〉〈Ψ+|)
ρ
(2)
1 =
1
2
(|Ψ−〉〈Ψ−|+ |Φ+〉〈Φ+|).
2
3.5 Using post-measurement information
and quantum memory
3.5.1 An algebraic framework for perfect prediction
So far, we had assumed that Bob is not allowed to store any qubits and can only
use the additional post-measurement information to improve his guess. Now, we
investigate the case where he has a certain amount of quantum memory at his
disposal. In particular, we present a general algebraic approach to determine the
minimum dimension 2q of quantum memory needed to succeed with probability
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1 at an instance of PIq-STAR(E), for any ensemble E = {pyb, ρyb} as long as the
individual states for different values of y are mutually orthogonal for a fixed b,
i.e., ∀y 6= z ∈ Y Tr(ρyb, ρzb) = 0. In particular, we are looking for an instrument
consisting of a family of completely positive maps ρ 7→ AρA†, adding up to
a trace preserving map, such that rank(A) ≤ 2q. This ensures that the post-
measurement state “fits” into q qubits, and thus takes care of the memory bound.
The fact that after the announcement of b the remaining state AρybA
† gives full
information about y is expressed by demanding orthogonality of the different
post-measurement states:
∀b ∈ B,∀y 6= z ∈ Y AρybA†AρzbA† = 0. (3.6)
Note that here we explicitly allow the possibility that, say, AρzbA
† = 0: this
means that if Bob obtains outcome A and later learns b, he can exclude the
output value z. What Eq. (3.6) also implies is that for all states |ψ〉 and |ϕ〉 in
the support of ρyb and ρzb, respectively, one has A|ψ〉〈ψ|A†A|ϕ〉〈ϕ|A† = 0. Hence,
introducing the support projectors Pyb of the ρyb, we can reformulate Eq. (3.6) as
∀b ∈ B,∀y 6= z ∈ Y APybA†APzbA† = 0,
which can equivalently be expressed as
∀b ∈ B,∀y 6= z ∈ Y Tr(A†APybA†APzb) = 0, (3.7)
by noting that A†A as well as the projectors are positive-semidefinite operators.
As expected, we see that only the POVM operators M = A†A of the instrument
play a role in this condition. Our conditions can therefore also be written as
MPybMPzb = 0. From this condition, we now derive the following lemma.
3.5.1. Lemma. Bob, using a POVM with operators {Mi}, succeeds at PIq-STAR
with probability 1, if and only if
1. for all i, rank(Mi) ≤ 2q,
2. for all y ∈ Y and b ∈ B, [M,Pyb] = 0, where Pyb is the projection on the
support of ρyb.
Proof. We first show that these two conditions are necessary. Note that only
the commutation condition has to be proved. Let M be a measurement operator
from a POVM succeeding with probability 1. Then, for any y, b, we have by
Eq. (3.7) that
Tr
(
MPybM(I− Pyb)
)
= 0, hence Tr
(
MPybMPyb
)
= Tr
(
MPybM
)
.
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Thus, by the positivity of the trace on positive operators, the cyclicity of the
trace, and P 2yb = Pyb we have that
0 ≤ Tr([M,Pyb]†[M,Pyb])
= Tr
(−(MPyb − PybM)2)
= Tr
(−MPybMPyb − PybMPybM + PybM2Pyb +MP 2ybM) = 0.
But that means that the commutator [M,Pyb] has to be 0.
Sufficiency is easy: since the measurement operators commute with the states’
support projectors Pyb, and these are orthogonal to each other for fixed b, the
post-measurement states of these projectors, ∝ √MPyb
√
M are also mutually
orthogonal for fixed b. Thus, if Bob learns b, he can perform a measurement to
distinguish the different values of y perfectly. The post-measurement states are
clearly supported on the support of M , which can be stored in q qubits. Since
Bob’s strategy succeeds with probability 1, it succeeds with probability 1 for any
states supported in the range of the Pyb. 2
Note that the operators M of the instrument need not commute with the
originally given states ρyb. Nevertheless, the measurement preserves the orthogo-
nality of ρyb and ρzb with y 6= z for fixed b, i.e., Tr(ρybρzb) = 0. Now that we know
that the POVM operators of the instrument have to commute with all the states’
support projectors Pyb, we can invoke some well-developed algebraic machinery
to find the optimal such instrument.
Looking at Appendix B, we see that M has to come from the commutant
of the operators Pyb. These themselves generate a ∗-subalgebra A of the full
operator algebra B(H) of the underlying Hilbert space H, and the structure of
such algebras and their commutants in finite dimension is well understood. We
know from Theorem B.4.7 that the Hilbert space H has a decomposition (i.e.,
there is an isomorphism which we write as an equality)
H =
⊕
j
Jj ⊗Kj (3.8)
into a direct sum of tensor products such that the ∗-algebra A and its commutant
algebra Comm(A) = {M : ∀P ∈ B(H) [P,M ] = 0} can be written
A ∼=
⊕
j
B(Jj)⊗ IKj , (3.9)
Comm(A) ∼=
⊕
j
IJj ⊗ B(Kj). (3.10)
Koashi and Imoto [KI02], in the context of finding the quantum operations
which leave a set of states invariant, have described an algorithm to find the
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commutant Comm(A), and more precisely the Hilbert space decomposition of
Eq. (3.8), of the states Pyb/TrPyb. They show that for this decomposition, there
exist states σj|i on Jj, a conditional probability distribution {qj|i}, and states ωj
on Kj which are independent of i, such that we can write them as
∀i σi =
⊕
j
qj|iσj|i ⊗ ωj,
Looking at Eq. (3.10), we see that the smallest rank operators M ∈ Comm(A )
are of the form IJj ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ| for some j and |ψ〉 ∈ Kj, and that they are all
admissible. Since we need a family of operators M that are closed to a POVM
(i.e., their sum is equal to the identity), we know that all j have to occur. Hence,
the minimal quantum memory requirement is
min 2q = max
j
dimJj. (3.11)
The strategy Bob has to follow is this: For each j, pick a basis {|ek|j〉} for Kj and
measure the POVM {IJj ⊗ |ek|j〉〈ek|j|}, corresponding to the decomposition
H =
⊕
jk
Jj ⊗ |ek|j〉〈ek|j|,
which commutes with the Pyb. For each outcome, he can store the post-measurement
state in q qubits [as in Eq. (3.11)], preserving the orthogonality of the states for
different y but fixed b. Once he learns b he can thus obtain y with certainty.
Of course, carrying out the Koashi-Imoto algorithm may not be a straight-
forward task in a given situation. We now consider two explicit examples that
one can understand as two special cases of this general method: First, we show
that in fact all Boolean functions with two bases (mutually unbiased or not) can
be computed perfectly when Bob is allowed to store just a single qubit. Second,
however, we show that there exist three bases such that for any balanced func-
tion, Bob must store all qubits to compute the function perfectly. We also give
a recipe how to construct such bases.
3.5.2 Using two bases
For two bases, Bob needs to store only a single qubit to compute any Boolean
function perfectly. As outlined in Section 3.5.1, we need to show that there exists
a measurement with the following properties: First, the post-measurement states
of states corresponding to strings x such that f(x) = 0 are orthogonal to the
post-measurement states of states corresponding to strings y such that f(y) = 1.
Indeed, if this is true and we keep the post-measurement state, then after the basis
is announced, we can distinguish perfectly between both types of states. Second,
of course, we need that the post-measurement states are supported in subspaces of
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dimension at most 2. The following little lemma shows that this is the case for any
Boolean function. The same statement has been shown independently many times
before in a variety of different contexts. For example, Masanes and also Toner and
Verstraete have shown the same in the context of non-local games [Mas06, TV06].
The key ingredient is also present in Bathia’s textbook [Bha97]. Indeed, there
is a close connection between the amount of post-measurement information we
require, and the amount of entanglement we need to implement measurements in
the setting of non-local games. We return to this question in Chapter 6.
3.5.2. Lemma. Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} and P0b =
∑
x∈f−1(0) Ub|x〉〈x|U †b where
U0 = I and U1 = U , then there exists a direct sum decomposition of the Hilbert
space
H =
m⊕
i=1
Hi, with dimHi ≤ 2,
such that P00 and P01 can be expressed as
P00 =
m∑
i=1
ΠiP00Πi,
P01 =
m∑
i=1
ΠiP01Πi,
where Πi is the orthogonal projector onto Hi.
Proof. There exists a basis so that P00 and P01 can be written as
P00 =
[
In0 0n0×n1
0n1×n0 0n1×n1
]
, P01 =
[
A00n0×n0 A
01
n0×n1
(A01)†n1×n0 A
11
n1×n1
]
,
where ny = |f−1(y)| is the number of strings x such that f(x) = y, and we have
specified the dimensions of the matrix blocks for clarity. In what follows these
dimensions will be omitted. We assume without loss of generality that n0 ≤ n1.
It is easy to check that, since P01 is a projector, it must satisfy
A00(In0 − A00) = A01A01†,
A11(In1 − A11) = A01†A01.
(3.12)
Consider a unitary of the following form
V =
[
V0 0
0 V1
]
,
where V0 and V1 are n0 × n0 and n1 × n1 unitaries respectively. Under such a
unitary, P00 and P01 are transformed to:
V P00V
† = P00,
V P01V
† =
[
V0A
00V †0 V0A
01V †1
(V0A
01V †1 )
† V1A11V
†
1
]
.
(3.13)
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We now choose V0 and V1 from the singular value decomposition (SVD, [HJ85,
Theorem 7.3.5]) of A01 = V †0DV1 which gives
D = V0A
01V †1 =
n0∑
k=1
dk|uk〉〈vk|,
where dk ≥ 0, 〈uk|ul〉 = 〈vk|vl〉 = δkl. Since (A01)†A01 and A01(A01)† are sup-
ported in orthogonal subspaces, it also holds that ∀k, l : 〈uk|vl〉 = 0. Eqs. (3.12)
and (3.13) now give us
V0A
00V †0 (In0 − V0A00V †0 ) =
∑n0
k=1 d
2
k|uk〉〈uk|,
V1A
11V †1 (In1 − V1A11V †1 ) =
∑n0
k=1 d
2
k|vk〉〈vk|.
Suppose for the time being that all the dk are different. Since they are all non-
negative, all the d2k will also be different and it must hold that
V0A
00V †0 =
n0∑
k=1
a0k|uk〉〈uk|,
V1A
11V †1 =
n0∑
k=1
a1k|vk〉〈vk|+
n1∑
k=n0+1
a1k|v˜k〉〈v˜k|
for some a0k, a
1
k and |v˜k〉 with 1 ≤ k ≤ n1.. Note that we can choose |v˜k〉 such that
∀k, k′, k 6= k′ : 〈v˜k|v˜k′〉 = 0 and ∀k, l : 〈uk|v˜l〉 = 0. We can now express V P01V †
as
V P01V
† =
=
n0∑
k=1
[
a0k|uk〉〈uk|+ dk(|uk〉〈vk|+ |vk〉〈uk|) + a1k|vk〉〈vk|
]
+
n1∑
k=n0+1
a1k|v˜k〉〈v˜k|.
It is now clear that we can choose allHk = span{|uk〉, |vk〉}, andHk′ = span{|v˜k′〉}
which are orthogonal and together add up to H.
In the case that all the dk are not different, there is some freedom left in
choosing |uk〉 and |vk〉 that still allows us to make V0A00V †0 and V1A11V †1 diagonal
so that the rest of the proof follows in the same way. 2
In particular, the previous lemma implies that the post-measurement states
corresponding to strings x for which f(x) = 0 are orthogonal to those corre-
sponding to strings x for which f(x) = 1, which is expressed in the following
lemma.
3.5.3. Lemma. Suppose one performs the measurement given by {Πi : i ∈ [m]}.
If the outcome of the measurement is i and the state was Ub|x〉, then the post-
measurement state is
|x, i, b〉 := ΠiUb|x〉√
〈x|U †bΠiUb|x〉
.
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The post-measurement states satisfy
∀x ∈ f−1(0), x′ ∈ f−1(1), i ∈ [m] : 〈x, i, b|x′, i, b〉 = 0.
Proof. The proof follows straightforwardly from that fact that the Πi commute
with both P00 and P01 (which follows from Lemma 3.5.2). 2
Now we are ready to prove the main theorem of this section.
3.5.4. Theorem. Let |Y| = |B| = 2, then there exists a strategy for Bob such
that he succeeds at PI1-STAR(E) with probability p = 1, for any function f and
prior PX on X .
Proof. The strategy that Bob uses is the following:
• Bob performs the measurement given by {Πi : i ∈ [m]}.
• He obtains an outcome i ∈ [m] and stores the post-measurement state which
is supported in the at most two-dimensional subspace Hi.
• After the basis b ∈ {0, 1} is announced, he measures {P0b, P1b} and reports
the outcome of this measurement.
By Lemma 3.5.3 this leads to success probability 1. 2
Our result also gives us a better lower bound for all Boolean functions than
what we had previously obtained in Section 3.4.1. Instead of storing the qubit,
Bob now measures it immediately along the lines of Lemma 3.3.1. It is not too
difficult to convince yourself that for one qubit the worst-case post-measurement
states to distinguish are in fact those in Lemma 3.3.1.
3.5.5. Corollary. Let |Y| = |B| = 2, then Bob succeeds at PI0-STAR(E) with
probability at least p ≥ (1 + 1/√2)/2.
In particular, our result implies that for the task of constructing Rabin-OT
in [DFSS05] it is essential for Alice to choose a random function f from a larger
set, which is initially unknown to Bob.
As a final remark, note that the prior distributions do not play any role.
Likewise, it is not actually important that the states ρyb are proportional to
projectors: we only require that for all b ∈ {0, 1}, the states ρ0b and ρ1b are
orthogonal.
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3.5.3 Using three bases
We have just shown that Bob can compute any Boolean function perfectly when
two bases are used. However, we now show that for any balanced Boolean func-
tion there exist three bases, such that Bob needs to store all qubits in order to
compute the function perfectly. The idea behind our proof is that for a particular
choice of three bases, any measurement operator that satisfies the conditions set
out in Lemma 3.5.1 must be proportional to the identity. This means that we
cannot reduce the number of qubits to be stored by a measurement and must
keep everything. First, we prove the following lemma which we need in our main
proof.
3.5.6. Lemma. Let M be a self-adjoint matrix which is diagonal in two mutually
unbiased bases, then M must be proportional to the identity.
Proof. Let |x〉 |ux〉 x ∈ {1, . . . , d} be the two MUBs and let mx and m′x be the
eigenvalues corresponding to |x〉 and |ux〉 respectively, then we can write
M =
d∑
x=1
mx|x〉〈x| =
d∑
x′=1
m′x′|ux′〉〈ux′|.
From the previous equation, it follows that
〈x|M |x〉 = mx =
d∑
x′=1
m′x′|〈ux′|x〉|2 =
1
d
TrM,
which implies the desired result. 2
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section.
3.5.7. Theorem. Let |Y| = 2 and |B| = 3, then for any balanced function f
and prior PX on X which is uniform on the pre-images f−1(y), there exist three
bases such that Bob succeeds at PIq-STAR(E) with probability p = 1 if and only
if q = log d.
Proof. Let P00 =
∑
x∈f−1(0) |x〉〈x|, P01 = U1P00U †1 and P02 = U2P00U †2 . Also,
let s : f−1(0)→ f−1(1) be a bijective map, and let sx = s(x). By a reordering of
the basis, P00, U1 and U2 can be written as
P00 =
[
I 0
0 0
]
, U1 =
[
U001 U
01
1
U101 U
11
1
]
, U2 =
[
U002 U
01
2
U102 U
11
2
]
,
where all the blocks are of size (d/2)× (d/2). P01 and P02 then take the following
form:
P01 =
[
U001 U
00
1
†
U001 U
10
1
†
(U001 U
10
1
†
)† U101 U
10
1
†
]
, P02 =
[
U002 U
00
2
†
U002 U
10
2
†
(U002 U
10
2
†
)† U102 U
10
2
†
]
.
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It follows from Lemma 3.5.1, that we only have to prove that [M,P00] =
[M,P01] = [M,P02] = 0 implies that M must be proportional to the identity.
Write
M =
[
M00 M01
(M01)† M11
]
.
Commutation with P00 implies M
01 = 0. Commutation with P01 and P02 implies
[M00, U001 U
00
1
†
] = [M00, U002 U
00
2
†
] = 0, (3.14)
[M11, U101 U
10
1
†
] = [M11, U102 U
10
2
†
] = 0, (3.15)
M00(U001 U
10
1
†
) = (U001 U
10
1
†
)M11, (3.16)
M00(U002 U
10
2
†
) = (U002 U
10
2
†
)M11. (3.17)
We choose U1 and U2 in the following way:
U1 =
∑
x∈f−1(0)
[
ax(|x〉〈x|+ |sx〉〈sx|) +
√
1− a2x(|x〉〈sx| − |sx〉〈x|)
]
,
U2 =
∑
x∈f−1(0)
[
ax(|ux〉〈ux|+ |vx〉〈vx|) +
√
1− a2x(|ux〉〈vx| − |vx〉〈ux|)
]
,
with ax ∈ [0, 1], satisfying ax = ax′ if and only if x = x′. Furthermore, choose
|ux〉 and |vx〉 such that
∀x, x′ ∈ f−1(0), 〈x|vx′〉 = 〈sx|ux′〉 = 0, |〈x|ux′〉|2 = |〈sx|vx′〉|2 = 2/d.
With this choice for U1 and U2 we have that
U001 U
00
1
†
=
∑
x∈f−1(0)
a2x|x〉〈x|,
U002 U
00
2
†
=
∑
x∈f−1(0)
a2x|ux〉〈ux|,
i.e., {|x〉} and {|ux〉} form an eigenbasis for U001 U001 † and U002 U002 † respectively.
Furthermore, since all the a2x are different, the eigenbases are unique. Now, using
Eq. (3.14), we see that M00 must commute with both U001 U
00
1
†
and U002 U
00
2
†
, and
since their eigenbases are unique, it must be true that M00 is diagonal in both
{|x〉} and {|ux〉}. Using the result of Lemma 3.5.6 it follows that M00 = m0Id/2.
In exactly the same way we can prove that M11 = m1Id/2 using Eq. (3.15). It
remains to prove that m0 = m1, which follows directly from either Eq. (3.16) or
Eq. (3.17). 2
From our proof it is clear how to construct U1 and U2. For P00 as defined
above, we could choose vectors of the form |x〉 = |0〉|xˆ〉 and |sx〉 = |1〉|xˆ〉 where
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xˆ ∈ {0, 1}n−1 to construct U1. For U2 we could then pick |ux〉 = |0〉H⊗n−1|xˆ〉
and analogously |vx〉 = |1〉H⊗n−1|xˆ〉. As we will see in Chapter 6, our example
shows that for non-local games we cannot hope to prove a statement analogous
to [Mas06, TV06] for three measurement settings where each measurement has
two outcomes.
Note, however, that whereas we know that for such unitaries Bob must store
all qubits in order to compute the value of the function perfectly, it remains
unclear how close he can get to computing the function perfectly when storing
fewer qubits. In particular, he can always choose two of the three bases, and
employ the strategy outlined in the previous section: he stores the one qubit that
allows him to succeed with probability 1 for two of the bases. If he gets the
third basis then he just flips a coin. In this case, he is correct with probability
2/3 + 1/(3 · 2) = 5/6 for a balanced function and a uniform prior. It remains an
important open question to address the approximate case.
3.6 Conclusion
We have introduced a new state discrimination problem, motivated by cryptog-
raphy: discrimination with extra information about the state after the measure-
ment, or, more generally, after a quantum memory bound applies. We have left
most general questions open, but we found fairly complete results in the case of
guessing y = f(x) with mutually unbiased encodings.
We have shown that storing just a single qubit allows Bob to succeed at PI-
STAR perfectly for any Boolean function and any two bases. In contrast, we
showed how to construct three bases such that Bob needs to store all qubits in
order to compute the function perfectly. We have also given an explicit strategy
for two functions, namely the AND and the XOR. More generally, it would be
interesting to determine, how many qubits Bob needs to store to compute f(x)
perfectly for any function f : X → Y in terms of the number of outputs |Y|
and the number of bases |B|. It should be clear that the algebraic techniques
of Section 3.5.1 allow us to answer these questions for any given function in
principle. However, so far, we have not been able to obtain explicit structures
for wider classes of functions. Our results imply that in existing protocols in
the bounded quantum storage model [DFSS05] we cannot restrict ourselves to a
single fixed function f to perform privacy amplification. Note that our algebraic
framework can also address the question of using more than one function, where
f is also announced after the memory bound applies [DFSS05]: we merely obtain
a larger problem. Yet, it is again difficult to determine a general bound.
In the important case of two mutually unbiased bases and balanced functions,
we have shown (Theorem 3.3.3 and Corollary 3.5.5) that there exists a clear
separation between the case where Bob gets the post-measurement information
(PI-STAR) and when he does not (STAR). Namely, for any such function, Bob’s
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optimal success probability is never larger than (1 + 1/
√
2)/2 ≈ 0.853 for STAR
and always at least as large as the same number for PI-STAR.
In some cases the gap between STAR and PI-STAR can be more dramatic.
The XOR function on strings of even length with two mutually unbiased bases
is one of these cases. We have shown that in this case the advantage can be
maximal. Namely, without the extra information Bob can never do better than
guessing the basis, with it however, he can compute the value of the function
perfectly. This contrasts with the XOR function on strings of odd length, where
the optimal success probabilities of STAR and PI-STAR are both (1 + 1/
√
2)/2
and the post-measurement information is completely useless for Bob. It would
be interesting to see, how large the gap between STAR and PI-STAR can be for
any function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}k where k > 2. We return to this question in
Chapter 6.4.
It would also be nice to show a general lower bound for non-balanced functions
or a non-uniform prior. As the example for 3 bases showed, the uniform prior is
not necessarily the one that leads to the largest gap, and thus the prior can play
an important role. Another generalization would be to consider functions of the
form f : [d]n → [d]k.
We now turn our attention to uncertainty relations. These will play an impor-
tant role in locking in Chapter 5. In the problem of locking, we also distinguish
measurement with basis information, analogous to our PIq-STAR with q = n,
and without corresponding to PI0-STAR. So far, our objective has been to obtain
an accurate guess of a value, e.g. y = f(x). In Chapter 5, we are interested
in a slightly different problem: How can we maximize the classical mutual in-
formation? In particular, can we use mutually unbiased bases to obtain locking
effects?

Chapter 4
Uncertainty relations
Uncertainty relations lie at the very core of quantum mechanics. Intuitively,
they quantify how much we can learn about different properties of a quantum
system simultaneously. Some properties lead to very strong uncertainty relations:
if we decide to learn one, we remain entirely ignorant about the others. But
what characterizes such properties? In this chapter, we first investigate whether
choosing our measurements to be mutually unbiased bases allows us to obtain
strong uncertainty relations. Sadly, it turns out that mutual unbiasedness is not
sufficient. Instead, we need to consider anti-commuting measurements.
4.1 Introduction
Heisenberg first realized that quantum mechanics leads to uncertainty relations
for conjugate observables such as position and momentum [Hei27]. Uncertainty
relations are probably best known in the form given by Robertson [Rob29], who
extended Heisenberg’s result to any two observables A and B. Robertson’s re-
lation states that if we prepare many copies of the state |ψ〉, and measure each
copy individually using either A or B, we have
∆A∆B ≥ 1
2
|〈ψ|[A,B]|ψ〉|
where ∆X =
√〈ψ|X2|ψ〉 − 〈ψ|X|ψ〉2 for X ∈ {A,B} is the standard deviation
resulting from measuring |ψ〉 with observable X. Recall from Chapter 2, that
classically we always have [A,B] = 0, and there is no such limiting lower bound.
Hence, uncertainty relations are another characteristic that sets apart quantum
theory. The consequences are rather striking: even if we had a perfect measure-
ment apparatus, we are nevertheless limited!
Entropic uncertainty relations are an alternative way to state Heisenberg’s un-
certainty principle. They are frequently a more useful characterization, because
the “uncertainty” is lower bounded by a quantity that does not depend on the
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state to be measured [Deu83, Kra87]. Recently, entropic uncertainty relations
have gained importance in the context of quantum cryptography in the bounded
storage model, where proving the security of such protocols ultimately reduces to
establishing such relations [DFR+07]. Proving new entropic uncertainty relations
could thus give rise to new protocols. Intuitively, it is clear that uncertainty re-
lations have a significant impact on what kind of protocols we can obtain in the
quantum settings. Recall the cryptographic task of oblivious transfer from Chap-
ter 1: the receiver should be able to extract information about one particular
property of a system, but should learn as little as possible about all other prop-
erties. It is clear that, without placing any additional restrictions on the receiver,
uncertainty relations intuitively quantify how well we are able to implement such
a primitive.
Entropic uncertainty relations were first introduced by Bialynicki-Birula and
Mycielski [BBM75]. For our purposes, we will be interested in uncertainty re-
lations in the form put forward by Deutsch [Deu83]. Following a conjecture by
Kraus [Kra87], Maassen and Uffink [MU88] have shown that if we measure the
state |ψ〉 with observables A and B determined by the bases A = {|a1〉, . . . , |ad〉}
and B = {|b1〉, . . . , |bd〉} respectively, we have
1
2
(H(A||ψ〉) +H(B||ψ〉)) ≥ − log c(A,B),
where c(A,B) = max {|〈a|b〉| | |a〉 ∈ A, |b〉 ∈ B}, and
H(X||ψ〉) = −
d∑
i=1
|〈ψ|xi〉|2 log |〈ψ|xi〉|2
is the Shannon entropy [Sha48] arising from measuring the state |ψ〉 in the basis
X = {|x1〉, . . . , |xd〉}. In fact, Maassen and Uffink provide a more general state-
ment which also leads to uncertainty relations for higher order Re´nyi entropies.
Such relations have also been shown by Bialynicki-Birula [BB06] for special sets
of observables. Note that the above relation achieves our initial goal: the lower
bound no longer depends on the state |ψ〉, but only on A and B itself. What is
the strongest possible relation we could obtain? That is, which choices of A and
B maximize − log c(A,B)? It is not hard to see that choosing A and B to be
mutually unbiased (see Section 2.4) provides us with a lower bound of (log d)/2
which is the strongest possible uncertainty relation: If we have no entropy for one
of the bases, then the entropy for the other bases must be maximal. For example,
in case of a one qubit system of d = 2 choosing A = {|0〉, |1〉} and B = {|+〉, |−〉}
to be the computational and the Hadamard basis respectively, we obtain a lower
bound of 1/2.
Can we derive a similar relation for measurements using three or more ob-
servables? Surprisingly, very little is known for a larger number of measurement
settings [Aza04]. Sanchez-Ruiz [San93, SR95] (using results of Larsen [Lar90])
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has shown that for measurements using all d+1 mutually unbiased bases, we can
obtain strong uncertainty relations. Here, we provide an elementary proof of his
result in dimension d = 2n. Given the fact that mutually unbiased bases seem
to be a good choice if we use only two or d+ 1 measurement settings, it may be
tempting to conclude that choosing our measurements to be mutually unbiased
always gives us good uncertainty relations for which the lower bound is as large as
possible. Numerical results for MUBs in prime dimensions up to 29 indicate that
MUBs may indeed be a good choice [DHL+04]. However, we show that merely be-
ing mutually unbiased is not sufficient to obtain strong uncertainty relations. To
this end, we prove tight entropic uncertainty relations for measurements in a large
number of mutually unbiased bases (MUBs) in square dimensions. In particular,
we consider any MUBs derived from mutually orthogonal Latin squares [WB05],
and any set of MUBs obtained from the set of unitaries of the form {U ⊗ U∗},
where {U} gives rise to a set of MUBs in dimension s when applied to the basis
elements of the computational basis. For any s, there are at most s + 1 such
MUBs in a Hilbert space of dimension d = s2: recall from Section 2.4 that we can
have at most s + 1 MUBs in a space of dimension s. Let B be the set of MUBs
coming from one of these two constructions. We prove that for any subset T ⊆ B
of these bases we have
min
|ψ〉
∑
B∈T
H(B||ψ〉) = |T|
2
log d.
Our result shows that one needs to be careful to think of “maximally in-
compatible” measurements as being necessarily mutually unbiased. When we
take entropic uncertainty relations as our measure of “incompatibility”, mutually
unbiased measurements are not always the most incompatible when considering
more than two observables. In particular, it has been shown [HLSW04] that
if we choose approximately (log d)4 bases uniformly at random, then with high
probability min|ψ〉(1/|T|)
∑
B∈TH(B||ψ〉) ≥ log d−3. This means that there exist
(log d)4 bases for which this sum of entropies is very large, i.e., measurements in
such bases are very incompatible. However, we show that when d is large, there
exist
√
d mutually unbiased bases that are much less incompatible according to
this measure. When considering entropic uncertainty relations as a measure of
“incompatibility”, we must therefore look for different properties for the bases to
define incompatible measurements.
Luckily, we are able to obtain maximally strong uncertainty relations for two-
outcome measurements for anti-commuting observables. In particular, we obtain
for Γ1, . . . ,ΓK with {Γi,Γj} = 0 that
min
ρ
1
K
K∑
j=1
H(Γj|ρ) = 1− 1
K
,
where H(Γj|ρ) = −
∑
b∈{0,1}Tr(Γ
b
jρ) log Tr(Γ
b
jρ) and Γ
0
j , Γ
1
j are projectors onto
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the positive and negative eigenspace of Γj respectively. Thus, if we have zero
entropy for one of the terms, we must have maximal entropy for all others. For
the collision entropy we obtain something slightly suboptimal
min
ρ
1
K
K∑
j=1
H2(Γj, ρ) ≈ 1− log e
K
for large K, where H2(Γj|ρ) = − log
∑
b∈{0,1}Tr(Γ
b
jρ)
2. Especially our second
uncertainty relation is of interest for cryptographic applications.
4.2 Limitations of mutually unbiased bases
We first prove tight entropic uncertainty for measurements in MUBs in square
dimensions. We need the result of Maassen and Uffink [MU88] mentioned above:
4.2.1. Theorem (Maassen and Uffink). Let B1 and B2 be two orthonormal
basis in a Hilbert space of dimension d. Then for all pure states |ψ〉
1
2
(H(B1||ψ〉) +H(B2||ψ〉)) ≥ − log c(B1,B2),
where c(B1,B2) = max {|〈b1|b2〉| | |b1〉 ∈ B1, |b2〉 ∈ B2}.
The case when B1 and B2 are MUBs is of special interest for us. More generally,
when one has a set of MUBs a trivial application of Theorem 4.2.1 leads to the
following corollary also noted in [Aza04].
4.2.2. Corollary. Let B = {B1, . . . ,Bm} be a set of MUBs in a Hilbert space
of dimension d. Then
1
m
m∑
t=1
H(Bt||ψ〉) ≥ log d
2
.
Proof. Using Theorem 4.2.1, one gets that for any pair of MUBs Bt and Bt′
with t 6= t′
1
2
[H(Bt|ψ) +H(Bt′|ψ)] ≥ log d
2
.
Adding up the resulting equation for all pairs t 6= t′ we get the desired result. 2
We now show that this bound can in fact be tight for a large set of MUBs.
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4.2.1 MUBs in square dimensions
Corollary 4.2.2 gives a lower bound on the average of the entropies of a set of
MUBs. But how good is this bound? We show that the bound is indeed tight
when we consider product MUBs in a Hilbert space of square dimension.
4.2.3. Theorem. Let B = {B1, . . . ,Bm} with m ≥ 2 be a set of MUBs in a
Hilbert space H of dimension s. Let Ut be the unitary operator that transforms
the computational basis to Bt. Then V = {V1, . . . ,Vm}, where
Vt = {Ut|k〉 ⊗ U∗t |l〉 | k, l ∈ [s]} ,
is a set of MUBs in H⊗H, and it holds that
min
|ψ〉
1
m
m∑
t=1
H(Vt||ψ〉) = log d
2
,
where d = dim(H⊗H) = s2.
Proof. It is easy to check that V is indeed a set of MUBs. Our proof works by
constructing a state |ψ〉 that achieves the bound in Corollary 4.2.2. It is easy to
see that the maximally entangled state
|ψ〉 = 1√
s
s∑
k=1
|kk〉,
satisfies U ⊗ U∗|ψ〉 = |ψ〉 for any U ∈ U(d). Indeed,
〈ψ|U ⊗ U∗|ψ〉 = 1
s
s∑
k,l=1
〈k|U |l〉〈k|U∗|l〉
=
1
s
s∑
k,l=1
〈k|U |l〉〈l|U †|k〉
=
1
s
TrUU † = 1.
Therefore, for any t ∈ [m] we have that
H(Vt||ψ〉) = −
∑
kl
|〈kl|Ut ⊗ U∗t |ψ〉|2 log |〈kl|Ut ⊗ U∗t |ψ〉|2
= −
∑
kl
|〈kl|ψ〉|2 log |〈kl|ψ〉|2
= log s =
log d
2
.
Taking the average of the previous equation over all t we obtain the result. 2
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4.2.2 MUBs based on Latin squares
We now consider mutually unbiased bases based on Latin squares [WB05] as
described in Section 2.4.1. Our proof again follows by providing a state that
achieves the bound in Corollary 4.2.2, which turns out to have a very simple
form.
4.2.4. Lemma. Let B = {B1, . . . ,Bm} with m ≥ 2 be any set of MUBs in a
Hilbert space of dimension d = s2 constructed on the basis of Latin squares. Then
min
|ψ〉
1
m
∑
B∈B
H(B||ψ〉) = log d
2
.
Proof. Consider the state |ψ〉 = |1, 1〉 and fix a basis Bt = {|vti,j〉|i, j ∈ [s]} ∈ B
coming from a Latin square. It is easy to see that there exists exactly one j ∈ [s]
such that 〈vt1,j|1, 1〉 = 1/
√
s. Namely this will be the j ∈ [s] at position (1, 1) in
the Latin square. Fix this j. For any other ` ∈ [s], ` 6= j, we have 〈vt1,`|1, 1〉 = 0.
But this means that there exist exactly s vectors in B such that |〈vti,j|1, 1〉|2 = 1/s,
namely exactly the s vectors derived from |vt1,j〉 via the Hadamard matrix. The
same argument holds for any such basis B ∈ T. We get∑
B∈T
H(B||1, 1〉) =
∑
B∈T
∑
i,j∈[s]
|〈vti,j|1, 1〉|2 log |〈vti,j|1, 1〉|2
= |T|s1
s
log
1
s
= |T| log d
2
.
The result then follows directly from Corollary 4.2.2. 2
4.2.3 Using a full set of MUBs
We now provide an alternative proof of an entropic uncertainty relation for a full
set of mutually unbiased bases. This has previously been proved in [San93, SR95].
We already provided an alternative proof using the fact that the set of all mutually
unbiased bases forms a 2-design [BW07]. Here, we provide a new alternative
proof for dimension d = 2n which has the advantage that it neither requires the
introduction of 2-designs, nor the results of [Lar90] that were used in the previous
proof by Sanchez-Ruiz [San93, SR95]. Instead, our proof is extremely simple:
After choosing a convenient parametrization of quantum states, the statement
follows immediately using only elementary Fourier analysis.
For the parametrization, we first introduce a basis for the space of 2n × 2n
matrices with the help of mutually unbiased bases. Recall from Section 2.4 that
in dimension 2n, we can find exactly 2n + 1 MUBs.
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4.2.5. Lemma. Consider the Hermitian matrices
Sjb =
∑
x∈{0,1}n
(−1)j·x|xb〉〈xb|,
for b ∈ [d + 1], j ∈ {0, . . . , d − 1} and for all x, x′ ∈ {0, 1}n and b 6= b′ ∈ [d + 1]
we have |〈xb|x′b′〉|2 = 1/d. Then the set {I} ∪ {Sjb | b ∈ [d+1], j ∈ {0, . . . , d− 1}}
forms a basis for the space of d×d matrices, where for all j and b, Sjb is traceless
and (Sjb )
2 = I.
Proof. First, note that we have (d+1)(d− 1)+ 1 = d2 matrices. We now show
that they are all orthogonal. Note that
Tr(Sjb ) =
∑
x∈{0,1}n
(−1)j·x = 0,
since j 6= 0, and hence Sjb is traceless. Hence Tr(ISjb ) = 0. Furthermore,
Tr(SjbS
j′
b′ ) =
∑
x,x′∈{0,1}n
(−1)j·x(−1)j′·x′|〈xb|x′b′〉|2. (4.1)
For b 6= b′, Eq. (4.1) gives us Tr(SjbSj
′
b′ ) = (1/d) (
∑
x(−1)j·x)
(∑
x′(−1)j
′·x′) = 0,
since j, j′ 6= 0. For b = b′, but j 6= j′, we get Tr(SjbSj
′
b′ ) =
∑
x(−1)(j⊕j
′)·x = 0
since j ⊕ j′ 6= 0.
Finally,
(
Sjb
)2
=
∑
xx′(−1)j·x(−1)j·x
′|xb〉〈xb||x′b〉〈x′b| = I. 2
Since {I, Sjb} form a basis for the d×d matrices, we can thus express the state
ρ of a d-dimensional system as
ρ =
1
d
I+ ∑
b∈[d+1]
∑
j∈{0,...,d−1}
sjbS
j
b
 ,
for some coefficients sjb ∈ R. It is now easy to see that
4.2.6. Lemma. Let ρ be a pure state parametrized as above. Then∑
b∈[d+1]
∑
j∈{0,...,d−1}
(sjb)
2 = d− 1.
Proof. If ρ is a pure state, we have Tr(ρ2) = 1. Hence
Tr(ρ2) =
1
d2
Tr(I) + ∑
b∈[d+1]
∑
j∈{0,...,d−1}
(sjb)
2Tr(I)

=
1
d
(
1 +
∑
b
∑
j
(sjb)
2
)
= 1,
82 Chapter 4. Uncertainty relations
from which the claim follows. 2
Suppose now that we are given a set of d + 1 MUBs B1, . . . ,Bd+1 with Bb =
{|xb〉 | x ∈ {0, 1}n}. Then the following simple observation lies at the core of our
proof:
4.2.7. Lemma. Let |xb〉 be the x-th basis vector of the b-th MUB. Then for any
state ρ
Tr(|xb〉〈xb|ρ) = 1
d
1 + ∑
j∈{0,...,d−1}
(−1)j·xsjb
 .
Proof. We have
Tr(|xb〉〈xb|ρ) = 1
d
(
Tr(|xb〉〈xb|) +
∑
b′,j
sjb′Tr(S
j
b′|xb〉〈xb|)
)
Suppose b 6= b′. Then Tr(Sjb′|xb〉〈xb|) = (1/d)
∑
x′(−1)j·x
′
= 0, since j 6= 0.
Suppose b = b′. Then Tr(Sjb′|xb〉〈xb|) =
∑
x′(−1)j·x
′|〈xb|x′b〉|2 = (−1)j·x, from
which the claim follows. 2
We are now ready to prove an entropic uncertainty relation for N mutually
unbiased bases.
4.2.8. Theorem. Let S = {B1, . . . ,BN} be a set of mutually unbiased bases.
Then
1
N
∑
b∈[N ]
H2(Bb, |Ψ〉) ≥ − log N + d− 1
dN
.
Proof. First, note that we can define functions fb(j) = s
j
b for j ∈ {0, . . . , d −
1} and fb(0) = 1. Then fˆb(x) = (1/
√
d)(
∑
j∈{0,...,d−1}(−1)j·xsjb) is the Fourier
transform of fb and (1/
√
d)fˆb(x) = Tr(|xb〉〈xb|) by Lemma 4.2.7. Thus
1
N
∑
b∈[N ]
H2(Bb, |Ψ〉) = − 1
N
∑
b∈[N ]
log
∑
x∈{0,1}n
|〈xb|Ψ〉|4
≥ − log 1
dN
∑
b
∑
x
fˆb(x)
2
= − log 1
dN
∑
b
(1 +
∑
j
(sjb)
2)
= − log 1
dN
(N + d− 1),
where the first inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality and the concavity of
log. The next equality follows from Parseval’s equality, and the last follows from
the fact that |Ψ〉 is a pure state and Lemma 4.2.6. 2
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4.2.9. Corollary. Let S = {B1, . . . ,BN} be a set of mutually unbiased bases.
Then
1
N
∑
b∈[N ]
H(Bb||Ψ〉) ≥ − log N + d− 1
dN
.
In particular, for a full set of N = d + 1 MUBs we have (1/N)
∑
bH(Bb||Ψ〉) ≥
log((d+ 1)/2).
Proof. This follows immediately from Theorem 4.2.8 and the fact that H(·) ≥
H2(·). 2
It is interesting to note that this bound is the same that arises from inter-
polating between the results of Sanchez-Ruiz [San93, SR95] and Maassen and
Uffink [MU88] as was done by Azarchs [Aza04].
4.3 Good uncertainty relations
As we saw, merely choosing our measurements to be mutually unbiased is not
sufficient to obtain good uncertainty relations. However, we now investigate mea-
surements using anti-commuting observables for which we do obtain maximally
strong uncertainty relations! In particular, we consider the matrices Γ1, . . . ,Γ2n,
satisfying the anti-commutation relations
ΓiΓj = −ΓjΓi, Γ2i = I (4.2)
for all i, j ∈ [2n]. Such operators Γ1, . . . ,Γ2n form generators for the Clifford
algebra, which we explain in more detail in Appendix C.
Intuitively, these operators have a property that is very similar to being mu-
tually unbiased: Recall from Appendix C that we can write for all j ∈ [2n]
Γj = Γ
0
j − Γ1j ,
where Γ0j and Γ
1
j are projectors onto the positive and negative eigenspace of Γj
respectively. We also have that for all i, j ∈ [2n] with i 6= j
Tr(ΓiΓj) =
1
2
Tr(ΓiΓj + ΓjΓi) = 0.
Hence the positive and negative eigenspaces of such operators are similarly mu-
tually unbiased as bases can be: from
Tr(ΓiΓ
0
j) = Tr(ΓiΓ
1
j),
we immediately see that if we would pick a vector lying in the positive or negative
eigenspace of Γj and perform a measurement with Γi, the probability to obtain
outcome Γ0i or outcome Γ
1
i must be the same. Thus, one might intuitively hope
to obtain good uncertainty relations for measurements using such operators. We
now show that this is indeed the case.
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4.3.1 Preliminaries
Before we can turn to proving our uncertainty relations, we recall a few simple
observations from Appendix C. The operators Γ1, . . . ,Γ2n have a unique (up to
unitary) representation in terms of the matrices
Γ2j−1 = σ⊗(j−1)y ⊗ σx ⊗ I⊗(n−j),
Γ2j = σ
⊗(j−1)
y ⊗ σz ⊗ I⊗(n−j),
for j = 1, . . . , n. We now fix this representation. The product Γ0 := iΓ1Γ2 · · ·Γ2n
is also called the pseudo-scalar. A particularly useful fact is that the collection
of operators
I
Γj (1 ≤ j ≤ 2n)
Γjk = iΓjΓk (1 ≤ j < k ≤ 2n)
Γjk` = ΓjΓkΓ` (1 ≤ j < k < ` ≤ 2n)
...
Γ12...(2n) = Γ0
forms an orthogonal basis for the d×d complex matrices for d = 2n, where in the
definition of the above operators we introduce a factor of i to all with an even
number of indices to make the whole set a basis for the Hermitian operators with
real valued coefficients. Hence we can write every state ρ ∈ H as
ρ =
1
d
(
I+
∑
j
gjΓj +
∑
j<k
gjkΓjk + . . .+ g0Γ0
)
. (4.3)
The real valued coefficients (g1, . . . , g2n) in this expansion are called “vector”
components, the ones belonging to higher degree products of Γ’s are “tensor” or
“k-vector” components.
Recall that we may think of the operators Γ1, . . . ,Γ2n as the basis vectors of
a 2n-dimensional real vector space. Essentially, we can then think of the positive
and negative eigenspace of such operators as the positive and negative direction
of the basis vectors. We can visualize the 2n basis vectors with the help of a 2n-
dimensional hypercube. Each basis vector determines two opposing faces of the
hypercube1, where we can think of the two faces as corresponding to the positive
and negative eigenspace of each operator as illustrated in Figures 4.1 and 4.2.
Finally, recall that within the Clifford algebra two vectors are orthogonal if
and only if they anti-commute. Hence, if we transform the generating set of Γj
linearly,
Γ′k =
∑
j
TjkΓj,
1Note that the face of an 2n-dimensional hypercube is a 2n−1 dimensional hypercube itself.
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Figure 4.1: 2n = 2-cube
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Figure 4.2: 2n = 4-cube
the set {Γ′1, . . . ,Γ′2n} satisfies the anti-commutation relations if and only if (Tjk)jk
is an orthogonal matrix. In that case there exists a matching unitary U(T ) of H
which transforms the operator basis as
Γ′j = U(T )ΓjU(T )
†.
We thus have an O(2n) symmetry of the generating set Γ1, . . . ,Γ2n. Indeed,
this can be extended to a SO(2n + 1) symmetry by viewing Γ0 as an additional
”vector”: It is not difficult to see that Γ0 anti-commutes with Γ1, . . . ,Γ2n. We
are thus free to remove one of these operators from the generating set and replace
it with Γ0 to obtain a new set of generators. Evidently, we may also view these
as basis vectors. This observation forms the basis of the following little lemma,
which allows us to prove our uncertainty relations:
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4.3.1. Lemma. The linear map P taking ρ as in Eq. (4.3) to
P(ρ) :=
1
d
(
I+
2n∑
j=0
gjΓj
)
(4.4)
is positive. I.e., if ρ is a state, then so is P(ρ), and in this case
∑2n
j=0 g
2
j ≤ 1.
Conversely, if
∑2n
j=0 g
2
j ≤ 1, then
σ =
1
d
(
I+
2n∑
j=0
gjΓj
)
is positive semidefinite, hence a state.
Proof. First, we show that there exists a unitary U such that ρ′ = UρU † has
no pseudo-scalar Γ0, and only one nonzero vector component, say at Γ1. Hence,
our goal is to find the transformation U that rotates g =
∑2n
j=0 gjΓj to the vector
b =
√
`Γ1, where we let ` :=
∑2n
j=0 g
2
j = (g
′
1)
2. Finding such a transformation
for only the first 2n generators can easily be achieved, as we saw in Appendix C.
The challenge is thus to include Γ0. To this end we perform three individual
operations: First, we rotate g′ =
∑2n
j=1 gjΓj onto the vector b
′ =
√
`′Γ1 with
`′ :=
∑2n
j=1 g
2
j . Second, we exchange Γ2 and Γ0. And finally we rotate the vector
g′′ =
√
`′Γ1 + g0Γ2 onto the vector b =
√
`Γ1.
First, we rotate g′ =
∑2n
j=1 gjΓj onto the vector b
′ =
√
`′Γ1: This is exactly
analogous to the transformation constructed in Appendix C. Consider the vector
gˆ = 1√
`′
g′ . We have gˆ2 = |gˆ|2I = I and thus the vector is of length 1. Let
m = gˆ + Γ1 denote the vector lying in the plane spanned by Γ1 and gˆ located
exactly halfway between Γ1 and gˆ. Let mˆ = c(gˆ+Γ1) with c = 1/
√
2(1 + g1/
√
`′).
It is easy to verify that mˆ2 = I and hence the vector mˆ has length 1. To rotate
the vector g′ onto the vector b′, we now need to first reflect g′ around the plane
perpendicular to mˆ, and then around the plane perpendicular to Γ1. Hence, we
now define R = Γ1mˆ. Evidently, R is unitary since RR
† = R†R = I. First of all,
note that
Rg′ = Γ1mˆg′
= cΓ1
(
1√
`′
g′ + Γ1
)
g′
= c
(
Γ1
g′2√
`′
+ Γ21g
′
)
= c
√
`′
(
Γ1 +
1√
`′
g′
)
=
√
`′mˆ.
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Hence,
Rg′R† =
√
`′mˆmˆΓ1 =
√
`′Γ1 = b′,
as desired. Using the geometry of the Clifford algebra, one can see that k-vectors
remain k-vectors when transformed with the rotation R (see Appendix C). Sim-
ilarly, it is easy to see that Γ0 is untouched by the operation R
RΓ0R
† = Γ0RR† = Γ0,
since {Γ0,Γj} = 0 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , 2n}. We can thus conclude that
RρR† =
1
d
(
I+
√
`′Γ1 + g0Γ0 +
∑
j<k
g′jkΓjk + . . .
)
,
for some coefficients g′jk and similar for the terms involving higher products.
Second, we exchange Γ2 and Γ0: To this end, recall that Γ2, . . . ,Γ2n,Γ0 is also
a generating set for the Clifford algebra. Hence, we can now view Γ0 itself as a
vector with respect to the new generators. To exchange Γ0 and Γ2, we now simply
rotate Γ0 onto Γ2. Essentially, this corresponds to a rotation about 90 degrees in
the plane spanned by vectors Γ0 and Γ2. Consider the vector n = Γ0+Γ2 located
exactly halfway between both vectors. Let nˆ = n/
√
2 be the normalized vector.
Let R′ = Γ2nˆ. A small calculation analogous to the above shows that
R′Γ0R′† = Γ2 and R′Γ2R
′† = −Γ0.
We also have that Γ1, Γ3, . . . ,Γ2n are untouched by the operation: for j 6= 0 and
j 6= 2, we have that
R′ΓjR
′† = Γj,
since {Γ0,Γj} = {Γ2,Γj} = 0. How does R′ affect the k-vectors in terms of the
original generators Γ1, . . . ,Γ2n? Using the anti-commutation relations and the
definition of Γ0 it is easy to convince yourself that all k-vectors are mapped to
k′-vectors with k′ ≥ 2 (except for Γ0 itself). Hence, the coefficient of Γ1 remains
untouched. We can thus conclude that
R′RρR†R
′† =
1
d
(
I+
√
`′Γ1 + g0Γ2 +
∑
j<k
g′′jkΓjk + . . .
)
,
for some coefficients g′′jk and so on.
Finally, we now rotate the vector g′′ =
√
`′Γ1 + g0Γ2 onto the vector b. Note
that (g′′)2 = (` + g20)I = `I. Let gˆ′′ = g′′/
√
` be the normalized vector. Our
rotation is derived exactly analogous to the first step: Let k = gˆ′′ + Γ1, and let
kˆ = k/
√
2(1 +
√
`′/
√
`). Let R′′ = Γ1kˆ. A simple calculation analogous to the
above shows that
R′′g′′R
′′† =
√
`Γ1,
88 Chapter 4. Uncertainty relations
as desired. Again, we have R′′ΓkR′′† = Γk for k 6= 1 and k 6= 2. Furthermore,
k-vectors remain k-vectors under the actions of R′′ [DL03]. Summarizing, we
obtain
R′′R′RρR†R
′†R
′′† =
1
d
(
I+
√
`Γ1 +
∑
j<k
g′′′jkΓjk + . . .
)
,
for some coefficients g′′′jk and so on. Thus, we can take U = R
′′R′R to arrive at a
new, simpler looking, state
ρ′ = UρU †
=
1
d
(
I+ g′1Γ1 +
∑
j<k
g′′′jkΓjk + . . .+ 0Γ0
)
,
for some g′′′jk, etc.
Similarly, there exist of course orthogonal transformations Fj that take Γk to
(−1)δjkΓk. Such transformations flip the sign of a chosen Clifford generator. In
a similar way to the above, it is easy to see that Fj = Γ0Γj fulfills this task: we
rotate Γj by 90 degrees in the plane given by Γ0 and Γj as in the example we
examined in Appendix C. Now, consider
ρ′′ =
1
2
(
ρ′ + Fjρ′F
†
j
)
,
for j > 1. Clearly, if ρ′ was a state, ρ′′ is a state as well. Note that we no longer
have terms involving Γj in the basis expansion: Note that if we flip the sign of
precisely those terms that have an index j (i.e., they have a factor Γj in the
definition of the operator basis), and then the coefficients cancel with those of ρ′.
We now iterate this map through j = 2, 3, . . . , 2n, and we are left with a final
state ρˆ of the form
ρˆ =
1
d
(I+ g′1Γ1) .
By applying U † = (R′′R′R)† from above, we now transform ρˆ to U †ρˆU = P(ρ),
which is the first part of the lemma.
Looking at ρˆ once more, we see that it can be positive semidefinite only if
g′1 ≤ 1, i.e.,
∑2n
j=0 g
2
j ≤ 1. Evidently, Tr(ρˆ) = 1 and hence ρˆ is a state.
Conversely, if
∑2n
j=0 g
2
j ≤ 1, then the (Hermitian) operator A =
∑
j gjΓj has
the property
A2 =
∑
jk
gjgkΓjΓk =
∑
j
g2j I ≤ I,
i.e. −I ≤ A ≤ I, so σ = 1
d
(I+ A) ≥ 0. 2
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4.3.2 A meta-uncertainty relation
We now first use the above tools to prove a “meta”-uncertainty relation, from
which we will then derive two new entropic uncertainty relations. Evidently, we
have immediately from the above that
4.3.2. Lemma. Let ρ ∈ H with dimH = 2n be a quantum state, and consider
K ≤ 2n+ 1 anti-commuting observables Γj. Then,
K−1∑
j=0
(
Tr(ρΓj)
)2 ≤ 2n∑
j=0
(
Tr(ρΓj)
)2
=
2n∑
j=0
g2j ≤ 1.
Our result is essentially a generalization of the Bloch sphere picture to higher
dimensions: For n = 1 (d = 2) the state is parametrized by ρ = 1
2
(I + g1Γ1 +
g2Γ2 + g0Γ0) where Γ1 = X, Γ2 = Z and Γ0 = Y are the familiar Pauli matrices.
Lemma 4.3.2 tells us that g20+g
2
1+g
2
2 ≤ 1, i.e., the state must lie inside the Bloch
sphere (see Figure 2.1). Our result may be of independent interest, since it is
often hard to find conditions on the coefficients g1, g2, . . . such that ρ is a state.
Notice that the gj = Tr(ρΓj) are directly interpreted as the expectations of
the observables Γj. Indeed, gj is precisely the bias of the ±1-variable Γj:
Pr[Γj = 1|ρ] = 1 + gj
2
.
Hence, we can interpret Lemma 4.3.2 as a form of uncertainty relation between
the observables Γj: if one or more of the observables have a large bias (i.e., they
are more precisely defined), this limits the bias of the other observables (i.e., they
are closer to uniformly distributed).
4.3.3 Entropic uncertainty relations
It turns out that Lemma 4.3.2 has strong consequences for the Re´nyi and von
Neumann entropic averages
1
K
K−1∑
j=0
Hα (Γj|ρ) ,
where Hα(Γj|ρ) is the Re´nyi entropy at α of the probability distribution arising
from measuring the state ρ with observable Γj. The minima over all states ρ of
such expressions can be interpreted as giving entropic uncertainty relations, as we
shall now do for α = 2 (the collision entropy) and α = 1 (the Shannon entropy).
4.3.3. Theorem. Let dimH = 2n, and consider K ≤ 2n + 1 anti-commuting
observables as defined in Eq. (4.2). Then,
min
ρ
1
K
K−1∑
j=0
H2 (Γj|ρ) = 1− log
(
1 +
1
K
)
∼ 1− log e
K
,
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where H2(Γj|ρ) = − log
∑
b∈{0,1}Tr(Γ
b
jρ)
2, and the minimization is taken over all
states ρ. The latter holds asymptotically for large K.
Proof. Using the fact that Γbj = (I+ (−1)bΓj)/2 we can first rewrite
1
K
K−1∑
j=0
H2 (Γj|ρ) = − 1
K
K−1∑
j=0
log
[
1
2
(
1 + Tr(ρΓj)
2
)]
≥ − log
(
1
2K
K−1∑
j=0
(
1 + g2j
))
≥ 1− log
(
1 +
1
K
)
,
where the first inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality and the concavity of
the log, and the second from Lemma 4.3.2. Clearly, the minimum is attained if
all gj = Tr(ρΓj) =
√
1
K
. It follows from Lemma 4.3.1 that our inequality is tight.
Via the Taylor expansion of log
(
1 + 1
K
)
we obtain the asymptotic result for large
K. 2
For the Shannon entropy (α = 1) we obtain something even nicer:
4.3.4. Theorem. Let dimH = 2n, and consider K ≤ 2n + 1 anti-commuting
observables as defined in Eq. (4.2). Then,
min
ρ
1
K
K−1∑
j=0
H(Γj|ρ) = 1− 1
K
,
where H(Γj|ρ) = −
∑
b∈{0,1}Tr(Γ
b
jρ) log Tr(Γ
b
jρ), and the minimization is taken
over all states ρ.
Proof. To see this, note that by rewriting our objective as above, we observe
that we need to minimize the expression
1
K
K−1∑
j=0
H
(
1±√tj
2
)
,
subject to
∑
j tj ≤ 1 and tj ≥ 0, via the identification tj = (Tr(ρΓj))2. An
elementary calculation shows that the function f(t) = H
(
1±√t
2
)
is concave in
t ∈ [0, 1]:
f ′(t) =
1
4 ln 2
1√
t
(
ln(1−√t)− ln(1 +√t)),
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and so
f ′′(t) =
1
8 ln 2
1
t3/2
(
ln
1 +
√
t
1−√t −
2
√
t
1− t
)
.
Since we are only interested in the sign of the second derivative, we ignore the
(positive) factors in front of the bracket, and are done if we can show that
g(t) := ln
1 +
√
t
1−√t −
2
√
t
1− t
= ln(1 +
√
t) +
1
1 +
√
t
− ln(1−√t)− 1
1−√t
is non-positive for 0 ≤ t ≤ 1. Substituting s = 1 − √t, which is also between 0
and 1, we rewrite this as
h(s) = − ln s− 1
s
+ ln(2− s) + 1
2− s,
which has derivative
h′(s) = (1− s)
(
1
s2
− 1
(2− s)2
)
,
and this is clearly positive for 0 < s < 1. In other words, h increases from its
value at s = 0 (where it is h(0) = −∞) to its value at s = 1 (where it is h(1) = 0),
so indeed h(s) ≤ 0 for all 0 ≤ s ≤ 1. Consequently, also f ′′(t) ≤ 0 for 0 ≤ t ≤ 1.
Hence, by Jensen’s inequality, the minimum is attained with one of the tj
being 1 and the others 0, giving just the lower bound of 1− 1
K
. 2
We have shown that anti-commuting Clifford observables obey the strongest
possible uncertainty relation for the von Neumann entropy. It is interesting that
in the process of the proof, however, we have found three uncertainty type in-
equalities (the sum of squares bound, the bound on H2, and finally the bound
on H1), and all three have a different structure of attaining the limit. The sum
of squares bound can be achieved in every direction (meaning for every tuple
satisfying the bound we get one attaining it by multiplying all components by
some appropriate factor), the H2 expression requires all components to be equal,
while the H1 expression demands exactly the opposite.
4.4 Conclusion
We showed that merely choosing our measurements to be mutually unbiased does
not lead to strong uncertainty relations. However, we were able to identify an-
other property which does lead to optimal entropic uncertainty relations for two
outcome measurements! Anti-commuting Clifford observables obey the strongest
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possible uncertainty relation for the von Neumann entropy: if we have no uncer-
tainty for one of the measurements, we have maximum uncertainty for all others.
We also obtain a slightly suboptimal uncertainty relation for the collision en-
tropy which is strong enough for all cryptographic purposes. Indeed, one could
use our entropic uncertainty relation in the bounded quantum storage setting to
construct, for example, 1-K oblivious transfer protocols analogous to [DFR+07].
Here, instead of encoding a single bit into either the computational or Hadamard
basis, which gives us a 1-2 OT, we now encode a single bit into the positive or neg-
ative eigenspace of each of these K operators. It is clear from the representation
of such operators discussed earlier, that such an encoding can be done experimen-
tally as easily as encoding a single bit into three mutually unbiased basis given
by σx, σy, σz. Indeed, our construction can be seen as a direct extension of such
an encoding: we obtain the uncertainty relation for the three MUBs previously
proved by Sanchez [San93, SR95] as a special case of our analysis for K = 3. It
is perhaps interesting to note that the same operators also play a prominent role
in the setting of non-local games as discussed in Chapter 6.3.2.
Sadly, strong uncertainty relations for measurements with more than two out-
comes remain inaccessible to us. It has been shown [Feh07] that uncertainty
relations for more outcomes can be obtained via a coding argument from un-
certainty relations as we construct them here. Yet, these are far from optimal.
A natural choice would be to consider the generators of a generalized Clifford
algebra, yet such an algebra does not have such nice symmetry properties which
enabled us to implement operations on the vector components above. It remains
an exciting open question whether such operators form a good generalization, or
whether we must continue our search for new properties.
Chapter 5
Locking classical information
Locking classical correlations in quantum states [DHL+04] is an exciting feature
of quantum information, intricately related to entropic uncertainty relations. In
this chapter, we will investigate whether good locking effects can be obtained
using mutually unbiased bases.
5.1 Introduction
Consider a two-party protocol with one or more rounds of communication. Intu-
itively, one would expect that in each round the amount of correlation between
the two parties cannot increase by much more than the amount of data transmit-
ted. For example, transmitting 2` classical bits or ` qubits (and using superdense
coding) should not increase the amount of correlation by more than 2` bits, no
matter what the initial state of the two-party system was. This intuition is accu-
rate when we take the classical mutual information Ic as our correlation measure,
and require all communication to be classical. However, when quantum com-
munication was possible at some point during the protocol, everything changes:
there exist two-party mixed quantum states, such that transmitting just a single
extra bit of classical communication can result in an arbitrarily large increase
in Ic [DHL+04]. The magnitude of this increase thereby only depends on the
dimension of the initial mixed state. Since then similar locking effects have been
observed, also for other correlation measures [CW05b, HHHO05]. Such effects
play a role in very different scenarios: they have been used to explain physical
phenomena related to black holes [SO06], but they are also important in crypto-
graphic applications such as quantum key distribution [KRBM07] and quantum
bit string commitment that we will encounter in Chapter 10. We are thus inter-
ested in determining how exactly we can obtain locking effects, and how dramatic
they can be.
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5.1.1 A locking protocol
The correlation measure considered here, is the classical mutual information of a
bipartite quantum state ρAB, which is the maximum classical mutual information
that can be obtained by local measurements MA ⊗ MB on the state ρAB (see
Chapter 2):
Ic(ρAB) = max
MA⊗MB
I(A,B). (5.1)
Recall from Chapter 2 that the mutual information is defined as I(A,B) =
H(PA)+H(PB)−H(PAB) where H is the Shannon entropy. PA, PB, and PAB are
the probability distributions corresponding to the individual and joint outcomes
of measuring the state ρAB with MA ⊗MB. The mutual information between A
and B is a measure of the information that B contains about A. This measure
of correlation is of particular relevance for quantum bit string commitments in
Chapter 10. Furthermore, the first locking effect was observed for this quan-
tity in the following protocol between two parties: Alice (A) and Bob (B). Let
B = {B1, . . . ,Bm} with Bt = {|bt1〉, . . . , |btd〉} be a set of m MUBs in Cd. Alice
picks an element k ∈ {1, . . . , d} and a basis Bt ∈ B uniformly at random. She
then sends |btk〉 to Bob, while keeping t secret. Such a protocol gives rise to the
joint state
ρAB =
1
md
d∑
k=1
m∑
t=1
(|k〉〈k| ⊗ |t〉〈t|)A ⊗ (|btk〉〈btk|)B.
Clearly, if Alice told her basis choice t to Bob, he could measure in the right
basis and obtain the correct k. Alice and Bob would then share log d + logm
bits of correlation, which is also their mutual information Ic(σAB), where σAB
is the state obtained from ρAB after the announcement of t. But, how large is
Ic(ρAB), when Alice does not announce t to Bob? It was shown [DHL+04] that
in dimension d = 2n, using the two MUBs given by the unitaries U+ = I⊗n and
U× = H⊗n applied to the computational basis we have Ic(ρAB) = (1/2) log d
(see Figure 5.1, where |xb〉 = Ub|x〉). This means that the single bit of basis
information Alice transmits to Bob “unlocks” (1/2) log d bits: without this bit,
the mutual information is (1/2) log d, but with this bit it is log d + 1. To get a
good locking protocol, we want to use only a small number of bases, i.e., m should
be as small as possible, while at the same time forcing Ic(ρAB) to be as low as
possible. That is, we want logm/(log d− Ic(ρAB)) to be small.
It is also known that if Alice and Bob randomly choose a large set of unitaries
from the Haar measure to construct B, then Ic(ρAB) can be brought down to a
small constant [HLSW04]. However, no explicit constructions with more than two
bases are known that give good locking effects. Based on numerical studies for
spaces of prime dimension 3 ≤ d ≤ 30, one might hope that adding a third MUB
would strengthen the locking effect and give Ic(ρAB) ≈ (1/3) log d [DHL+04].
Here, however, we show that this intuition fails us. We prove that for three
MUBs given by I⊗n, H⊗n, and K⊗n where K = (I + iσx)/
√
2 and dimension
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Alice Bob
1: choose x ε {0,1}n, b ε {+,x}
   
2:
|xb>
3: b
Ic(ρAB)=n/2
Ic(σAB)=n+1
Figure 5.1: A locking protocol for 2 bases.
d = 2n for some even integer n, we have
Ic(ρAB) = 1
2
log d, (5.2)
the same locking effect as with two MUBs. We also show that for any subset of
the MUBs based on Latin squares and the MUBs in square dimensions based on
generalized Pauli matrices [BBRV02], we again obtain Eq. (5.2), i.e., using two
or all
√
d of them makes no difference at all! Finally, we show that for any set
of MUBs B based on generalized Pauli matrices in any dimension, Ic(ρAB) =
log d − min|φ〉(1/|B|)
∑
B∈BH(B||φ〉), i.e., it is enough to determine a bound on
the entropic uncertainty relation to determine the strength of the locking effect.
Although bounds for general MUBs still elude us, our results show that merely
choosing the bases to be mutually unbiased is not sufficient and we must look
elsewhere to find bases which provide good locking.
5.1.2 Locking and uncertainty relations
We first explain the connection between locking and entropic uncertainty rela-
tions. In particular, we will see that for MUBs based on generalized Pauli ma-
trices, we only need to look at such uncertainty relations to determine the exact
strength of the locking effect.
In order to determine how large the locking effect is for some set of mutually
unbiased bases B, and the shared state
ρAB =
|B|∑
t=1
d∑
k=1
pt,k(|k〉〈k| ⊗ |t〉〈t|)A ⊗ (|btk〉〈btk|)B, (5.3)
we must find the value of Ic(ρAB) or at least a good upper bound. That is,
we must find a POVM MA ⊗ MB that maximizes Eq. (5.1). Here, {pt,k} is a
probability distribution over B× [d]. It has been shown in [DHL+04] that we can
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restrict ourselves to taking MA to be the local measurement determined by the
projectors {|k〉〈k| ⊗ |t〉〈t|}. It is also known that we can limit ourselves to take
the measurement MB consisting of rank one elements {αi|Φi〉〈Φi|} only [Dav78],
where αi ≥ 0 and |Φi〉 is normalized. Maximizing over MB then corresponds to
maximizing Bob’s accessible information as defined in Chapter 2 for the ensemble
E = {pk,t, |btk〉〈btk|}
Iacc(E) =
max
MB
(
−
∑
k,t
pk,t log pk,t+
∑
i
∑
k,t
pk,tαi〈Φi|ρk,t|Φi〉 log pk,t〈Φi|ρk,t|Φi〉〈Φi|µ|Φi〉
)
,
(5.4)
where µ =
∑
k,t pk,tρk,t and ρk,t = |btk〉〈btk|. Therefore, we have Ic(ρAB) = Iacc(E).
As we saw in Chapter 2, maximizing the accessible information is often a very
hard task. Nevertheless, for our choice of MUBs, the problem will turn out to be
quite easy in the end.
5.2 Locking using mutually unbiased bases
5.2.1 An example
We now determine how well we can lock information using specific sets of mutually
unbiased bases. We first consider a very simple example with only three MUBs
that provides the intuition behind the remainder of our proof. The three MUBs
we consider now are generated by the unitaries I, H and K = (I+ iσx)/
√
2 when
applied to the computational basis. For this small example, we also investigate
the role of the prior over the bases and the encoded basis elements. It turns
out that this does not affect the strength of the locking effect positively, i.e., we
do not obtain a stronger locking affect using a non-uniform prior. Actually, it is
possible to show the same for encodings in many other bases. However, we do not
consider this case in full generality as to not obscure our main line of argument.
5.2.1. Lemma. Let U1 = I⊗n,U2 = H⊗n, and U3 = K⊗n, and take k ∈ {0, 1}n
where n is an even integer. Let {pt} with t ∈ [3] be a probability distribution
over the set S = {U1, U2, U3}. Suppose that p1, p2, p3 ≤ 1/2 and let {pt,k} with
pt,k = pt/d be the joint distribution over S × {0, 1}n. Consider the ensemble
E = {pt 1d , Ut|k〉〈k|U †t }, then
Iacc(E) = n
2
.
If, on the other hand, there exists a t ∈ [3] such that pt > 1/2, then Iacc(E) > n/2.
Proof. We first give an explicit measurement strategy and then prove a match-
ing upper bound on Iacc. Consider the Bell basis vectors |Γ00〉 = (|00〉+ |11〉)/
√
2,
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|Γ01〉 = (|00〉 − |11〉)/
√
2, |Γ10〉 = (|01〉+ |10〉)/
√
2, and |Γ11〉 = (|01〉 − |10〉)/
√
2.
Note that we can write for the computational basis
|00〉 = 1√
2
(|Γ00〉+ |Γ01〉),
|01〉 = 1√
2
(|Γ10〉+ |Γ11〉),
|10〉 = 1√
2
(|Γ10〉 − |Γ11〉),
|11〉 = 1√
2
(|Γ00〉 − |Γ01〉).
The crucial fact to note is that if we fix some k1, k2, then there exist exactly two
Bell basis vectors |Γi1i2〉 such that |〈Γi1i2|k1, k2〉|2 = 1/2. For the remaining two
basis vectors the inner product with |k1, k2〉 will be zero. A simple calculation
shows that we can express the two-qubit basis states of the other two mutually
unbiased bases analogously: for each two qubit basis state there are exactly two
Bell basis vectors such that the inner product is zero and for the other two the
inner product squared is 1/2.
We now take the measurement given by {|Γi〉〈Γi|} with |Γi〉 = |Γi1i2〉 ⊗
. . . ⊗ |Γin−1in〉 for the binary expansion of i = i1i2 . . . in. Fix a k = k1k2 . . . kn.
By the above argument, there exist exactly 2n/2 strings i ∈ {0, 1}n such that
|〈Γi|k〉|2 = 1/2n/2. Putting everything together, Eq. (5.4) now gives us for any
prior distribution {pt,k} that
−
∑
i
〈Γi|µ|Γi〉 log〈Γi|µ|Γi〉 − n
2
≤ Iacc(E). (5.5)
For our particular distribution we have µ = I/d and thus
n
2
≤ Iacc(E).
We now prove a matching upper bound that shows that our measurement is
optimal. For our distribution, we can rewrite Eq. (5.4) for the POVM given by
{αi|Φi〉〈Φi|} to
Iacc(E) = max
M
(
log d+
∑
i
αi
d
∑
k,t
pt|〈Φi|Ut|k〉|2 log |〈Φi|Ut|k〉|2
)
= max
M
(
log d−
∑
i
αi
d
∑
t
ptH(Bt||Φi〉)
)
,
for the bases Bt = {Ut|k〉 | k ∈ {0, 1}n}.
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It follows from Corollary 4.2.2 that ∀i ∈ {0, 1}n and p1, p2, p3 ≤ 1/2
(1/2− p1)[H(B2||Φi〉) +H(B3||Φi〉)] +
(1/2− p2)[H(B1||Φi〉) +H(B3||Φi〉)] +
(1/2− p3)[H(B1||Φi〉) +H(B2||Φi〉)] ≥ n/2,
where we used the fact that p1 + p2 + p3 = 1. Reordering the terms we now
get
∑3
t=1 ptH(Bt||Φi〉) ≥ n/2. Putting things together and using the fact that∑
i αi = d, we obtain
Iacc(E) ≤ n
2
,
from which the result follows.
If, on the other hand, there exists a t ∈ [3] such that pt > 1/2, then by
measuring in the basis Bt we obtain Iacc(E) ≥ ptn > n/2, since the entropy will
be 0 for basis Bt and we have
∑
t pt = 1. 2
Above, we have only considered a non-uniform prior over the set of bases.
In Chapter 3, we observed that when we want to guess the XOR of a string of
length 2 encoded in one (unknown to us) of these three bases, the uniform prior
on the strings is not the one that gives the smallest probability of success. This
might lead one to think that a similar phenomenon could be observed in the
present setting, i.e., that one might obtain better locking with three basis for a
non-uniform prior on the strings. In what follows, however, we show that this is
not the case.
Let pt =
∑
k pk,t be the marginal distribution on the basis, then the difference
in Bob’s knowledge between receiving only the quantum state and receiving the
quantum state and the basis information, where we will ignore the basis infor-
mation itself, is given by
∆(pk,t) = H(pk,t)− Iacc(E)−H(pt),
Consider the post-measurement state ν =
∑
i〈Γi|µ|Γi〉|Γi〉〈Γi|. Using Eq. (5.5)
we obtain
∆(pk,t) ≤ H(pk,t)− S(ν) + n/2−H(pt), (5.6)
where S is the von Neumann entropy. Consider the state
ρ12 =
d∑
k=1
3∑
t=1
pk,t(|t〉〈t|)1 ⊗ (Ut|k〉〈k|U †t )2,
for which we have that
S(ρ12) = H(pk,t) ≤ S(ρ1) + S(ρ2)
= H(pt) + S(µ)
≤ H(pt) + S(ν).
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Using Eq. (5.6) and the previous equation we get
∆(pk,t) ≤ n/2,
for any prior distribution. This bound is saturated by the uniform prior and
therefore we conclude that the uniform prior results in the largest gap possible.
5.2.2 MUBs from generalized Pauli matrices
We now consider MUBs based on the generalized Pauli matrices Xd and Zd as
described in Chapter 2.4.2. We consider a uniform prior over the elements of
each basis and the set of bases. Choosing a non-uniform prior does not lead to a
better locking effect.
5.2.2. Lemma. Let B = {B1, . . . ,Bm} be any set of MUBs constructed on the
basis of generalized Pauli matrices in a Hilbert space of prime power dimension
d = pN . Consider the ensemble E = { 1
dm
, |btk〉〈btk|}. Then
Iacc(E) = log d− 1
m
min
|ψ〉
∑
Bt∈B
H(Bt||ψ〉).
Proof. We can rewrite Eq. (5.4) for a POVM MB of the form {αi|Φi〉〈Φi|} as
Iacc(E) = max
MB
(
log d+
∑
i
αi
dm
∑
k,t
|〈Φi|btk〉|2 log |〈Φi|btk〉|2
)
= max
MB
(
log d−
∑
i
αi
d
∑
t
ptH(Bt||Φi〉)
)
.
For convenience, we split up the index i into i = a, b with a = a1, . . . , aN and
b = b1, . . . , bN , where a`, b` ∈ {0, . . . , p− 1} in the following.
We first show that applying generalized Pauli matrices to the basis vectors of
a MUB merely permutes those vectors.
1. Claim. Let Bt = {|bt1〉, . . . , |btd〉} be a basis based on generalized Pauli matrices
(Chapter 2.4.2) with d = pN . Then ∀a, b ∈ {0, . . . , p− 1}N ,∀k ∈ [d] we have that
∃k′ ∈ [d], such that |btk′〉 = Xa1d Zb1d ⊗ . . .⊗XaNd ZbNd |btk〉.
Proof. Let T ip for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} denote the generalized Pauli’s T 0p = Ip,
T 1p = Xp, T 3p = Zp, and T 2p = XpZp. Note that XupZvp = ωuvZvpXup , where
ω = e2pii/p. Furthermore, define T i,(x)p = I⊗(x−1) ⊗ T ip ⊗ IN−x to be the Pauli
operator T ip applied to the x-th qupit. Recall from Section 2.4.2 that there exist
sets of Pauli operators Ct such that the basis Bt is the unique simultaneous
eigenbasis of the set of operators in Ct, i.e., for all k ∈ [d] and f, g ∈ [N ],
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|btk〉 ∈ Bt and ctf,g ∈ Ct, we have ctf,g|btk〉 = λtk,f,g|btk〉 for some value λtk,f,g. Note
that any vector |v〉 that satisfies this equation is proportional to a vector in Bt.
To prove that any application of one of the generalized Paulis merely permutes
the vectors in Bt is therefore equivalent to proving that T i,(x)p |btk〉 are eigenvectors
of ctf,g for any f, g ∈ [k] and i ∈ {1, 3}. This can be seen as follows: Note that
ctf,g =
⊗N
n=1
(
T 1,(n)p
)fN (T 3,(n)p )gN for f = (f1, . . . , fN) and g = (g1, . . . , gN) with
fN , gN ∈ {0, . . . , p− 1} [BBRV02]. A calculation then shows that
ctf,gT i,(x)p |btk〉 = τfx,gx,iλtk,f,gT i,(x)p |btk〉,
where τfx,gx,i = ω
gx for i = 1 and τfx,gx,i = ω
−fx for i = 3. Thus T i,(x)p |btk〉 is an
eigenvector of ctf,g for all t, f, g and i, which proves our claim. 2
Suppose we are given |ψ〉 that minimizes ∑Bt∈TH(Bt||ψ〉). We can then
construct a full POVM with d2 elements by taking {1
d
|Φab〉〈Φab|} with |Φab〉 =
(Xa1d Z
b1
d ⊗ . . . ⊗ XaNd ZbNd )†|ψ〉. However, it follows from our claim above that
∀a, b, k, ∃k′ such that |〈Φab|btk〉|2 = |〈ψ|btk′〉|2, and thus H(Bt||ψ〉) = H(Bt||Φab〉)
from which the result follows. 2
Determining the strength of the locking effects for such MUBs is thus equiv-
alent to proving bounds on entropic uncertainty relations. We thus obtain as
a corollary of Theorem 4.2.3 and Lemma 5.2.2, that, for dimensions which are
the square of a prime power (i.e. d = p2N), using any product MUBs based on
generalized Paulis does not give us any better locking than just using 2 MUBs.
5.2.3. Corollary. Let S = {S1, . . . ,Sm} with m ≥ 2 be any set of MUBs
constructed on the basis of generalized Pauli matrices in a Hilbert space of prime
(power) dimension s = pN . Define Ut as the unitary that transforms the computa-
tional basis into the t-th MUB, i.e., St = {Ut|1〉, . . . , Ut|s〉}. Let B = {B1, . . . ,Bm}
be the set of product MUBs with Bt = {Ut ⊗ U∗t |1〉, . . . , Ut ⊗ U∗t |d〉} in dimension
d = s2. Consider the ensemble E = { 1
dm
, |btk〉〈btk|}. Then
Iacc(E) = log d
2
.
Proof. The claim follows from Theorem 4.2.3 and the proof of Lemma 5.2.2, by
constructing a similar measurement formed from vectors |Φˆaˆbˆ〉 = Ka1b1⊗K∗a2b2|ψ〉
with aˆ = a1a2 and bˆ = b1b2, where a1, a2 and b1, b2 are defined like a and b in the
proof of Lemma 5.2.2, and Kab = (X
a1
d Z
b1
d ⊗ . . .⊗XaNd ZbNd )† from above. 2
The simple example we considered above is in fact a special case of Corol-
lary 5.2.3. It shows that if the vector that minimizes the sum of entropies has
certain symmetries, the resulting POVM can even be much simpler. For example,
the Bell states are vectors which such symmetries.
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5.2.3 MUBs from Latin squares
At first glance, one might think that maybe the product MUBs based on gener-
alized Paulis are not well suited for locking just because of their product form.
Perhaps MUBs with entangled basis vectors do not exhibit this problem? Let’s
examine how well MUBs based on Latin squares can lock classical information in
a quantum state. All such MUBs are highly entangled, with the exception of the
two extra MUBs based on non-Latin squares. Surprisingly, it turns out, however,
that any set of at least two MUBs based on Latin squares, does equally well at
locking as using just 2 such MUBs. Thus such MUBs perform equally “badly”,
i.e., we cannot improve the strength of the locking effect by using more MUBs of
this type.
5.2.4. Lemma. Let B = {B1, . . . ,Bm} with m ≥ 2 be any set of MUBs in a
Hilbert space of dimension d = s2 constructed on the basis of Latin squares.
Consider the ensemble E = { 1
dm
, |btk〉〈btk|}. Then
Iacc(E) = log d
2
.
Proof. Note that we can again rewrite Iacc(E) as in the proof of Lemma 5.2.2.
Consider the simple measurement in the computational basis {|i, j〉〈i, j| | i, j ∈
[s]}. The result then follows by the same argument as in Lemma 4.2.4. 2
Intuitively, our measurement outputs one sub-square of the Latin square used
to construct the MUBs as depicted in Figure 5.2.3. As we saw in the construction
of MUBs based on Latin squares in Chapter 2.4.1, each entry “occurs” in exactly√
d = s MUBs.
1 2 3
2 3 1
3 1 2
Figure 5.2: Measurement for |1, 1〉.
5.3 Conclusion
We have shown tight bounds on locking for specific sets of mutually unbiased
bases. Surprisingly, it turns out that using more mutually unbiased basis does not
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always lead to a better locking effect. It is interesting to consider what may make
these bases so special. The example of three MUBs considered in Lemma 5.2.1
may provide a clue. These three bases are given by the common eigenbases of
{σx ⊗ σx, σx ⊗ I, I ⊗ σx}, {σz ⊗ σz, σz ⊗ I, I ⊗ σz} and {σy ⊗ σy, σy ⊗ I, I ⊗ σy}
respectively [BBRV02]. However, σx ⊗ σx, σz ⊗ σz and σy ⊗ σy commute and
thus also share a common eigenbasis, namely the Bell basis. This is exactly
the basis we will use as our measurement. For all MUBs based on generalized
Pauli matrices, the MUBs in prime power dimensions are given as the common
eigenbasis of similar sets consisting of strings of Paulis. It would be interesting
to determine the strength of the locking effect on the basis of the commutation
relations of elements of different sets. Furthermore, perhaps it is possible to
obtain good locking from a subset of such MUBs where none of the elements
from different sets commute.
It is also worth noting that the numerical results of [DHL+04] indicate that at
least in dimension p using more than three bases does indeed lead to a stronger
locking effect. It would be interesting to know, whether the strength of the locking
effect depends not only on the number of bases, but also on the dimension of the
system in question.
Whereas general bounds still elude us, we have shown that merely choosing
mutually unbiased bases is not sufficient to obtain good locking effects. We thus
have to look for different properties. Sadly, whereas we were able to obtain good
uncertainty relations in Chapter 4.3, the same approach does not work here: To
obtain good locking we must not only find good uncertainty relations, but also
find a way to encode many bits using only a small number of encodings.
Part III
Entanglement
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Chapter 6
Introduction
Entanglement is possibly the most intriguing element of quantum theory. It plays
a crucial role in quantum algorithms, quantum cryptography and the understand-
ing of quantum mechanics itself. It enables us to perform quantum teleportation,
as well as superdense coding [NC00]. In this part, we investigate one particular
aspect of quantum entanglement: the violation of Bell-inequalities, and their im-
plications for classical protocols. But first, let’s take a brief look at the history
of entanglement, and introduce the essential ingredients we need later.
6.1 Introduction
In 1935, Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) identified one of the striking con-
sequences of what latter became known as entanglement. In their seminal arti-
cle [EPR35] ”Can Quantum Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Con-
sidered Complete?” the authors define “elements of reality” as follows:
If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with cer-
tainty (i.e. with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quan-
tity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to
this physical quantity.
EPR call a theory that satisfies this condition complete. They put forward the
now famous EPR-Paradox, here stated informally using discrete variables as put
forward by Bohm [Per93]. EPR assume that if we have a state shared between
two spatially separated systems, Alice and Bob, that do not interact at the time
of a measurement,
no real change can take place in the second system as a consequence
of anything that may be done to the first system.
That means that Alice and Bob cannot use the shared state itself to transmit
information. We will also refer to this as the no-signaling condition. Now consider
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the shared state
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
( |0〉︸︷︷︸
Alice
|0〉︸︷︷︸
Bob
+ |1〉︸︷︷︸
Alice
|1〉︸︷︷︸
Bob
) =
1√
2
( |+〉︸︷︷︸
Alice
|+〉︸︷︷︸
Bob
+ |−〉︸︷︷︸
Alice
|−〉︸︷︷︸
Bob
). (6.1)
Suppose that we measure Alice’s system in the computational basis to obtain
outcome cA. Note that we can now predict the outcome of a measurement of
Bob’s system in the computational basis with certainty: cB = cA, without having
disturbed Bob’s system in any way. Thus cB is an “element of physical reality”.
However, we might as well have measured Alice’s system in the Hadamard basis
to obtain outcome hA. Likewise, we can now predict with certainty the out-
come of measuring Bob’s system in the Hadamard basis, hB = hA, again without
causing any disturbance to the second system. Thus hB should also be an “el-
ement of physical reality”. But as we saw in Chapter 4, quantum mechanics
forbids us to assign exact values to both cB and hB simultaneously, as measure-
ments in the computational and Hadamard basis are non-commutative. Indeed,
in Chapter 4.2, we saw that these two measurements give the strongest entropic
uncertainty relation for two measurements. EPR thus conclude
that the quantum mechanical description of reality given by the wave
function is not complete.
EPR’s article spurred a flurry of discussion that continues up to the present day.
Shortly after the publication of their article, Schro¨dinger published two papers
in which he coined the term entanglement (German: Verschra¨nkung) [Sch35b,
Sch35a] and investigated this phenomenon which he described as “not one, but
rather the characteristic trait of quantum mechanics, the one that enforces its en-
tire departure from classical lines of thought” [Sch35b]. One point of discussion
in the ensuing years was whether the fact that quantum mechanics is not com-
plete, means that there might exist a more detailed description of nature which
is complete. Even though, these more detailed descriptions also called “hidden
variables” had remained inaccessible to us so far: a better theory and better tech-
nology might enable us to learn them. Thus quantum mechanical observations
would merely appear to be probabilistic in the absence of our knowledge of such
hidden variables.
6.1.1 Bell’s inequality
This idea was put to rest by Bell [Bel65] in 1964, when he proposed conditions
that any classical theory, i.e. any theory based on local hidden variables, has to
satisfy, and which can be verified experimentally. These conditions are known
as Bell inequalities . Intuitively, Bell inequalities measure the strength of non-
local correlations attainable in any classical theory. Non-local correlations arise
as the result of measurements performed on a quantum system shared between
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two spatially separated parties. Imagine two parties, Alice and Bob, who are
given access to a shared quantum state |Ψ〉, but cannot communicate. In the
simplest case, each of them is able to perform one of two possible measurements.
Every measurement has two possible outcomes labeled ±1. Alice and Bob now
measure |Ψ〉 using an independently chosen measurement setting and record their
outcomes. In order to obtain an accurate estimate for the correlation between
their measurement settings and the measurement outcomes, they perform this
experiment independently many times using an identically prepared state |Ψ〉 in
each round.
|Ψ> X1                                                     Y1
 X2                                                     Y2
Alice Bob 1,-1,1,1,-1,1,-1,-1,-1,
1,1
,1,-1,1,1-1,-1 , 1,-
1
Figure 6.1: Alice and Bob measure many copies of |Ψ〉
Both classical and quantum theories impose limits on the strength of non-local
correlations. In particular, both should not violate the non-signaling condition
of special relativity as put forward by EPR above. That is, the local choice of
the measurement setting does not allow Alice and Bob to transmit information.
Limits on the strength of correlations which are possible in the framework of any
classical theory are the Bell inequalities. The best known Bell inequality is the
Clauser, Horne, Shimony and Holt (CHSH) inequality [CHSH69]
〈CHSH〉c = |〈X1Y1〉+ 〈X1Y2〉+ 〈X2Y1〉 − 〈X2Y2〉| ≤ 2, (6.2)
where X1, X2 and Y1, Y2 are the observables representing the measurement set-
tings of Alice and Bob respectively and we use 〈XiYj〉 = 〈Ψ|Xi⊗Yj|Ψ〉 to denote
the mean value of Xi and Yj. Quantum mechanics allows for a violation of the
CHSH inequality, and is thus indeed non-classical: If we take the shared state
|Ψ〉 = (|00〉 + |11〉)/√2 and let X1 = σx, X2 = σz, Y1 = (σx + σz)/2, and
Y2 = (σx − σz)/2 we obtain
〈CHSH〉q = |〈X1Y1〉+ 〈X1Y2〉+ 〈X2Y1〉 − 〈X2Y2〉| = 2
√
2.
Most importantly, this violation can be experimentally verified allowing us to test
the validity of the theory. The first such tests were performed by Clauser [Cla76]
and Aspect, Dalibard, Grangier, and Roger [AGR82, ADR82]. Over the years
these tests have been refined considerably, ruling out many loopholes present in
the initial experiments such as for example detector inefficiency [RKM+01]. Yet,
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no conclusive test has been achieved so far. Unfortunately, such experimental
concerns are outside the scope of this thesis, and we merely point to an overview
of such issues [Asp99].
6.1.2 Tsirelson’s bound
Curiously, even quantum mechanics itself still limits the strength of non-local
correlations. Tsirelson’s bound [Tsi80] says that for quantum mechanics
|〈X1Y1〉+ 〈X1Y2〉+ 〈X2Y1〉 − 〈X2Y2〉| ≤ 2
√
2,
and thus the above measurements are optimal. We provide a simple proof of this
fact in Chapter 7. It is interesting to consider what would happen if quantum
mechanics allowed for more powerful non-local correlations. To this end, it is
convenient to rewrite the CHSH inequality from Eq. (6.2) in the form∑
x,y∈{0,1}
Pr[ax ⊕ by = x · y] ≤ 3.
Here, x ∈ {0, 1} and y ∈ {0, 1} denote the choice of Alice’s and Bob’s measure-
ment, ax ∈ {0, 1} and by ∈ {0, 1} the respective binary outcomes, and ⊕ addition
modulo 2 (see Section 6.2.3 for details). In this form, quantum mechanics allows
a violation up to the maximal value of 2+
√
2. Since special relativity would even
allow a violation of Tsirelson’s bound, Popescu and Rohrlich [PR94, PR96, PR97]
raised the question why nature is not more ’non-local’? That is, why does quan-
tum mechanics not allow for a stronger violation of the CHSH inequality up to
the maximal value of 4? To gain more insight into this question, they constructed
a toy-theory based on non-local boxes. Each such box takes inputs x, y ∈ {0, 1}
from Alice and Bob respectively and always outputs measurement outcomes ax,by
such that x · y = ax⊕ by. Alice and Bob still cannot use this box to transmit any
information. However, since for all x and y, Pr[ax ⊕ by = x · y] = 1, the above
sum equals 4 and thus non-local boxes lead to a maximum violation of the CHSH
inequality.
Van Dam [vD05, vD00] has shown that having access to such non-local boxes
allows Alice and Bob to perform any kind of distributed computation by trans-
mitting only a single bit of information. This is even true for slightly less perfect
boxes achieving weaker correlations [BBL+06]. In [BCU+06], we showed that
given any non-local boxes, Alice and Bob could perform bit commitment and
oblivious transfer, which is otherwise known to be impossible. Thus, such cryp-
tographic principles are in principle compatible with the theory of non-signaling:
non-signaling itself does not prevent us from implementing them.
Looking back to the uncertainty relations in Chapter 4, which rest at the heart
of the EPR paradox, we might suspect that the violation of the CHSH inequality
likewise depends on the commutation relations between the local measurements
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of Alice and Bob. Indeed, it has been shown by Landau [Lan87], and Khalfin and
Tsirelson [KT87], there exists a state |Ψ〉 such that
|〈X1Y1〉+ 〈X1Y2〉+ 〈X2Y1〉 − 〈X2Y2〉| = 2
√
1 + 4‖ [X01 , X02 ][Y 01 , Y 02 ] ‖,
for any X1 = X
0
1 −X11 , X2 = X02 −X12 and Y1 = Y 01 − Y 11 , Y2 = Y 02 − Y 12 , where
we use the superscripts ’0’ and ’1’ to denote the projectors onto the positive and
negative eigenspace respectively. Thus, given any observables X1, X2 and Y1, Y2,
the CHSH inequality is violated if and only if [X01 , X
0
2 ][Y
0
1 , Y
0
2 ] 6= 0.
6.2 Setting the stage
6.2.1 Entangled states
The state given in Eq. (6.1) is just one possible example of an entangled state.
Recall from Chapter 2 that if |Ψ〉 ∈ HA ⊗HB is a pure state, we say that |Ψ〉 is
separable if and only if there exist states |ΨA〉 ∈ HA and |ΨB〉 ∈ HB such that
|Ψ〉 = |ΨA〉 ⊗ |ΨB〉. A separable pure state is also called a product state. A state
that is not separable is called entangled. For mixed states the definition is slightly
more subtle. Let ρ ∈ S(HA ⊗HB) be a mixed state. Then ρ is called a product
state if there exist ρA ∈ S(HA) and ρB ∈ S(HB) such that ρ = ρA ⊗ ρB. The
state ρ is called separable, if there exists an ensemble E = {pj, |Ψj〉〈Ψj|} such
that |Ψj〉 = |ΨAj 〉 ⊗ |ΨBj 〉 with |ΨAj 〉 ∈ HA and |ΨBj 〉 ∈ HB for all j, such that
ρ =
∑
j
pj|Ψj〉〈Ψj| =
∑
j
pj|ΨAj 〉〈ΨAj | ⊗ |ΨBj 〉〈ΨBj |.
Intuitively, if ρ is separable then ρ corresponds to a mixture of separable pure
states according to a joint probability distribution {pj}, a purely classical form of
correlation. Given a description of a mixed state ρ it is an NP-hard problem to
decide whether ρ is separable [Gur03]. However, many criteria and approximation
algorithms have been proposed [DPS02, DPS04, DPS05, IT06, ITCE04]. It is an
interesting question to determine the maximal violation of a given Bell-inequality
for a fixed state ρ [LD07]. Here, we only concern ourselves with maximal viola-
tions of Bell inequalities, and refer to [Ioa07] for an overview of the separability
problem. Generally, the maximal violation is obtained by using the maximally
entangled state. However, there are cases for which the maximal violation is
achieved by a non maximally entangled state [CGL+02]. Note that we can never
observe a Bell inequality violation for a separable state: it is no more than a
classical mixture of separable pure states. On the other hand, any two-qubit pure
state that is entangled violates the CHSH inequality [Gis91]. However, not all
entangled mixed states violate the CHSH inequality! A counterexample was given
110 Chapter 6. Introduction
by Werner [Wer81] with the so-called Werner-state
ρW = p
2
d2 + d
Psym + (1− p) 2
d2 − dPasym,
where Psym and Pasym are projectors onto the symmetric and the anti-symmetric
subspace respectively. For p ≥ 1/2 this state is separable, but it is entangled
for p < 1/2. Yet, the CHSH inequality is not violated. A lot of work has been
done to quantify the amount of entanglement in quantum states, and we refer
to [Ter99, Eis01, Chr05] for an overview.
6.2.2 Other Bell inequalities
The CHSH inequality we encountered above is by no means the only Bell in-
equality. Recall that non-local correlations arise as the result of measurements
performed on a quantum system shared between two spatially separated parties.
Let x and y be the variables corresponding to Alice and Bob’s choice of mea-
surement. Let a and b denote the corresponding outcomes1. Let Pr[a, b|x, y]
be the probability of obtaining outcomes a, b given settings x, y. What values
are allowed for Pr[a, b|x, y]? Clearly, we want that for all x, y, a, b we have that
Pr[a, b|x, y] ≥ 0 and ∑a,b Pr[a, b|x, y] = 1. From the no-signaling condition we
furthermore obtain that the marginals obey Pr[a|x] = Pr[a|x, y] =∑b Pr[a, b|x, y]
and likewise for Pr[b|y], i.e. the probability of Alice’s measurement outcome is in-
dependent of Bob’s choice of measurement setting, and vice versa. For n players,
who each perform one of N measurements with k possible outcomes, we have
(Nk)n such probabilities to assign, giving us a (Nk)n dimensional vector. To
find all Bell inequalities, we now look for inequalities that bound the classically
accessible region (a convex polytope) for such assignments. It is clear that we
can find a huge number of such inequalities. Of course, often the most interesting
inequalities are the ones that are satisfied only classically, but where we can find a
better quantum strategy. Much work has been done to identify such inequalities,
and we refer to [WW01b] for an excellent overview. In the following chapters, we
are interested in the following related question: Given an inequality, what is the
optimal quantum measurement strategy that maximizes the inequality?
6.2.3 Non-local games
It is often convenient to view Bell experiments as a game between two, or more,
distant players, who cooperate against a special party. We call this special party
the verifier . In a two player game with players Alice and Bob, the verifier picks
two questions, say s1 and s2, and hands them to Alice and Bob respectively,
who now need to decide answers a1 and a2. To this end, they may agree on any
1For simplicity, we assume that the set of possible outcomes is the same for each setting.
6.2. Setting the stage 111
strategy beforehand, but can no longer communicate once the game starts. The
verifier then decides according to a fixed set of public rules, whether Alice and
Bob win by giving answers a1, a2 to questions s1, s2. In a quantum game, Alice
and Bob may perform measurements on a shared entangled state to determine
their answers. We can thus think of the questions as measurement settings and
the answers as measurement outcomes.
More formally, we consider games amongN players P1, . . . , PN . Let S1, . . . , SN
and A1, . . . , AN be finite sets corresponding to the possible questions and answers
respectively. Let pi be a probability distribution on S1 × . . . × SN , and let V
be a predicate on A1 × . . . × AN × S1 × . . . × SN . Then G = G(V, pi) is the
following N -player cooperative game: A set of questions (s1, . . . , sN) ∈ S1× . . .×
SN is chosen at random according to the probability distribution pi. Player Pj
receives question sj, and then responds with answer aj ∈ Aj. The players win
if and only if V (a1, . . . , aN , s1, . . . , sN) = 1. We write V (a1, . . . , aN |s1, . . . , sN) =
V (a1, . . . , aN , s1, . . . , sN) to emphasize the fact that a1, . . . , aN are the answers
given questions s1, . . . , sN .
Verifier
Player 1                          Player 2                         Player 3
a1                           a2                      a3
  s1                          s2                    s3
Figure 6.2: Multiplayer non-local games.
The value of the game ω(G) is the probability that the players win the game,
maximized over all possible strategies. We use ωc(G) and ωq(G) to differentiate
between the value of the game in the classical and quantum case respectively.
Classically, ωc(G) can always be attained by a deterministic strategy [CHTW04a].
We can thus write
ωc(G) = max
f1,...,fN
∑
s1,...,sN
pi(s1, . . . , sN)V (f1(s1), . . . , fN(sN)|s1, . . . , sN), (6.3)
where the maximization is taken over all functions fj : Sj → Aj that determine
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answers aj = fj(sj).
Quantumly, the strategy of the players consists of their choice of measurements
and shared entangled state. Let |Ψ〉 denote the players’ choice of state, and let
X
[j]
sj = {Xaj ,[j]sj | aj ∈ Aj} denote the POVM of player Pj for question sj ∈ Sj.
Here, we always assume that the underlying Hilbert space is finite-dimensional.
The value of the quantum game is then
ωq(G) = max
X[1],...,X[N ]
∑
s1,...,sN
pi(s1, . . . , sN)
∑
a1,...,aN
〈Ψ|Xa1,[1]s1 ⊗ . . .⊗XaN ,[N ]sN |Ψ〉, (6.4)
where the maximization is taken over all POVMS X
[j]
sj for all j ∈ [N ] and sj ∈ Sj.
In the following, we say that a set of measurement operators achieves p, if
p =
∑
s1,...,sN
pi(s1, . . . , sN)
∑
a1,...,aN
〈Ψ|Xa1,[1]s1 ⊗ . . .⊗XaN ,[N ]sN |Ψ〉.
Of particular relevance in the next chapters is a special class of two-player games
known as XOR-games [CHTW04a]: Here, N = 2 and we assume that A1 = A2 =
{0, 1}. The two players P1 (Alice) and P2 (Bob) each have only two possible
measurement outcomes. Furthermore, the winning condition only depends on
the XOR of answers a1 and a2 and thus we write V (c|s1, s2) with c = a1 ⊕ a2. It
can be shown [CHTW04a] that the optimal POVM in this case consists only of
projectors. We can thus write X
[1]
s1 and X
[2]
s2 as observables with two eigenvalues:
X
[1]
s1 = X
0,[1]
s1 −X1,[1]s1 and X [2]s2 = X0,[2]s2 −X1,[2]s2 where s1 ∈ S1 and s2 ∈ S2. A small
calculation using the fact that X
0,[1]
s1 +X
1,[1]
s1 = I and X
0,[2]
s2 +X
1,[2]
s2 = I shows that
we can rewrite the optimal value of a quantum XOR-game as
ωq(G) = (6.5)
max
X[1],X[2]
1
2
∑
s1,s2
pi(s1, s2)
∑
c∈{0,1}
V (c|s1, s2)(1 + (−1)c〈Ψ|X [1]s1 ⊗X [2]s2 |Ψ〉).
(6.6)
From the above, we can see that XOR-games correspond to correlation inequali-
ties with two-outcome measurements. We will see in Chapter 7 that this reformu-
lation enables us to determine the optimal measurements for such XOR-games in
a very simple manner. Indeed, the CHSH inequality can be rephrased as a simple
quantum XOR-game. Here, Alice and Bob win if and only if given questions s1, s2
they return answers a1, a2 such that s1 · s2 = a1⊕ a2, i.e. we have V (c|s1, s2) = 1
if and only if s1 · s2 = c. Recalling Eq. (6.2) we can write
ω(CHSH) =
1
2
(
1 +
〈CHSH〉
4
)
,
from which we obtain ωq(CHSH) = 1/2 + 1/(2
√
2) vs. ωc(CHSH) = 3/4.
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6.3 Observations
In the following chapters, we are concerned with finding the optimal quantum
measurement strategies for Bell inequalities. To this end, we first make a few
simple observations that help us understand the structural properties of our prob-
lem. In particular, this also enables us to understand the relation between Bell
inequalities and the problem of post-measurement information in Chapter 6.4.
We then present a theorem by Tsirelson [Tsi80, Tsi87] that plays a crucial role
in the subsequent chapters.
6.3.1 Simple structural observations
Suppose we are given a set of measurements for Alice and Bob and a shared state
ρ. Can we reduce the dimension of Alice and Bob’s measurements operators and
the thereby amount of entanglement they need? As we saw in Chapter 2, we can
often simplify our problem by identifying its classical and quantum part. Indeed,
this is also the case here.
6.3.1. Lemma. Let H = HA ⊗HB and let A = {Xas ∈ B(HA)} and B = {Y bt ∈
B(HB)} be the set of Alice and Bob’s measurement operators respectively. Let
ρ ∈ S(H) be the state shared by Alice and Bob. Suppose that for such operators
we have
q =
∑
s∈S,t∈T
pi(s, t)
∑
a∈A,b∈B
V (a, b|s, t)Tr(Xas ⊗ Y bt ρ).
Then there exist measurement operators A˜ = {X˜as } and B˜ = {Y˜ bt } and a state ρ˜
such
q ≤
∑
s∈S,t∈T
pi(s, t)
∑
a∈A,b∈B
V (a, b|s, t)Tr(X˜as ⊗ Y˜ bt ρ˜).
and the C∗-algebra generated by A˜ and B˜ is simple.
Proof. Let A = 〈A〉 andB = 〈B〉. If A andB are simple, we are done. If not,
we know from Lemma B.4.1 and Lemma B.4.4 that there exists a decomposition
HA⊗HB =⊕jkHAj ⊗HBk . Consider Tr((MA⊗MB)ρ), whereMA⊗MB ∈ A ⊗B.
It follows from the above that MA⊗MB =⊕jk(ΠAj ⊗ΠBk )MA⊗MB(ΠAj ⊗ΠBk ),
where ΠAj and Π
B
k are projectors ontoHAj andHBk respectively. Let ρˆ =
⊕
jk(Π
A
j ⊗
ΠBk )ρ(Π
A
j ⊗ ΠBk ). Clearly,
Tr((MA ⊗MB)ρˆ) =
∑
jk
Tr
(
(ΠAj ⊗ ΠBk )MA ⊗MB(ΠAj ⊗ ΠBk )ρ
)
= Tr((MA ⊗MB)ρ).
The statement now follows immediately by convexity: Alice and Bob can now
measure ρ using {ΠAj ⊗ ΠBk } and record the classical outcomes j, k. The new
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measurements are then A˜as,j = Π
A
j X
a
sΠ
A
j and B˜
b
t,k = Π
B
k Y
b
t Π
B
k on state ρ˜jk =
(ΠAj ⊗ ΠBk )ρ(ΠAj ⊗ ΠBk )/Tr((ΠAj ⊗ ΠBk )ρ). By construction, A˜j = {A˜as,j} and
B˜k = {B˜bt,k} are simple.
Let qjk denote the probability that we obtain outcomes j, k, and let
rjk =
∑
s∈S,t∈T
pi(s, t)
∑
a∈A,b∈B
V (a, b|s, t)Tr(A˜as,j ⊗ B˜bt,j ρ˜jk).
Then q =
∑
jk qjkrjk ≤ maxjk rjk. Let u, v be such that ru,v = maxjk rjk. Hence,
we can skip the initial measurement and instead use measurements X˜as = A˜
a
s,u,
Y˜ bt = B˜
b
t,v and state ρ˜ = ρ˜u,v. 2
It also follows immediately from the above proof that
6.3.2. Corollary. dim(ρ˜) ≤ dim(HAu ) dim(HBv )
We can thus assume without loss of generality, that the algebra generated by
Alice and Bob’s optimal measurements is always simple. We also immediately
see why we can simulate the quantum measurement classically if Alice or Bob’s
measurements commute locally. Indeed, the above proof tells us how to construct
the appropriate classical strategy:
6.3.3. Corollary. Let H = HA ⊗ HB and let A = {Xas ∈ B(HA)} and B =
{Y bt ∈ B(HB)} be the set of Alice and Bob’s measurement operators respectively.
Let ρ ∈ S(H) be the state shared by Alice and Bob. Let p be the value of the
non-local game achieved using these measurements. Suppose that for all s, s′,and
a, a′ we have that [Xas , X
a′
s′ ] = 0 (or for all t, t
′, b, b′ [Y bt , Y
b′
t′ ] = 0). Then there
exists a classical strategy for Alice and Bob that achieves p.
Proof. Our conditions imply that either A or B is abelian. Suppose wlog that
A is abelian. Hence, by the above proof we have maxj dim(HAj ) = 1. Again,
Alice and Bob perform the measurements determined by ΠAj and Π
B
k and record
their outcomes j, k. Since dim(HAj ) = 1, Alice’s post-measurement state is in fact
classical, and we have no further entanglement between Alice and Bob. 2
To violate a Bell inequality, Alice and Bob must thus use measurements which
do not commute locally. However, since Alice and Bob are spatially separated, we
can write Alice and Bob’s measurement operators as X = Xˆ ⊗ I and Y = I⊗ Yˆ
respectively as for any ρ we can write Tr(ρ(X ⊗ Y )) = Tr(ρ(Xˆ ⊗ I)(I ⊗ Yˆ )).
Thus [X, Y ] = 0. Thus from a bipartite structure we obtain certain commutation
relations. How about the converse? As it turns out, in any finite-dimensional C∗-
algebra2, these two notions are equivalent: From commutation we immediately
obtain a bipartite structure! We encounter this well-known, rather beautiful
observation in Appendix B.
2or indeed any Type-I von Neumann algebra
6.3. Observations 115
6.3.2 Vectorizing measurements
In Chapter 7, we show how to obtain the optimal measurements for any bipartite
correlation inequality. At first sight, this may appear to be a daunting problem:
We must simultaneously maximize Eq. (6.5) over the state ρ as well as measure-
ment operators of the form X ⊗ Y , a problem which is clearly not convex. Yet,
the following brilliant observation by Tsirelson [Tsi80, Tsi87] greatly simplifies
our problem.
6.3.4. Theorem (Tsirelson). Let X1, . . . , Xn and Y1, . . . , Ym be observables
with eigenvalues in the interval [−1, 1]. Then for any state |Ψ〉 ∈ HA ⊗HB and
for all s ∈ [n], t ∈ [m], there exist real unit vectors x1, . . . , xn,y1, . . . , ym ∈ Rn+m
such that
〈Ψ|Xs ⊗ Yt|Ψ〉 = xs · yt,
where xs ·yt is the standard inner product. Conversely, let xs, yt ∈ RN be real unit
vectors. Let |Ψ〉 ∈ HA ⊗HB be any maximally entangled state where dim(HA) =
dim(HB) = 2bN/2c. Then for all s ∈ [n], t ∈ [m] there exist observables Xs on HA
and Yt on HB with eigenvalues in {−1, 1} such that
xs · yt = 〈Ψ|Xs ⊗ Yt|Ψ〉.
In fact, by limiting ourselves onto the space spanned by the vectors x1, . . . , xn
or y1, . . . , ym, we could further decrease the dimension of the vectors to N =
min{n,m} [Tsi87]. The result was proven by Tsirelson in a more general form for
any finite-dimensional C∗-algebra. Here, we do not consider this more abstract
argument, but instead simply sketch how to obtain the vectors and state how to
find the corresponding measurement operators in turn [Tsi93]. To find vectors xs
and yt, we merely need to consider the vectors
xs = Xs ⊗ I|Ψ〉 and yt = I⊗ Yt|Ψ〉,
where may take the vectors to be real [Tsi80]. Recall that we are only interested
in the inner products. But clearly we can then bound the dimension of our vectors
as the number of our vectors is strictly limited and thus cannot span a space of
dimension larger than N .
To construct observables corresponding to a given set of vectors, consider
the generators of a Clifford algebra Γ1, . . . ,ΓN with N even
3 that we already
encountered in Section 4.3, i.e., we have that for all j 6= k ∈ [N ], {Γj,Γk} = 0 and
Γ2j = I. Note that we also have Tr(ΓjΓk) = δjk as the two matrices anti-commute.
Consider two vectors xs, yt ∈ RN with xs = (x1s, . . . , xNs ) and yt = (y1t , . . . , yNt ).
Define Xs =
∑
j∈[N ] x
j
sΓ
T
j and Yt =
∑
j∈[N ] y
j
tΓj and let |Ψ〉 = (1/
√
d)
∑
k |k〉|k〉
with d = 2bN/2c be the maximally entangled state. We then have
〈Ψ|Xs ⊗ Yt|Ψ〉 = 1
d
∑
jk
xjsy
k
tTr(ΓjΓk) =
1
d
∑
j
xjsy
k
tTr(I) = xs · yt.
3If N is odd, we obtain one additional element from Γ0.
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Note that in principle we could have chosen any set of orthogonal operators
Γ1, . . . ,ΓN to obtain the stated equality. However, we obtain from their anti-
commutation that
X2s =
∑
jk
xjsx
k
sΓjΓk =
1
2
∑
jk
xjsx
k
s{Γj,Γk} =
∑
j
(xjs)
2I = I,
since ||xs|| = 1. Hence, Xs has eigenvalues in {−1, 1} as desired. Curiously,
Γ1, . . . ,ΓN were also the right choice of operators to obtain good uncertainty
relations in Chapter 4.3.
6.4 The use of post-measurement information
Looking back to Chapter 3, we see that we have already encountered the same
structure in the context of post-measurement information. Recall that there our
goal was to determine y given some ρyb ∈ {ρyb | y ∈ Y and b ∈ B} after receiv-
ing additional post-measurement information b. In particular, as we explain in
more detail in Chapter 8 we see that the question of how much post-measurement
information is required is the same as the following: given a set of observables,
how large does our quantum state have to be in order to implement the resulting
non-local game? However, we can further exploit the relationship between these
two problems to prove a gap between the optimal success probability in the set-
ting of state discrimination (STAR) and the setting of state discrimination with
post-measurement information (PI-STAR). In particular, we show that for some
problems, if we can succeed perfectly in the setting of PI-STAR without keeping
any qubits at all, our success at STAR can in fact be bounded by a Bell-type
inequality! Of course, PI-STAR itself is not a non-local problem. However, as we
saw in Appendix B, the commutation relations which are necessary for Bob to
succeed at PI-STAR perfectly in Lemma 3.5.1, do induce a bipartite structure.
We now exploit the structural similarity of the two problems.
We first consider the very simple case of two bases and a Boolean function.
Here, it turns out that we can bound the value of the STAR problems using
the CHSH inequality. We do this by showing a bound on the average of two
equivalent STAR problems, illustrated in Figures 6.3 and 6.4. The XOR function
considered in Chapter 3 is an example of such a problem. Below we construct
a generalization of the CHSH inequality which allows us to make more general
statements. We state our result in the notation introduced in Chapter 3. For
simplicity, we use indices + and × to denote two arbitrary bases and use the
notation STAR(ρ0, . . . , ρn−1) to refer to a state discrimination problem between
n different states.
6.4.1. Lemma. Let PX(x) = 1/2
n for all x ∈ {0, 1}n and let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}
be any Boolean function. Let B = {+,×} denote a set of two bases, and suppose
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there exists a unitary U such that ρ0+ = Uρ0+U
†, ρ1+ = Uρ1+U †, ρ1× = Uρ0×U †
and ρ0× = Uρ1×U †. Suppose Bob succeeds at PI-STAR0(f) with probability p = 1.
Then he succeeds at STAR(ρ0, ρ1) with probability at most 3/4, where ρ0 = (ρ0++
ρ0×)/2, ρ1 = (ρ1+ + ρ1×)/2.
Proof. Let P0+, P1+, P0× and P1× be projectors onto the support of ρ0+,
ρ1+, ρ0× and ρ1× respectively. Suppose that Bob succeeds with probability p
at STAR(ρ0, ρ1). Then there exists a strategy for Alice and Bob to succeed at
the CHSH game with probability p, where Alice’s measurements are given by
{P0+, P1+} and {P0×, P1×}:
Let ρˆ0 = (ρ0+ + ρ1×)/2 and ρˆ1 = (ρ1+ + ρ0×)/2. Note that since there exists
such a U , we have that Bob succeeds at STAR(ρˆ0, ρˆ1) with probability p as well.
Suppose that Alice and Bob share the maximally entangled state |ΨAB〉⊗n with
|ΨAB〉 = (|00〉 + |11〉)/
√
2. With probability 1/2 Alice chooses measurement
setting x = 0 and then her measurement is given by {P0+, P1+}. Let a denote
her measurement outcome. Bob’s system is now in the state ρa+. Similarly, with
probability 1/2 Alice sets x = 1 and measures {P0×, P1×}, which leaves Bob’s
system in the state ρa×. Let y denote Bob’s measurement setting. The CHSH
game now requires Bob to obtain a measurement outcome b such that x·y = a⊕b.
Thus, for y = 0, Bob always tries to obtain b = a which means he wants to solve
STAR(ρ0, ρ1). For y = 1, Bob tries to obtain b = a for x = 0 but b = 1 − a
for x = 1, i.e., he wants to solve STAR(ρˆ0, ρˆ1). Since Bob chooses y ∈ {0, 1}
uniformly at random, we obtain the stated result.
Now suppose that Bob succeeds at PI-STAR0(f) with probability p = 1. We
know from Lemma 3.5.1 that for all y, y′ ∈ Y and b, b′ ∈ B we have [Pyb, Py′b′ ] = 0
where Pyb is a projector onto the support of ρyb. Now, suppose that on the
contrary he succeeds at STAR(ρ0, ρ1) with probability greater than 3/4. Then
we know from the above argument that there exists a strategy for Alice and Bob
to succeed at the CHSH game with probability greater than 3/4 where Alice
measures two commuting observables, which contradicts Corollary 6.3.3. 2
+   x
 0  P0+ P0x
1  P1+ P1x
Figure 6.3: Original problem
+   x
 0  P0+ P0x
1  P1+ P1x
Figure 6.4: Derived problem
It may appear unrealistic to assume that the two STAR problems are es-
sentially equal. Note however, that this is indeed the case in the example of
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the XOR function and two mutually unbiased bases (e.g. computational and
Hadamard). The unitary here is just U = σz ⊗ I⊗n−1, as σz acts as a bit-flip in
the Hadamard basis, but leaves the computational basis invariant. We saw in the
proof of Theorem 3.3.5 that such unitaries exist for any choice of two bases from
the computational, Hadamard and K-basis. Indeed, for the XOR function on a
string of length n with n even we saw that for STAR the optimal probability is
p = 3/4, whereas for PI-STAR we obtained p = 1, as expected.
To generalize this approach, we need to consider more complicated inequali-
ties. In general, there are many possibilities for such inequalities, and one should
choose an inequality that reflects the equivalences of possible STAR problems:
For example, for the XOR function the CHSH inequality is a good choice as we
could identify U = σz⊗I⊗n−1 to give us an equivalence between the two problems.
Of course, we would like to ensure that for one of Bob’s measurement settings
he needs to solve the original STAR problem where Bob’s goal is to determine
Alice’s measurement outcome. At the same time, we would like to minimize the
number of possibly inequivalent additional STAR problems created in a similar
proof, i.e. we would like to find an inequality where Bob has only a small number
of measurement settings. As an example, we consider the following easy way to
extend the CHSH inequality. Here, we assume that Alice has equally many mea-
surement outcomes as she has measurement settings. In the language of PI-STAR
that means we have wlog A = Y = S = B. We fix the number of Bob’s measure-
ment settings to 2, but allow an arbitrarily large number of settings |S| = |B|
for Alice. Wlog we use T = {0, 1} and S = {0, . . . , |B| − 1}. We now define the
predicate V with the help of the function τ st for s ∈ S and t ∈ T . Let τ s0 (y) = y
for all s ∈ S and let τ 01 (y) = y and τ s1 (y) = σs(y) for all s ∈ {1, . . . , |B| − 1},
where σ = (1, . . . , |B| − 1) is the cyclic permutation. We now define the inequal-
ity as a non-local game with predicate V (a, b|s, t) = 1 if and only if b = τ st (a).
Intuitively, this means that if Bob chooses setting t = 0 he is required to solve
the original STAR problem, where he tries to guess Alice’s measurement out-
come. For the setting t = 1 he has to solve the problem where the values of y are
shifted depending on the basis. Note that the CHSH inequality is a special case
of this inequality. Recall from Section 6.2.3 that the optimal value of a classical
game can always be attained by a deterministic strategy. Let fA : S → Y and
fB : T → Y denote the functions implementing this strategy for Alice and Bob
respectively. Looking at Eq. (6.3) we see that we can write
ωc(G) = max
1
2|B|
∑
t,s
[τ st (fA(s)) = fB(t)],
where [x = y] = 1 if and only if x = y. It is easy to see that for a uniform choice of
Alice and Bob’s measurements, the best thing Bob can do is answer fB(t) = x for
all t where we choose any fixed x ∈ Y and let x = fA(s) for all s ∈ S, i.e. Alice and
Bob agree on a particular outcome which will always be their answer regardless
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of their setting. For t = 0 this means that Bob is always correct, and for t = 1 he
will be correct if Alice obtained a = 0. We then have ωc(G) = (|B| + 1)/(2|B|).
For the CHSH case, this gives us ωc(G) = 3/4 as expected. It is now possible to
make a similar statement then in Lemma 6.4.1 for a bigger PI-STAR problem.
The connection to Bell inequalities helped us understand the case where there
exists a clear gap between the two problems. Here, post-measurement informa-
tion was extremely helpful to us. However, as we saw in Chapter 3 there do
exist cases where post-measurement information is entirely useless: we can do
equally well without it, if we cannot store any quantum information. Interest-
ingly, in the example of the XOR function on an odd number of input bits this
happens exactly when the corresponding states correspond to a measurement
that maximally violates CHSH. We have thus reached an extremal point of our
problem. Is it possible to find conditions on a set of states which determine when
post-measurement information is indeed useful?
6.5 Conclusion
As we saw, entanglement is an inherent aspect of quantum theory. We can experi-
mentally violate Bell’s inequality, because we can indeed measure non-commuting
observables. The existence of such violations is, next to uncertainty relations and
locking, another consequence of the existence of non-commuting measurements
within quantum theory. This illustrates their close link to uncertainty relations,
locking and even post-measurement information we encountered in the preceding
chapters. In essence, in all these tasks we are faced with exactly the same prob-
lem: what are the consequences of non-commuting measurements? And how can
we find maximally “incompatible” measurements?
In the following chapters, we examine entanglement from a variety of view-
points. In Chapter 7, we first consider Bell inequalities, and show how to find
upper bounds on their violation in a quantum setting. Our approach allows us to
find the optimal measurements for any bipartite correlation inequality with two-
outcome measurements in a very easy manner. We then consider more general
multipartite inequalities. Sadly, our method does not easily apply for more gen-
eral inequalities. In fact, it is not even clear how large our optimization problem
would have to be. We therefore consider a related problem in Chapter 8: Given
a probability distribution over measurement outcomes, how large a state do we
need to implement such a strategy? We prove a very weak lower bound on the
dimension on the resulting state for a very restricted class of games. Finally, we
consider the effects that entanglement has on classical protocols in Chapter 9. To
this end we examine interactive proof systems where the two provers are allowed
to share entanglement. Surprisingly, it turns out that two such provers can be
simulated by just a single quantum prover.

Chapter 7
Finding optimal quantum strategies
In the previous chapter, we encountered the CHSH inequality and its generaliza-
tions in the guise of quantum games. Tsirelson has proven an upper bound on the
CHSH inequality that can be achieved using a quantum strategy. But how can we
prove upper bounds for more general inequalities? Or actually, how can we find
the optimal measurement strategy? In this chapter, we answer these questions for
a restricted class of inequalities by presenting a method that yields the optimal
strategy for any two-player correlation inequality with n measurement settings
and two measurement outcomes, i.e. an XOR-game.
7.1 Introduction
Optimal strategies for generalized inequalities not only have applications in com-
puter science with regard to interactive proof systems, but may also be important
to ensure security in cryptographic protocols. From a physical perspective find-
ing such bounds may also be helpful. As Braunstein and Caves [BC90b] have
shown, it is interesting to consider inequalities based on many measurement set-
tings, in particular, the chained CHSH inequality in Eq. 7.1 below: Here, the
gap between the classical and the quantum bound is larger than for the origi-
nal CHSH inequality with only two measurement settings. This can be helpful
in real experiments that inevitably include noise, as this inequality leads to a
larger gap achieved by the optimal classical and the quantum strategy, and may
thus lead to a better test. However, determining bounds on the correlations that
quantum theory allows remains a difficult problem [BM05]. All Tsirelson-type
bounds are known for correlation inequalities with two measurement settings and
two outcomes for both Alice and Bob [Tsi93]. Landau [Lan88] has taken a step
towards finding Tsirelson-type bounds by considering when two-party correla-
tions of two measurement settings for both Alice and Bob can be realized using
quantum measurements. Filipp and Svozil [FS04] have considered the case of
three measurement settings analytically and conducted numerical studies for a
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larger number of settings. Werner and Wolf [WW01a] also considered obtaining
Tsirelson-type bounds for two-outcome measurements for multiple parties and
studied the case of three and four settings explicitly. However, their method is
hard to apply to general inequalities. Finally, Buhrman and Massar have shown a
bound for a generalized CHSH inequality using three measurement settings with
three outcomes each [BM05]. It is not known whether this bound can be attained.
Our approach is based on semidefinite programming in combination with
Tsirelson’s seminal results [Tsi80, Tsi87, Tsi93] as outlined in Section 6.3.2. See
Appendix A for a brief introduction to semidefinite programming. It is very easy
to apply and gives tight bounds as we can find the optimal measurements explic-
itly. Let X and Y be Alice’s and Bob’s observables, and let |Ψ〉 be a state shared
by Alice and Bob. The key benefit we derive from Tsirelson’s construction is that
it saves us from the need to maximize over all states |Ψ〉 and observables. In-
stead, we can replace any terms of the form 〈Ψ|X ⊗Y |Ψ〉 with the inner product
of two real unit vectors x · y, and then maximize over all such vectors instead.
Our method is thereby similar to methods used in computer science for the two-
way partitioning problem [BV04] and the approximation algorithm for MAXCUT
by Goemans and Williamson [GW95]. Semidefinite programming allows for an
efficient way to approximate Tsirelson’s bounds for any CHSH-type inequalities
numerically. However, it can also be used to prove Tsirelson type bounds ana-
lytically. As an illustration, we first give an alternative proof of Tsirelson’s origi-
nal bound using semidefinite programming. We then prove a new Tsirelson-type
bound for the following generalized CHSH inequality [Per93, BC90b]. Classically,
it can be shown that
|
n∑
i=1
〈XiYi〉+
n−1∑
i=1
〈Xi+1Yi〉 − 〈X1Yn〉| ≤ 2n− 2. (7.1)
Here, we show that for quantum mechanics
|
n∑
i=1
〈XiYi〉+
n−1∑
i=1
〈Xi+1Yi〉 − 〈X1Yn〉| ≤ 2n cos
( pi
2n
)
,
where {X1, . . . , Xn} and {Y1, . . . , Yn} are observables with eigenvalues ±1 em-
ployed by Alice and Bob respectively, corresponding to their n possible measure-
ment settings. It is well known that this bound can be achieved [Per93, BC90b]
for a specific set of measurement settings if Alice and Bob share a singlet state.
Here, we show that this bound is indeed optimal for any state |Ψ〉 and choice of
measurement settings. This method generalizes to other CHSH inequalities, for
example, the inequality considered by Gisin [Gis99].
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7.2 A simple example: Tsirelson’s bound
To illustrate our approach we first give a detailed proof of Tsirelson’s bound
using semidefinite programming. This proof is more complicated than Tsirelson’s
original proof. However, it serves as a good introduction to the following section.
Let X1, X2 and Y1, Y2 denote the observables with eigenvalues ±1 used by Alice
and Bob respectively. Our goal is now to show an upper bound for
|〈X1Y1〉+ 〈X1Y2〉+ 〈X2Y1〉 − 〈X2Y2〉|.
From Theorem 6.3.4 we know that there exist real unit vectors xs, yt ∈ R4 such
that for all s, t ∈ {0, 1} 〈XsYt〉 = xs·yt. In order to find Tsirelson’s bound, we thus
want to solve the following problem: maximize x1·y1+x1·y2+x2·y1−x2·y2, subject
to ‖ x1 ‖ = ‖ x2 ‖ = ‖ y1 ‖ = ‖ y2 ‖ = 1. Note that we can drop the absolute
value since any set of vectors maximizing the above equation, simultaneously leads
to a set of vectors minimizing it by taking −y1,−y2 instead. We now phrase this
as a semidefinite program. Let G = [gij] be the Gram matrix of the vectors
{x1, x2, y1, y2} ⊆ R4 with respect to the inner product:
G =

x1 · x1 x1 · x2 x1 · y1 x1 · y2
x2 · x1 x2 · x2 x2 · y1 x2 · y2
y1 · x1 y1 · x2 y1 · y2 y1 · y2
y2 · x1 y2 · x2 y2 · y1 y2 · y2
 .
G can thus be written as G = BTB where the columns of B are the vectors
{x1, x2, y1, y2}. By [HJ85, Theorem 7.2.10] we can write G = BTB if and only if
G is positive semidefinite. We thus impose the constraint that G ≥ 0. To make
sure that we obtain unit vectors, we add the constraint that all diagonal entries
of G must be equal to 1. Define
W =

0 0 1 1
0 0 1 −1
1 1 0 0
1 −1 0 0
 .
Note that the choice of order of the vectors in B is not unique, however, a different
order only leads to a different W and does not change our argument. We can
now rephrase our optimization problem as the following SDP:
maximize 1
2
Tr(GW )
subject to G ≥ 0 and ∀i, gii = 1
Analogous to Appendix A, we can then write for the Lagrangian
L(G, λ) =
1
2
Tr(GW )− Tr(diag(λ)(G− I)),
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where λ = (λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4). The dual function is then
g(λ) = sup
G
Tr
(
G
(
1
2
W − diag(λ)
))
+ Tr(diag(λ))
=
{
Tr(diag(λ)) if 1
2
W − diag(λ) ≤ 0
∞ otherwise
We then obtain the following dual formulation of the SDP
minimize Tr(diag(λ))
subject to −1
2
W + diag(λ) ≥ 0
Let p′ and d′ denote optimal values for the primal and Lagrange dual problem
respectively. From weak duality it follows that d′ ≥ p′. For our example, it is not
difficult to see that this is indeed true as we show in Appendix A.
In order to prove Tsirelson’s bound, we now exhibit an optimal solution for
both the primal and dual problem and then show that the value of the pri-
mal problem equals the value of the dual problem. The optimal solution is well
known [Tsi80, Tsi87, Per93]. Alternatively, we could easily guess the optimal
solution based on numerical optimization by a small program for Matlab1 and
the package SeDuMi [SA] for semidefinite programming. Consider the following
solution for the primal problem
G′ =

1 0 1√
2
1√
2
0 1 1√
2
− 1√
2
1√
2
1√
2
1 0
1√
2
− 1√
2
0 1
 ,
which gives rise to the primal value p′ = 1
2
Tr(G′W ) = 2
√
2. Note thatG′ ≥ 0 since
all its eigenvalues are non-negative [HJ85, Theorem 7.2.1], and all its diagonal
entries are 1. Thus all constraints are satisfied. The lower left quadrant of G′ is
in fact the same as the well known correlation matrix for 2 observables [Tsi93,
Equation 3.16]. Next, consider the following solution for the dual problem
λ′ =
1√
2
(1, 1, 1, 1) .
The dual value is then d′ = Tr(diag(λ′)) = 2
√
2. Because −W + diag(λ′) ≥ 0, λ′
satisfies the constraint. Since p′ = d′, G′ and λ′ are in fact optimal solutions for
the primal and dual respectively. We can thus conclude that
|〈X1Y1〉+ 〈X1Y2〉+ 〈X2Y1〉 − 〈X2Y2〉| ≤ 2
√
2,
which is Tsirelson’s bound [Tsi80]. By Theorem 6.3.4, this bound is achievable.
1See http://www.cwi.nl/˜wehner/tsirel/ for the Matlab example code.
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7.3 The generalized CHSH inequality
We now show how to obtain bounds for inequalities based on more than 2 ob-
servables for both Alice and Bob. In particular, we prove a bound for the chained
CHSH inequality for the quantum case. It is well known [Per93] that it is possi-
ble to choose observablesX1, . . . , Xn and Y1, . . . , Yn, and the maximally entangled
state, such that
|
n∑
i=1
〈XiYi〉+
n−1∑
i=1
〈Xi+1Yi〉 − 〈X1Yn〉| = 2n cos
( pi
2n
)
.
We now show that this is optimal. Our proof is similar to the last section.
However, it is more difficult to show feasibility for all n.
7.3.1. Theorem. Let ρ ∈ A ⊗ B be an arbitrary state, where A and B denote
the Hilbert spaces of Alice and Bob. Let X1, . . . , Xn and Y1, . . . , Yn be observables
with eigenvalues ±1 on A and B respectively. Then
|
n∑
i=1
〈XiYi〉+
n−1∑
i=1
〈Xi+1Yi〉 − 〈X1Yn〉| ≤ 2n cos
( pi
2n
)
,
Proof. By Theorem 6.3.4, our goal is to find the maximum value for x1 ·y1+x2 ·
y1+x2 ·y2+x3 ·y2+. . .+xn ·yn−x1 ·yn, for real unit vectors x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn ∈
R2n. As above we can drop the absolute value. Let G = [gij] be the Gram
matrix of the vectors {x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn} ⊆ R2n. As before, we can thus write
G = BTB, where the columns of B are the vectors {x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn}, if
and only if G ≥ 0. To ensure we obtain unit vectors, we again demand that all
diagonal entries of G equal 1. Define n× n matrix A and 2n× 2n matrix W by
A =

1 1 0 . . . 0
0 1 1
...
...
. . . . . . 0
0 1 1
−1 0 . . . 0 1
 , W =
(
0 A†
A 0
)
.
We can now phrase our maximization problem as the following SDP:
maximize 1
2
Tr(GW )
subject to G ≥ 0 and ∀i, gii = 1
Analogous to the previous section, the dual SDP is then:
minimize Tr(diag(λ))
subject to −1
2
W + diag(λ) ≥ 0
Let p′ and d′ denote optimal values for the primal and dual problem respectively.
As before, d′ ≥ p′.
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Primal We now show that the vectors suggested in [Per93] are optimal. For
k ∈ [n], choose unit vectors xk, yk ∈ R2n to be of the form
xk = (cos(φk), sin(φk), 0, . . . , 0),
yk = (cos(ψk), sin(ψk), 0, . . . , 0),
where φk =
pi
2n
(2k − 2) and ψk = pi2n(2k − 1). The angle between xk and yk is
given by ψk − φk = pi2n and thus xk · yk = cos
(
pi
2n
)
. The angle between xk+1 and
yk is φk+1 − ψk = pi2n and thus xk+1 · yk = cos
(
pi
2n
)
. Finally, the angle between
−x1 and yn is pi − ψn = pi2n and so −x1 · yn = cos
(
pi
2n
)
. The value of our primal
problem is thus given by
p′ =
n∑
k=1
xk · yk +
n−1∑
k=1
xk+1 · yk − x1 · yn = 2n cos
( pi
2n
)
.
Let G′ be the Gram matrix constructed from all vectors xk, yk as described earlier.
Note that our constraints are satisfied: ∀i : gii = 1 and G′ ≥ 0, because G′ is
symmetric and of the form G′ = BTB.
Dual Now consider the 2n-dimensional vector
λ′ = cos
( pi
2n
)
(1, . . . , 1) .
In order to show that this is a feasible solution to the dual problem, we have to
prove that −1
2
W + diag(λ′) ≥ 0 and thus the constraint is satisfied. To this end,
we first show that
2. Claim. The eigenvalues of A are given by γs = 1 + e
ipi(2s+1)/n with s =
0, . . . , n− 1.
Proof. Note that if the lower left corner of A were 1, A would be a circulant
matrix [Gra71], i.e. each row of A is constructed by taking the previous row and
shifting it one place to the right. We can use ideas from circulant matrices to
guess eigenvalues γs with eigenvectors
us = (ρ
n−1
s , ρ
n−2
s , ρ
n−3
s , . . . , ρ
1
s, ρ
0
s),
where ρs = e
−ipi(2s+1)/n and s = 0, . . . , n − 1. By definition, u = (u1, u2, . . . , un)
is an eigenvector of A with eigenvalue γ if and only if Au = γu. Here, Au = γu
if and only if
(i) ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} : uj + uj+1 = γuj,
(ii) −u1 + un = γun.
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Since for any j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}
uj + uj+1 = ρ
n−j
s + ρ
n−j−1
s =
= e−i(n−j)pi(2s+1)/n(1 + eipi(2s+1)/n) =
= ρn−js γs = γsuj,
(i) is satisfied. Furthermore (ii) is satisfied, since
−u1 + un = −ρn−1s + ρ0s =
= −e−ipi(2s+1)eipi(2s+1)/n + 1 =
= 1 + eipi(2s+1)/n =
= γsρ
0
s = γsun.
2
3. Claim. The largest eigenvalue of W is given by γ = 2 cos
(
pi
2n
)
.
Proof. By [HJ85, Theorem 7.3.7], the eigenvalues ofW are given by the singular
values of A and their negatives. It follows from Claim 2 that the singular values
of A are
σs =
√
γsγ∗s =
√
2 + 2 cos
(
pi(2s+ 1)
n
)
.
Considering the shape of the cosine function, it is easy to see that the largest
singular value of A is given by
√
2 + 2 cos(pi/n) =
√
4 cos2(pi/(2n)), the largest
eigenvalue of W is
√
2 + 2 cos(pi/n) = 2 cos(pi/(2n)). 2
Since −1
2
W and diag(λ′) are both Hermitian, Weyl’s theorem [HJ85, Theorem
4.3.1] implies that
γmin
(
−1
2
W + diag(λ′)
)
≥ γmin
(
−1
2
W
)
+ γmin (diag(λ
′)) ,
where γmin(M) is the smallest eigenvalue of a matrixM . It then follows from the
fact that diag(λ′) is diagonal and Claim 3 that
γmin
(
−1
2
W + diag(λ′)
)
≥ −1
2
(
2 cos
( pi
2n
))
+ cos
( pi
2n
)
= 0.
Thus −1
2
W + diag(λ′) ≥ 0 and λ′ is a feasible solution to the dual problem. The
value of the dual problem is then
d′ = Tr(diag(λ′)) = 2n cos
( pi
2n
)
.
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Because p′ = d′, G′ and λ′ are optimal solutions for the primal and dual respec-
tively, which completes our proof. 2
Note that for the primal problem we are effectively dealing with 2-dimensional
vectors, xk, yk. As we saw in Section 6.3.2, it follows from Tsirelson’s construc-
tion [Tsi93] that in this case we just need a single EPR pair such that we can
find observables that achieve this bound. In fact, these vectors just determine
the measurement directions as given in [Per93].
Figure 7.1: Optimal vectors for n = 4 obtained numerically using Matlab.
7.4 General approach and its applications
7.4.1 General approach
Our approach can easily be generalized to other correlation inequalities. For
another inequality, we merely use a different matrix A in W . For example, for
Gisin’s CHSH inequality [Gis99], A is the matrix with 1’s in the upper left half
and on the diagonal, and -1’s in the lower right part. Otherwise our approach
stays exactly the same, and thus we do not consider this case here. Numerical
results provided by our Matlab example code suggest that Gisin’s observables are
optimal. Given the framework of semidefinite programming, the only difficulty
in proving bounds for other inequalities is to determine the eigenvalues of the
corresponding A, a simple matrix. All bounds found this way are tight, as we
can always implement the resulting strategy using a maximally entangled state
as shown in Section 6.3.2.
With respect to finding numerical bounds, we see that the optimal strategy
can be found in time exponential in the number of measurement settings: The
size of the vectors scales exponentially with the number of settings, however, we
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can fortunately find the optimal vectors in time polynomial in the length of the
vectors using well-known algorithms for semidefinite programming [BV04].
7.4.2 Applications
In Chapter 9, we will see that the mere existence of such a semidefinite program
has implications for the computational complexity of interactive proof systems
with entanglement. Cleve, Høyer, Toner and Watrous [CHTW04a] have also
remarked during their presentation at CCC’04 that Tsirelson’s constructions leads
to an approach by semidefinite programming in the context of multiple interactive
proof systems with entanglement, but never gave an explicit argument.
The above semidefinite program has also been used to prove results about
compositions of quantum games, in particular, parallel repetitions of quantum
XOR-games [CSUU07]. One particular type of composition studied by Cleve,
Slofstra, Unger and Upadhyay [CSUU07] is the XOR-composition of non-local
games. For example, an XOR-composition of a CHSH game is a new game where
Alice and Bob each have n inputs x1, . . . , xn and y1, . . . , yn with xj, yj ∈ {0, 1}
and must give answers a and b such that a ⊕ b = ⊕xj · yj. In terms of our
semidefinite program, this is indeed easy to analyze. The matrix defining the
game is now given by
A =
(
1 1
1 −1
)
W =
(
0 A⊗n
A⊗n 0
)
.
Note that the eigenvalues ofW are given by±√γ(A)γ(A)∗ where γ(A) = ±(√2)n
is an eigenvalue of A⊗n. Consider the matrix G = I + W/(
√
2)n. Clearly,
W/(
√
2)n has eigenvalues ±1 so we have G ≥ 0. Thus G is a valid solution
to our primal problem, for which we obtain p = Tr(GW )/2 = (2
√
2)k. Consider
λ = (1, . . . , 1)((
√
2)n/2). Clearly, it is a valid solution to our dual problem as
−W/2 + diag(λ) ≥ 0, again using Weyl’s theorem. This gives for our dual prob-
lem d = Tr(diag(λ)) = (2
√
2)n = p and thus our primal solution is optimal. For
more general problems, such a composition may be more complicated as the dual
solution is not immediately related to the eigenvalues of W . Nevertheless, it can
be readily evaluated using Schur’s complement trick [CSUU07]. By rewriting, one
can then relate such compositions to the questions of parallel repetition: Given
multiple runs of the game, does there exist a better quantum measurement than
executing the optimal strategy of each round many times? It is very interest-
ing that this is in fact not true for XOR-games [CSUU07]. However, there exist
inequalities and specific quantum states for which collective measurements are
better. Such examples can be found in the works of Peres [Per96] and Liang and
Doherty [LD06]. Sadly, our approach fails here.
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7.5 Conclusion
We have provided a simple method to obtain the optimal measurements for any
bipartite correlation inequality, i.e. any two-player XOR game. Our method
easily allows us to obtain bounds using numerical analysis, but also suits itself to
construct analytical proofs as demonstrated by our examples. However, the above
discussion immediately highlights the shortcomings of our approach. How can we
find the optimal strategies for more generalized inequalities, where we have more
than two players or a non-correlation inequality? Or more than two measurement
outcomes? How can we find the optimal strategy for a fixed quantum state that
is given to Alice and Bob? To address more than two measurement outcomes, we
can rescale the observables such that they have eigenvalues in the interval [−1, 1].
Indeed, examining Tsirelson’s proof, it is easy to see that we could achieve the
same by demanding that the vectors have a length proportional to the number of
settings. However, it is clear that the converse of Tsirelson’s theorem that allows
us to construct measurement from the vectors can no longer hold. Indeed, any
matrix M =
∑
jmjXj that can be written as a sum of anti-commuting matrices
X1, . . . , Xn with X
2
j = I and
∑
jm
2
j = 1 must have eigenvalues ±1 itself since
M2 =
∑
jkmjmkXjXk =
(∑
jm
2
j
)
I = I.
Since the completion of this work, exciting progress has been made to an-
swer the above questions. Liang and Doherty [LD07] have shown how to ob-
tain lower and upper bounds on the optimal strategy achievable using a fixed
quantum state using semidefinite programming relaxations. Kempe, Kobayashi,
Matsumoto, Toner and Vidick [KKM+07] have since shown that there exist three-
player games for which the optimal quantum strategy cannot be computed using
a semidefinite program that is exponential in the number of measurement set-
tings unless P=NP. Finally, Navascue´s, Pironio and Ac´ın [NPA07] have shown
how to obtain bounds for general two-party inequalities with more measurement
outcomes using semidefinite programming, inspired by Landau [Lan88]. Their
beautiful approach used successive hierarchies of semidefinite programs to obtain
better and better bounds. In their approach, they consider whether a given dis-
tribution over outcomes can be obtained using a quantum strategy. Sadly, it does
not give a general method to construct actual measurements and thus show that
an obtained bound is tight. A similar result obtained using an approach that is
essentially dual to [NPA07] has been obtained in [DLTW08], which also proves a
convergence result for such a hierarchy.
One of the difficulties we face when trying to find tight bounds for more general
inequalities is to determine how large our optimization problem has to be. But
even if we are given some distribution over possible outcomes, how can we decide
how large our system has to be in order to implement a quantum strategy? In
general, this is a tricky problem which we will consider in the next chapter.
Chapter 8
Bounding entanglement in NL-games
In the previous chapter, we provided a simple method to determine the optimal
quantum strategy for two-outcome XOR games. However, when trying to find
the optimal strategies for more general games, we are faced with a fundamental
issue: How large do we have to choose our state and measurements such that we
can achieve the optimal quantum value?
8.1 Introduction
Determining an upper bound and the amount of entanglement we need, given
the description of the game alone, turns out to be a tricky problem in the gen-
eral case. Hence, we address an intermediate problem: Given the description of
a non-local game and associated probabilities, how large a state do Alice and
Bob need to implement such a strategy? Navascue´s, Pironio and Ac´ın [NPA07]
and also [DLTW08] have shown how to obtain upper bounds for the violation of
more general quantum games using multiple hierarchies of semidefinite programs.
However, their method does not provide us with an explicit strategy, and it re-
mains unclear how many levels of the hierarchy we need to consider in order to
obtain a tight bound. Yet, from their method we can obtain a probability distri-
bution over measurement outcomes. Using our approach, we can then determine
an extremely weak lower bound on the dimension of the quantum state we would
need in order to implement a corresponding quantum strategy.
The idea behind our approach is to transform a non-local game into a random
access code. A random access code is an encoding of a string into a quantum
state such that we can retrieve at least one entry of our choice from this string
with some probability. Intuitively, Alice’s measurements will create an encoding.
Bob’s choice of measurement then determines which bit of this “encoding” he
wants to retrieve. We prove a general lower bound for any independent one-
to-one non-local game among n players, where a one-to-one non-local game is a
game where for each possible measurement setting there exists exactly one correct
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measurement outcome. In particular, we show that in any one-to-one non-local
game where player Pj obtains the correct outcome a ∈ Aj for any measurement
setting s ∈ Sj with probability p the dimension d of player Pj’s state obeys
d ≥ 2(log |Aj |−H(p)−(1−p) log(|Aj |−1))|Sj |.
Even though our bound is very weak, and the class of games very restricted, we are
hopeful that our approach may lead to stronger results in the future. Finally, we
discuss how we could obtain upper bounds from the description of the non-local
game alone without resorting to probability distributions.
8.2 Preliminaries
Before we can prove our lower bound, we first introduce the notion of a random
access code. For our purposes, we need to generalize the existing results on
random access codes. We use M(ρ) to denote the random variable corresponding
to the outcome of a measurement M on a state ρ. We also use An to denote an
n-element string where each element is chosen from an alphabet A. We will also
use the notation ~s−j to denote the string ~s = (s1, . . . , sn) without the element sj.
8.2.1 Random access codes
A quantum (n,m, p)-random access code (RAC) [ANTV99, Nay99] over a binary
alphabet is an encoding of an n-bit string x into an m-qubit state ρx such that for
any i ∈ [n] we can retrieve xi from ρx with probability p. Note that we are only
interested in retrieving a single bit of the original string x from ρx. In general, it
is unlikely we will be able to retrieve more than a single bit. For such codes the
following lower bound has been shown [Nay99, Theorem 2.3], where it is assumed
that the original strings x are chosen uniformly at random:
8.2.1. Theorem (Nayak). Any (n,m, p)-random access code has m ≥ (1 −
H(p))n.
In the following, we make use of a generalization of random access codes to
larger alphabets. We also need two additional generalizations: First, we also
want to obtain a bound on such a RAC encoding if the string x is chosen from a
slightly more general, possibly non-uniform, distribution. Let PXt be a probability
distribution over Σ and let PX = PX1×. . .×PXn be a probability distribution over
Σn. That is, a particular string x is chosen with probability PX(x) = Π
n
t=1PXt(xt).
Note that we assume that the individual entries of x are chosen independently.
Second, we allow for unbalanced random access codes, where each entry of the
string x may have a different probability of being decoded correctly. We define
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8.2.2. Definition. An (n,m, (p1, . . . , pn))|Σ|-unbalanced random access code (URAC)
over a finite alphabet Σ is an encoding of an n-element string x ∈ Σn into an
m-qubit state ρx such that for any t ∈ [n], there exists a measurement Mt with
outcomes Σ such that for all x ∈ Σn we have Pr[Mt(ρx) = xt] ≥ pt.
Fortunately, it is straightforward to extend the analysis of Nayak [Nay99] to
this setting. We extend the proof by Nayak as opposed to other known proofs
of this lower bound in order to deal with unbalanced random access codes more
easily.
8.2.3. Lemma. Let PX = PX1 × . . .× PXn be a probability distribution over Σn.
Then any (n,m, (p1, . . . , pn))|Σ|-unbalanced random access code has
m ≥
n∑
t=1
H(Xt)−H(pt)− (1− pt) log(|Σ| − 1)
where Xt is a random variable chosen from Σ according to the probability distri-
bution PXt.
Proof. The proof follows along the same lines as Lemma 4.1 and Claim 4.6
of [Nay99]. We state the adaption for clarity:
We first consider decoding a single element. Let σa with a ∈ Σ be density
matrices, and let P be a probability distribution over Σ. Define σ =
∑
a∈Σ P (a)σa.
Let M be a measurement with outcomes Σ that given any state σa gives the
correct outcome a with average probability p. Let X be a random variable over
Σ chosen according to probability distribution P , and let Z be a random variable
over Σ corresponding to the outcome of the measurement. It now follows from
Fano’s inequality (see for example [Hay06, Theorem 2.2]) that I(X,Z) = H(X)−
H(X|Z) ≥ H(X) −H(p) − (1− p) log(|Σ| − 1). Using Holevo’s bound, we then
have S(σ) ≥∑a∈Σ P (a)S(σa) +H(X)−H(p)− (1− p) log(|Σ| − 1).
We now consider an entire string x encoded as a state ρx. Consider k with
n ≥ k ≥ 0 and define ρy =
∑
z∈Σn−k qzρzy with qz = Π
n
j=n−kPXj(zj) where we
used indices z = zn, . . . , zn−k and PXj to denote the probability distribution over
Σ according to which the j-th entry was encoded. We now claim that S(ρy) ≥∑
a∈Σ PXn−k(a)S(ρay) +H(Xn−k)−H(pn−k)− (1− pn−k) log(|Σ| − 1). The proof
follows by downward induction over k: Consider n = k, clearly S(ρy) ≥ 0 and the
claim is valid. Now suppose our claim holds for k + 1. Note that we have ρy =∑
a∈Σ PXn−k(a)ρay. Note that strings encoded by the density matrices ρay only
differ by one element a ∈ Σ. We can therefore distinguish them with probability
pn−k. From the above discussion we have that S(ρy) ≥
∑
a∈Σ PXn−k(a)S(ρay) +
H(Xn−k)−H(pn−k)− (1− pn−k) log(|Σ| − 1).
Using the inductive hypothesis, letting y be the empty string and using the
fact that S(ρ) ≤ log d = m then completes the proof. 2
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8.2.2 Non-local games and state discrimination
For our purpose, we need to think of non-local games as a special form of state
discrimination. When each subset of players performs a measurement on their
part of the state, they effectively prepare a certain state on the system of the
remaining players. Let χ
~s−j
~a−j denote the state of Player Pj if the remaining play-
ers chose measurement settings ~s−j and obtained outcomes ~a−j. Note that the
probability that player Pj holds χ
~s−j
~a−j is Pr[~a−j, ~s−j] = Pr[~a−j|~s−j]ΠN`=1,` 6=jpi`(s`).
Define the state
ζsjaj =
1
q
sj
aj
∑
~s−j
∑
~a−j
V (~a|~s) Pr[~a−j|~s−j]χ~s−j~a−j

where q
sj
aj =
∑
~s−j
∑
~a−j V (~a|~s) Pr[~a−j|~s−j] to ensure normalization. We call a
game independent, if the sets of probabilities {quaj | aj ∈ Aj} and {qvak | ak ∈ Aj}
are uncorrelated for all measurement settings u, v ∈ Sj with u 6= v. Note that
q
sj
aj is the probability that player Pj holds state ζ
sj
aj , and that
∑
aj∈Aj q
sj
aj = 1
since the game is one-to-one. If player Pj now chooses measurement setting sj he
is effectively trying to solve a state discrimination problem, given the ensemble
{qsjaj , ζsjaj |aj ∈ Aj}.
Note that we already encountered this viewpoint in Chapter 6.4. Consider
the simple case of the CHSH game. Here, Alice (Player 1) and Bob (Player 2)
had to give answers a1 and a2 for settings s1 and s2 such that s1 · s2 = a1 ⊕ a2.
Let ζs1a1 denote Bob’s state if Alice chose measurement setting s1 and obtained
outcome a1. If Bob chooses setting s2 = 0, he has to solve the state discrimination
problem described by Figure 6.3: he must answer a2 = a1, and hence his goal
is to learn a1. That is, he must solve the state discrimination problem given by
ρ0 = (ζ
0
0 + ζ
1
0 )/2 and ρ1 = (ζ
0
1 + ζ
1
1 )/2. For s2 = 1, he has to solve the problem
given by Figure 6.4: For s1 = 0, he must answer a2 = a1, but for s1 = 1 he must
answer a2 6= a1. Hence, he must solve the state discrimination problem given by
ρ˜0 = (ζ
0
0 + ζ
1
1 )/2 and ρ˜1 = (ζ
0
1 + ζ
1
0 )/2.
8.3 A lower bound
We now show how to obtain a random access encoding from a one-to-one non-local
game. This enables us to find a lower bound on the dimension of the quantum
state necessary for any player Pj to implement particular non-local strategies.
Recall that we are trying to give a bound given all parameters of the game. In
particular, we are given the probabilities Pr[~a−j|~s−j] that the remaining players
obtain outcomes ~a−j for their measurement settings ~s−j, as well as the value of
the game. Note that we do not need to know an actual state and measurement
strategy for the players. We just want to give a lower bound for a chosen set of
parameters, whether these can be obtained or not.
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8.3.1. Theorem. Any one-to-one independent non-local game where player Pj
obtains the correct outcome aj ∈ Aj for measurement setting sj ∈ Sj with
probability psj for all ~s−j ∈ S1 × . . . × Sj−1 × Sj+1 × . . . × SN and ~a−j ∈
A1 × . . . × Aj−1 × Aj+1 × . . . × AN is a (|Sj|,m, (p1, . . . , p|Sj |))|Aj |-unbalanced
random access code.
Proof. To encode a string, the other players choose measurement settings ~s−j
and measure their part of the state as in the non-local game to obtain outcomes
~a−j. Note that the string is chosen randomly by the measurement. Since our
game was one-to-one we can define a function
g(~s−j,~a−j) = f1(~s−j,~a−j), . . . , f|Sj |(~s−j,~a−j).
Let x = g(~s−j,~a−j) be the encoded string and note that ρx = χ
~s−j
~a−j . We have
PXt(c) = q
sj
c , since our game is one-to-one. Since our game is independent, we
have that PX is a product distribution. To retrieve the t-th entry of x, player
Pj then has to distinguish ζ
sj
aj as in the non-local game which he can do with
probability psj by assumption. 2
Now that we can obtain a random access code from a non-local game, we can
easily give a lower bound on the dimension of the state from a lower bound of
the size of the random access code. It follows immediately from Theorem 8.3.1
and Lemma 8.2.3 that
8.3.2. Corollary. In any one-to-one independent non-local game where player
Pj obtains the correct outcome a ∈ Aj for measurement setting s ∈ Sj with
probability ps for all measurement settings ~s−j ∈ S1× . . .×Sj−1×Sj+1× . . .×SN
and outcomes ~a−j ∈ A1 × . . .× Aj−1 × Aj+1 × . . .× AN of the other players, the
dimension d of player Pj’s state obeys
d ≥ 2
P|Sj |
t=1 H(Xt)−H(pt)−(1−pt) log(|Aj |−1),
where Xt is a random variable chosen from Aj where Pr[Xt = a] = q
t
a.
For almost all known games, we can obtain a simplified bound as each player
will choose a measurement setting uniformly at random. Likewise, in most cases
we can assume that the probability that the players obtain certain outcomes is
also uniform. Indeed, if we do not know a particular measurement strategy for
a given game, we can find a bound if we assume that the distribution over the
outcomes given the choice of measurement settings is uniform. In this case, we
also assume that the probability of giving the correct answer is the same for each
possible choice of measurement settings and is equal to the value of the game.
We then obtain
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8.3.3. Corollary. In any one-to-one independent non-local game where player
Pj obtains the correct outcome a ∈ Aj for any measurement setting s ∈ Sj with
probability p where qta = 1/|Aj| for all t ∈ Sj and measurement settings ~s−j ∈
S1×. . .×Sj−1×Sj+1×. . .×SN and outcomes ~a−j ∈ A1×. . .×Aj−1×Aj+1×. . .×AN
of the other players, the dimension d of player Pj’s state obeys
d ≥ 2(log(|Aj |)−H(p)−(1−p) log(|Aj |−1))|Sj |.
Note that if we are willing to assume that the optimal value of the game is
achieved when the players share a maximally entangled state, we can improve
this bound to d ≥ maxj 2(log(|Aj |)−H(p)−(1−p) log(|Aj |−1))|Sj |.
Let’s look at a small example which illustrates the proof. Consider the CHSH
inequality. Here, we have only two players, Alice (Player 1) and Bob (Player
2). Bob’s goal is to obtain an outcome a2 such that s1 · s1 = a1 + a2 mod 2.
This means we define the function g(s1, a1) = x as g(0, 0) = 0, 0, g(1, 0) = 1, 1,
g(0, 1) = 1, 0 and g(1, 1) = 0, 1. For the lower bound we do not need to consider
a specific encoding, however, for the well-known CHSH state and measurements
we would have an encoding of ρ00 = |0〉〈0|, ρ01 = |−〉〈−|, ρ10 = |+〉〈+|, and ρ11 =
|1〉〈1| and q1x1 = q2x2 = 1/2 for all x1, x2 ∈ {0, 1}. How many qubits does Bob need
to use if he wants to give the correct answers with probability p = 1/2+1/(2
√
2)?
Since everything is uniform we obtain log d ≥ (1−H(p))2 ≈ 0.8, i.e., Bob needs
to keep at least one qubit.
Our bound contains a tradeoff between the probability p of giving the cor-
rect answer, the number of measurement settings, and the number of possible
outcomes. Clearly, our bound will only be good, if the number of measurement
settings is large. It is also clear that it performs badly as p approaches 1/2
and |Aj| is large, and thus for most cases our bound will be very unsatisfactory.
The following figures illustrate the tradeoff between the different parameters of
Corollary 8.3.3.
8.4 Upper bounds
Ideally, we would find an upper bound on the amount of entanglement we need
purely from the description of the game alone. Clearly, Tsirelson’s construction
from Chapter 6.3.2 tells us that for any XOR game the local dimension of Alice’s
and Bob’s system is d ≤ 2N/2, where N is the number of measurement settings.
Similarly to XOR games, we can consider mod k-games. Here, Alice and Bob
have to give answers a1, a2 given questions s1, s1 such that f(s1, s2) = a1 + a2
mod k for some function f : S1 × S2 → {0, . . . , k − 1}. One may hope that for
mod k-games, similarly than for XOR-games, the following holds:
8.4.1. Conjecture. For any mod k-game, the dimension of Alice’s and Bob’s
systems obeys d ≤ kN/2, where N is the number of measurement settings for Alice
and Bob.
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Figure 8.1: Tradeoff for p = 0.6.
An alternative approach to bounding the dimension would be to consider how
far we can reduce the size of an existing state and observables using Lemma 6.3.1.
Suppose that Alice has only two measurement settings X0 = X
0
0 −X10 and X1 =
X01 −X11 with X00 +X10 = I and X01 +X11 = I. We know from Lemma 3.5.2 that
there exist projectors Πj such that we can decompose Xs as Xs =
∑
j ΠjX
a
sΠj
for s, b ∈ 0, 1, where rank(Πj) ≤ 2. Hence, we can immediately conclude from
Lemma 6.3.1 that if Alice only measures two possible observables with two out-
comes each, the dimension of her state does not need to exceed d = 2. This has
previously been proved by Masanes [Mas06]. Could we prove something similar
for three measurement settings? Sadly, Theorem 3.5.7 tells us that this is not
possible! There do exist three measurements for which no such decomposition
exists. It is not hard to see that the question of how large Alice’s entangled
state has to be given a specific set of measurement operators is essentially equiv-
alent to the question of how many qubits we need to store in the problem of
post-measurement information to achieve perfect success. In both settings we are
interested in reducing the dimension by finding a way to block-diagonalize the
matrices.
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8.5 Conclusion
Bounding the amount of entanglement that we need to implement the optimal
strategy in non-local games remains a tricky problem. We have given a simple
lower bound on the amount of entanglement necessary for an extremely restricted
class of games. The CHSH game forms an instance of such a game. Even though
our bound is very weak, and the class of games quite restricted, we are hopeful
that our approach may lead to stronger statements in the future. We also showed
how our earlier considerations and Tsirelson’s construction led to an upper bound
for the specific case of XOR-games. Sadly, better bounds still elude us so far.
Chapter 9
Interactive Proof Systems
As we saw in the past chapters, two spatially separated parties, Alice and Bob, can
use entanglement to obtain correlations that are impossible to achieve classically,
without any additional communication. However, there do exist classical systems
whose strength, or security, indeed depends crucially on the fact that specific
parties cannot communicate during the course of the protocol. How are such
systems affected by the presence of entanglement? Can Alice and Bob use their
shared entanglement to gain a significant advantage? Here, we study interactive
proof systems which are a specific case of such a classical system. Surprisingly,
it turns out that the space-like separation is lost alltogether and we can simulate
two classical parties with just a single quantum one.
9.1 Introduction
9.1.1 Classical interactive proof systems
Before getting to the heart of the matter, we first need to take a closer look
at interactive proof systems. Classical interactive proof systems have received
considerable attention [BFL91, BOGKW88, CCL90, Fei91, LS91, FL92] since
their introduction by Babai [Bab85] and Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [GMR89]
in 1985. An interactive proof system takes the form of a protocol of one or
more rounds between two parties, a verifier and a prover. Whereas the prover
is computationally unbounded, the verifier is limited to probabilistic polynomial
time. Both the prover and the verifier have access to a common input string x.
The goal of the prover is to convince the verifier that x belongs to a pre-specified
language L. The verifier’s aim, on the other hand, is to determine whether the
prover’s claim is indeed valid. In each round, the verifier sends a polynomial
(in x) size query to the prover, who returns a polynomial size answer. At the
end of the protocol, the verifier decides to accept, and conclude x ∈ L, or reject
based on the messages exchanged and his own private randomness. A language
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has an interactive proof if there exists a verifier V and a prover P such that: If
x ∈ L, the prover can always convince V to accept. If x /∈ L, no strategy of
the prover can convince V to accept with non-negligible probability. IP denotes
the class of languages having an interactive proof system. Watrous [Wat99] first
considered the notion of quantum interactive proof systems. Here, the prover
has unbounded quantum computational power whereas the verifier is restricted
to quantum polynomial time. In addition, the two parties can now exchange
quantum messages. QIP is the class of languages having a quantum interactive
proof system. Classically, it is known that IP = PSPACE [Sha92, She92], where
PSPACE is the class of languages decidable using only polynomial space. For the
quantum case, it has been shown that PSPACE ⊆ QIP ⊆ EXP [Wat99, KW00].
If, in addition, the verifier is given polynomial size quantum advice, the resulting
class QIP/qpoly contains all languages [Raz05]. Let QIP(k) denote the class
where the prover and verifier are restricted to exchanging k messages. It is known
that QIP = QIP(3) [KW00] and QIP(1) ⊆ PP [Vya03, MW05], where PP is the
class of all problems solvable by a probabilistic machine in polynomial time. We
refer to [MW05] for an overview of the extensive work done on QIP(1), also
known as QMA. Very little is known about QIP(2) and its relation to either PP
or PSPACE.
In multiple-prover interactive proof systems the verifier can interact with mul-
tiple, computationally unbounded provers. Before the protocol starts, the provers
are allowed to agree on a joint strategy, however they can no longer communicate
during the execution of the protocol. Let MIP denote the class of languages hav-
ing a multiple-prover interactive proof system. Here, we are especially interested
in two-prover interactive proof systems as introduced by Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Kil-
ian and Widgerson [BOGKW88]. Babai, Fortnow and Lund [BFL91], and Feige
and Lova´sz [FL92] have shown that a language is in NEXP if and only if it has a
two-prover one-round proof system, i.e., MIP[2] = NEXP. Feige and Lova´sz have
also shown that a system using more than two-provers is thus no more powerful
than a system with only two provers, i.e., MIP[2] = MIP. Let ⊕MIP[2] denote
the restricted class where the verifier’s output is a function of the XOR of two
binary answers. Even for such a system ⊕MIP[2] = NEXP, for certain soundness
and completeness parameters [CHTW04a]. Classical multiple-prover interactive
proof systems are thus more powerful than classical proof systems based on a
single prover, assuming PSPACE 6= NEXP.
9.1.2 Quantum multi-prover interactive proof systems
Given the advent of quantum computing, one can also consider quantum in-
teractive proof systems with multiple provers. These can be grouped into two
categories: First, one can consider provers and a verifier that are quantum them-
selves and can exchange quantum messages. Kobayashi and Matsumoto have
considered such quantum multiple-prover interactive proof systems which form
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an extension of quantum single prover interactive proof systems as described
above. Let QMIP denote the resulting class. In particular, they showed that
QMIP = NEXP if the provers do not share quantum entanglement [KM03]. If
the provers share at most polynomially many entangled qubits the resulting class
is contained in NEXP [KM03].
Secondly, one can consider proof systems where all communication remains
classical, but the provers can share any entangled state as part of their strategy
on which they are allowed to perform arbitrary measurements. Cleve, Høyer,
Toner and Watrous [CHTW04a] have raised the question whether a classical two-
prover system is weakened in such a setting. We write MIP∗ if the provers share
entanglement. The authors provide a number of examples which demonstrate that
the soundness condition of a classical proof system can be compromised, i.e. the
interactive proof system is weakened, when entanglement is used. In their paper,
it is proved that ⊕MIP∗[2] ⊆ NEXP. Later, the same authors also showed that
⊕MIP∗[2] ⊆ EXP using semidefinite programming [CHTW04b]. Entanglement
thus clearly weakens an interactive proof system, assuming EXP 6= NEXP.
Intuitively, entanglement allows the provers to coordinate their answers, even
though they cannot use it to communicate. By measuring the shared entan-
gled state the provers can generate correlations which they can use to deceive
the verifier. Tsirelson [Tsi80, Tsi87] has shown that even quantum mechanics
limits the strength of such correlations, as we saw in Chapter 6. Recall that
Popescu and Roehrlich [PR94, PR96, PR97] have raised the question why na-
ture imposes such limits. To this end, they constructed a toy-theory based on
non-local boxes [PR94, vD00], which are hypothetical “machines” generating cor-
relations stronger than possible in nature. In their full generalization, non-local
boxes can give rise to any type of correlation as long as they cannot be used to
signal. Preda [Pre05] showed that sharing non-local boxes allows two provers to
coordinate their answers perfectly and obtained ⊕MIPNL = PSPACE, where we
write ⊕MIPNL to indicate that the two provers share non-local boxes.
Kitaev and Watrous [KW00] mention that it is unlikely that a single-prover
quantum interactive proof system can simulate multiple classical provers, because
then from QIP ⊆ EXP and MIP = NEXP it follows that EXP = NEXP.
Surprisingly, it turns out that when the provers are allowed to share entan-
glement it can be possible to simulate two such classical provers by one quantum
prover. This indicates that entanglement among provers truly leads to a weaker
proof system. In particular, we show that a two-prover one-round interactive
proof system where the verifier computes the XOR of two binary answers and the
provers are allowed to share an arbitrary entangled state, can be simulated by a
single quantum interactive proof system with two messages: ⊕MIP∗[2] ⊆ QIP(2).
Since very little is known about QIP(2) so far [KW00], we hope that our result
may help shed some light on its relation to PP or PSPACE. Our result also leads
to a proof that ⊕MIP∗[2] ⊆ EXP.
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9.2 Proof systems and non-local games
9.2.1 Non-local games
For our proof, it is necessary to link interactive proof systems to non-local games,
as we described in Chapter 6.2.3. Since we consider only two parties, we omit
unnecessary indices and use separate letters to refer to the sets of possible ques-
tions and answers. We briefly recap our setup, summarized in Figure 9.1: Let S,
T , A and B be finite sets, and pi a probability distribution on S × T . Let V be
a predicate on S × T × A × B. Then G = G(V, pi) is the following two-person
cooperative game1: A pair of questions (s, t) ∈ S × T is chosen at random ac-
cording to the probability distribution pi. Then s is sent to player 1, henceforth
called Alice, and t to player 2, which we call Bob. Upon receiving s, Alice has
to reply with an answer a ∈ A. Likewise, Bob has to reply to question t with an
answer b ∈ B. They win if V (s, t, a, b) = 1 and lose otherwise. Alice and Bob
may agree on any kind of strategy beforehand, but they are no longer allowed
to communicate once they have received questions s and t. The value ω(G) of a
game G is the maximum probability that Alice and Bob win the game. We write
V (a, b|s, t) instead of V (s, t, a, b) to emphasize the fact that a and b are answers
given questions s and t.
Here, we are particularly interested in non-local games. Alice and Bob are
allowed to share an arbitrary entangled state |Ψ〉 to help them win the game. Let
HA and HB denote the Hilbert spaces of Alice and Bob respectively. The state
|Ψ〉 ∈ HA⊗HB is part of the quantum strategy that Alice and Bob can agree on
beforehand. This means that for each game, Alice and Bob can choose a specific
|Ψ〉 to maximize their chance of success. In addition, Alice and Bob can agree
on quantum measurements. For each s ∈ S, Alice has a projective measurement
described by {Xas | a ∈ A} on HA. For each t ∈ T , Bob has a projective
measurement described by {Y bt | b ∈ B} on HB. For questions (s, t) ∈ S × T ,
Alice performs the measurement corresponding to s on her part of |Ψ〉 which gives
her outcome a. Likewise, Bob performs the measurement corresponding to t on
his part of |Ψ〉 with outcome b. Both send their outcome, a and b, back to the
verifier. The probability that Alice and Bob answer (a, b) ∈ A× B is then given
by
〈Ψ|Xas ⊗ Y bt |Ψ〉.
The probability that Alice and Bob win the game is now given by
Pr[Alice and Bob win] =
∑
s,t
pi(s, t)
∑
a,b
V (a, b|s, t)〈Ψ|Xas ⊗ Y bt |Ψ〉. (9.1)
The quantum value ωq(G) of a game G is the maximum probability over all
possible quantum strategies that Alice and Bob win. Recall that XOR game is
1Players 1 and 2 collaborate against the verifier
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Figure 9.1: A one-round XOR proof system.
a game where the value of V only depends on c = a ⊕ b and not on a and b
independently. For XOR games we write V (c|s, t) instead of V (a, b|s, t). Here,
we are only interested in the case that a ∈ {0, 1} and b ∈ {0, 1} and XOR games.
Alice and Bob’s measurements are then described by {X0s , X1s} for s ∈ S and
{Y 0t , Y 1t } for t ∈ T respectively. Note that X0s +X1s = I and Y 0t +Y 0t = I and thus
these measurements can be expressed in the form of observables Xs and Yt with
eigenvalues ±1: Xs = X0s −X1s and Yt = Y 0t −Y 1t . Recall from Chapter 6.3.2 that
Tsirelson [Tsi80, Tsi87] has shown that for any |Ψ〉 ∈ HA ⊗HB there exists real
unit vectors xs, yt ∈ RN with N = |S| + |T | such that 〈Ψ|Xs ⊗ Yt|Ψ〉 = 〈xs|yt〉.
It is then easy to see from Eq. (9.1) that for XOR games we can express the
maximum winning probability as
ωq(G) = max
xs,yt
1
2
∑
s,t
pi(s, t)
∑
c
V (c|s, t) (1 + (−1)c〈xs|yt〉) , (9.2)
where the maximization is taken over all unit vectors xs, yt ∈ RN .
9.2.2 Multiple classical provers
It is well known [CHTW04a, FL92], that two-prover one-round interactive proof
systems with classical communication can be modeled as (non-local) games. Here,
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Alice and Bob take the role of the two provers. The verifier now poses questions
s and t, and evaluates the resulting answers. A proof system associates with each
string x a game Gx, where ω(Gx) determines the probability that the verifier
accepts (and thus concludes x ∈ L). The string x, and thus the nature of the
game Gx is known to both the verifier and the provers. Ideally, for all x ∈ L the
value of ω(Gx) is close to one, and for x /∈ L the value of ω(Gx) is close to zero.
It is possible to extend the game model for MIP[2] to use a randomized predicate
for the acceptance predicate V . This corresponds to V taking an extra input
string chosen at random by the verifier. However, known applications of MIP[2]
proof systems do not require this extension [Fei95]. Our argument in Section 9.3
can easily be extended to deal with randomized predicates. Since V is not a
randomized predicate in [CHTW04a], we follow this approach.
We concentrate on proof systems involving two provers, one round of commu-
nication, and single-bit answers. The provers are computationally unbounded,
but limited by the laws of quantum physics. However, the verifier is proba-
bilistic polynomial time bounded. As defined by Cleve, Høyer, Toner and Wa-
trous [CHTW04a],
9.2.1. Definition. For 0 ≤ s < c ≤ 1, let ⊕MIPc,s[2] denote the class of all
languages L recognized by a classical two-prover interactive proof system of the
following form:
• They operate in one round, each prover sends a single bit in response to
the verifier’s question, and the verifier’s decision is a function of the parity
of those two bits.
• If x ∈ L then there exists a strategy for the provers for which the probability
that the verifier accepts is at least c (the completeness probability).
• If x /∈ L then, whatever strategy the two provers follow, the probability
that the verifier accepts is at most s (the soundness probability).
9.2.2. Definition. For 0 ≤ s < c ≤ 1, let ⊕MIP∗c,s[2] denote the class cor-
responding to a modified version of the previous definition: all communication
remains classical, but the provers may share prior quantum entanglement, which
may depend on x, and perform quantum measurements.
We generally omit indices c, s, unless they are explicitly relevant.
In Chapter 7, we discussed how to find the optimal strategies for XOR-games.
In particular, we saw that we can determine the optimal value of ωq(Gx) in
time exponential in min(|S|, |T |) using semidefinite programming. This implies
immediately that ⊕MIP∗ ⊆ EXP, as was shown by Cleve, Høyer, Toner and Wa-
trous [CHTW04a] during their presentation at CCC’04. Here, we show something
stronger, namely that ⊕MIP∗ ⊆ QIP(2).
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9.2.3 A single quantum prover
Instead of two classical provers, we can also consider a system consisting of a
single quantum prover Pq and a quantum polynomial time verifier Vq as defined by
Watrous [Wat99]. Again, the quantum prover Pq is computationally unbounded,
however, he is limited by the laws of quantum physics. The verifier and the prover
can communicate over a quantum channel. In this thesis, we are only interested in
one round quantum interactive proof systems: the verifier sends a single quantum
message to the prover, who responds with a quantum answer. We here express
the definition of QIP(2) [Wat99] in a form similar to the definition of ⊕MIP∗:
9.2.3. Definition. Let QIP(2, c, s) denote the class of all languages L recog-
nized by a quantum one-prover one-round interactive proof system of the follow-
ing form:
• If x ∈ L then there exists a strategy for the quantum prover for which the
probability that the verifier accepts is at least c.
• If x /∈ L then, whatever strategy the quantum prover follows, the probability
that the quantum verifier accepts is at most s.
9.3 Simulating two classical provers with one
quantum prover
We now show that an interactive proof system where the verifier bases his decision
only on the XOR of two binary answers is in fact no more powerful than a system
based on a single quantum prover. The main idea behind our proof is to combine
two classical queries into one quantum query, and thereby simulate the classical
proof system with a single quantum prover. Similar techniques have been used
to prove results about classical locally decodable codes [KW03, WdW05]. Recall
that the two provers can use an arbitrary entangled state as part of their strategy.
For our proof we make use of the fact that we can write the optimal value of
the game as in Eq. (9.2).
9.3.1. Theorem. For all s and c such that 0 ≤ s < c ≤ 1, ⊕MIP∗c,s[2] ⊆
QIP(2, c, s).
Proof. Let L ∈ ⊕MIP∗c,s[2] and let Ve be a verifier witnessing this fact. Let
P 1e (Alice) and P
2
e (Bob) denote the two provers sharing entanglement. Fix an
input string x. As mentioned above, interactive proof systems can be modeled as
games indexed by the string x. It is therefore sufficient to show that there exists
a verifier Vq and a quantum prover Pq, such that ωsim(Gx) = ωq(Gx), where
ωsim(Gx) is the value of the simulated game.
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Let s,t be the questions that Ve sends to the two provers P
1
e and P
2
e in the
original game. The new verifier Vq now constructs the following state in V ⊗M
|Φinit〉 = 1√
2
( |0〉︸︷︷︸
V
|0〉|s〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
+ |1〉︸︷︷︸
V
|1〉|t〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
),
and sends register M to the single quantum prover Pq.
We first consider the honest strategy of the prover. Let a and b denote the
answers of the two classical provers to questions s and t respectively. The quantum
prover now transforms the state to
|Φhonest〉 = 1√
2
((−1)a |0〉︸︷︷︸
V
|0〉|s〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
+(−1)b |1〉︸︷︷︸
V
|1〉|t〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
),
and returns register M back to the verifier. The verifier Vq now performs a
measurement on V ⊗M described by the following projectors
P0 = |Ψ+st〉〈Ψ+st| ⊗ I
P1 = |Ψ−st〉〈Ψ−st| ⊗ I
Preject = I − P0 − P1,
where |Ψ±st〉 = (|0〉|0〉|s〉±|1〉|1〉|t〉)/
√
2. If he obtains outcome “reject”, he imme-
diately aborts and concludes that the quantum prover is cheating. If he obtains
outcome m ∈ {0, 1}, the verifier concludes that c = a ⊕ b = m. Note that
Pr[m = a⊕ b|s, t] = 〈Φhonest|Pa⊕b|Φhonest〉 = 1, so the verifier can reconstruct the
answer perfectly.
We now consider the case of a dishonest prover. In order to convince the
verifier, the prover applies a transformation onM⊗P and send registerM back
to the verifier. We show that for any such transformation the value of the resulting
game is at most ωq(Gx): Note that the state of the total system in V ⊗M⊗ P
can now be described as
|Φdish〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉|φs〉+ |1〉|φt〉)
where |φs〉 =
∑
u∈S′∪T ′ |u〉|αsu〉 and |φt〉 =
∑
v∈S′∪T ′ |v〉|βtv〉 with S ′ = {0s|s ∈
S} and T ′ = {1t|t ∈ T}. Any transformation employed by the prover can be
described this way. We now have that
Pr[m = 0|s, t] = 〈Φdish|P0|Φdish〉 = 1
4
(〈αss|αss〉+ 〈βtt |βtt〉) +
1
2
<(〈αss|βtt〉) (9.3)
Pr[m = 1|s, t] = 〈Φdish|P1|Φdish〉 = 1
4
(〈αss|αss〉+ 〈βtt |βtt〉)−
1
2
<(〈αss|βtt〉) (9.4)
The probability that the prover wins is given by
Pr[Prover wins] =
∑
s,t
pi(s, t)
∑
c∈{0,1}
V (c|s, t) Pr[m = c|s, t].
9.3. Simulating two classical provers with one quantum prover 147
The prover will try to maximize his chance of success by maximizing Pr[m = 0|s, t]
or Pr[m = 1|s, t]. We can therefore restrict ourselves to considering real unit
vectors for which 〈αss|αss〉 = 1 and 〈βtt |βtt〉 = 1, as the dimension of our vectors is
directly determined by their number. Hence, we may also assume that |αs′s 〉 = 0
iff s 6= s′ and |βt′t 〉 = 0 iff t 6= t′: any other strategy can lead to rejection and
thus to a lower probability of success. By substituting into Eqs. (9.3) and (9.4),
it follows that the probability that the quantum prover wins the game (when he
avoids rejection) is
1
2
∑
s,t,c
pi(s, t)V (c|s, t)(1 + (−1)c〈αss|βtt〉). (9.5)
In order to convince the verifier, the prover’s goal is to choose real vectors |αss〉
and |βtt〉 which maximize Eq. (9.5). Since in |φs〉 and |φt〉 we sum over |S ′|+|T ′| =
|S|+ |T | elements respectively, the dimension of P need not exceed N = |S|+ |T |.
Thus, it is sufficient to restrict the maximization to vectors in R|S|+|T |. Given
Eq. (9.5), we thus have
ωsim(Gx) = max
αss,β
t
t
1
2
∑
s,t,c
pi(s, t)V (c|s, t)(1 + (−1)c〈αss|βtt〉),
where the maximization is taken over vectors {αss ∈ RN : s ∈ S}, and {βtt ∈ RN :
t ∈ T}. However, we know from Eq. (9.2) that
ωq(Gx) = max
xs,yt
1
2
∑
s,t,c
pi(s, t)V (c|s, t)(1 + (−1)c〈xs|yt〉)
where the maximization is taken over unit vectors {xs ∈ RN : s ∈ S} and
{yt ∈ RN : t ∈ T}. We thus have
ωsim(Gx) = ωq(Gx)
which completes our proof. 2
9.3.2. Corollary. For all s and c such that 0 ≤ s < c ≤ 1, ⊕MIP∗c,s[2] ⊆ EXP.
Proof. This follows directly from Theorem 9.3.1 and the result that QIP(2) ⊆
EXP [KW00]. 2
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9.4 Conclusion
As we have shown, the strength of classical systems can be weakened considerably
in the presence of entanglement. In our example above, we showed that the
systems can be weakened so much that all space-like separation is lost: we saw
that two classical parties with entanglement are as powerful as a single quantum
party.
It would be interesting to show that this result also holds for a proof system
where the verifier is not restricted to computing the XOR of both answers, but
some other Boolean function. However, the approach based on vectors from
Tsirelson’s results does not work for binary games. Whereas it is easy to construct
a single quantum query which allows the verifier to compute an arbitrary function
of the two binary answers with some advantage, it thus remains unclear how the
value of the resulting game is related to the value of a binary game. Furthermore,
mere classical tricks trying to obtain the value of a binary function from XOR
itself seem to confer extra cheating power to the provers.
Examples of non-local games with longer answers [CHTW04a], such as the
Kochen-Specker or the Magic Square game, seem to make it even easier for the
provers to cheat by taking advantage of their entangled state. Furthermore,
existing proofs that MIP = NEXP break down if the provers share entanglement.
It is therefore an open question whether MIP∗ = NEXP or, MIP∗ ⊆ EXP.
As described, non-locality experiments between two space-like separated ob-
servers, Alice and Bob, can be cast in the form of non-local games. For ex-
ample, the experiment based on the well known CHSH inequality [CHSH69],
is a non-local game with binary answers of which the verifier computes the
XOR [CHTW04a]. Our result implies that this non-local game can be simu-
lated in superposition by a single prover/observer: Any strategy that Alice and
Bob might employ in the non-local game can be mirrored by the single prover in
the constructed “superposition game”, and also vice versa, due to Tsirelson’s con-
structions [Tsi80, Tsi87] mentioned earlier. This means that the “superposition
game” corresponding to the non-local CHSH game is in fact limited by Tsirelson’s
inequality [Tsi80], even though it itself has no non-local character. Whereas this
may be purely coincidental, it would be interesting to know its physical inter-
pretation, if any. Perhaps it may be interesting to ask whether Tsirelson-type
inequalities have any consequences on local computations in general, beyond the
scope of these very limited games.
Part IV
Consequences for Crytography
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Chapter 10
Limitations
Finally, we turn our attention to cryptographic protocols directly. As we saw in
Chapter 1, it is impossible to implement bit commitment even in the quantum
setting! In the face of the negative results, what can we still hope to achieve?
10.1 Introduction
Here, we consider the task of committing to an entire string of n bits at once
when both the honest player and the adversary have unbounded resources. Since
perfect bit commitment is impossible, perfect bit string commitment is clearly
impossible as well. Curiously, however, we can still make interesting statements
in the quantum setting, if we give both Alice and Bob a limited ability to cheat.
That is, we allow Alice to change her mind about the committed string within
certain limited parameters, and allow Bob to gain some information about the
committed string. It turns out that it matters crucially how we measure Bob’s
information gain.
First, we introduce a framework for the classification of bit string commit-
ments in terms of the length n of the string, Alice’s ability to cheat on at most a
bits and Bob’s ability to acquire at most b bits of information before the reveal
phase. We say that Alice can cheat on a bits if she can reveal up to 2a strings suc-
cessfully. Bob’s security definition is crucial to our investigation: If b determines
a bound on his probability to guess Alice’s string, then we prove that a+ b is at
least n. This implies that the trivial protocol, where Alice’s commitment consists
of sending b bits of her string to Bob, is optimal. If, however, b is a bound on the
accessible information that the quantum states contain about Alice’s string, then
we show that non-trivial schemes exist. More precisely, we construct schemes
with a = 4 log n+O(1) and b = 4. This is impossible classically. We also present
a simple, implementable, protocol, that achieves a = 1 and b = n/2. This proto-
col can furthermore be made cheat-sensitive. Quantum commitments of strings
have previously been considered by Kent [Ken03], who pointed out that in the
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quantum world useful bit string commitments could be possible despite the no-
go theorem for bit commitment. His scenario differs significantly from ours and
imposes an additional constraint, which is not present in our work: Alice does
not commit to a superposition of strings.
10.2 Preliminaries
10.2.1 Definitions
We first formalize the notion of quantum string commitments in a quantum set-
ting.
10.2.1. Definition. An (n, a, b)-Quantum Bit String Commitment (QBSC) is
a quantum communication protocol between two parties, Alice (the committer)
and Bob (the receiver), which consists of two phases:
• (Commit Phase) Assume that both parties are honest. Alice chooses a string
x ∈ {0, 1}n with probability px. Alice and Bob communicate and at the end
Bob holds state ρx.
• (Reveal Phase) If both parties are honest, Alice and Bob communicate and
at the end Bob outputs x. Bob accepts.
We have the following two security requirements:
• (Concealing) If Alice is honest, then for any strategy of Bob∑
x∈{0,1}n
pBx|x ≤ 2b,
where pBx|x is the probability that Bob correctly guesses x before the reveal
phase.
• (Binding) If Bob is honest, then for any strategy of Alice∑
x∈{0,1}n
pAx ≤ 2a,
where pAx is the probability that Alice successfully reveals x (Bob accepts the
opening of x).
Bob thereby accepts the opening of a string x, if he performs a test depending
on the individual protocol to check Alice’s honesty and concludes that she was
indeed honest. Note that quantumly, Alice can always commit to a superposition
of different strings without being detected. Thus even for a perfectly binding bit
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string commitment (i.e. a = 0) we only demand that
∑
x∈{0,1}n p
A
x ≤ 1, whereas
classically one wants that pAx′ = δx,x′ . Note that our concealing definition reflects
Bob’s a priori knowledge about x. We choose an a priori uniform distribution
(i.e. px = 2
−n) for (n, a, b)-QBSCs, which naturally comes from the fact that we
consider n-bit strings. A generalization to any (PX , a, b)-QBSC where PX is an
arbitrary distribution is possible but omitted in order not to obscure our main
line of argument.
Instead of Bob’s guessing probability, one can take any information measure
B to express the security against Bob. In general, we consider an (n, a, b)-QBSCB
where the new Concealing-condition reads
• (General Concealing) If Alice is honest, then for any ensemble E = {px, ρx}
that Bob can obtain by a cheating strategy B(E) ≤ b.
Later, we will show that for B being the accessible information, non-trivial proto-
cols, i.e. protocols with a+b n, do exist. Recall that the accessible information
was defined in Section 2.3.2 as Iacc(E) = maxM I(X, Y ), where PX is the prior
distribution of the random variable X, Y is the random variable of the outcome
of Bob’s measurement on E , and the maximization is taken over all measurements
M .
10.2.2 Model
We work in the model of two-party non-relativistic quantum protocols of Yao
[Yao95], simplified by Lo and Chau [LC97] which is usually adopted in this con-
text. Here, any two-party quantum protocol can be regarded as a pair of quantum
machines (Alice and Bob), interacting through a quantum channel. Consider the
product of three Hilbert spaces HA, HB and HC of bounded dimensions, repre-
senting the Hilbert spaces of Alice’s and Bob’s machines and the channel, respec-
tively. Without loss of generality, we assume that each machine is initially in a
specified pure state. Alice and Bob perform a number of rounds of communication
over the channel. Each such round can be modeled as a unitary transformation
on HA ⊗ HC and HB ⊗ HC respectively. Since the protocol is known to both
Alice and Bob, they know the set of possible unitary transformations used in the
protocol. We assume that Alice and Bob are in possession of both a quantum
computer and a quantum storage device. This enables them to add ancillae to the
quantum machine and use reversible unitary operations to replace measurements.
The state of this ancilla can then be read off only at the end of the protocol, and
by doing so, Alice and Bob can effectively delay any measurements until the very
end. The resulting protocol will be equivalent to the original and thus we can
limit ourselves to protocols where both parties only measure at the very end.
Moreover, any classical computation or communication that may occur can be
simulated by a quantum computer.
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10.2.3 Tools
We now gather the essential ingredients for our proof. First, we now show that
every (n, a, b)-QBSC is an (n, a, b)-QBSCξ. The security measure ξ(E) is defined
by
ξ(E) := n−H2(ρAB|ρ), (10.1)
where ρAB =
∑
x px|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρx and ρ =
∑
x pxρx are only dependent on the
ensemble E = {px, ρx}. H2(·|·) is an entropic quantity defined in [Ren05]
H2(ρAB|ρ) := − log Tr
([
I⊗ ρ− 12 )ρAB
]2)
.
Interestingly, this quantity is directly connected to Bob’s maximal average prob-
ability of successfully guessing the string:
10.2.2. Lemma. Bob’s maximal average probability of successfully guessing the
committed string, i.e. supM
∑
x pxp
B,M
x|x where M = {Mx} ranges over all mea-
surements and pB,My|x = Tr(Myρx) is the conditional probability of outputting y
given ρx, obeys
sup
M
∑
x
pxp
B,M
x|x ≥ 2−H2(ρAB |ρ).
Proof. By definition, the maximum average guessing probability is lower
bounded by the average guessing probability for a particular measurement strat-
egy. We choose the square-root measurement which has operators
Mx = pxρ
− 1
2ρxρ
− 1
2 .
We use pBx|x = Tr(Mxρx) to denote the probability that Bob guesses x given ρx,
hence
log
∑
x
pxp
B,max
x|x ≥ log
∑
x
p2xTr(ρ
− 1
2ρxρ
− 1
2ρx)
= log Tr
(∑
x
p2x|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρ−
1
2ρxρ
− 1
2ρx
)
= logTr
([
(I⊗ ρ− 12 )ρAB
]2)
= −H2(ρAB|ρ)
2
Related estimates were derived in [BK02].
Furthermore, we make use of the following theorem, known as privacy ampli-
fication against a quantum adversary with two-universal hash functions, which
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we state in a form that is most convenient for our purposes in this chapter.
A class F of functions f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}` is thereby called two-universal if
for all x 6= y ∈ {0, 1}n and for uniformly at random chosen f ∈ F we have
Pr[f(x) = f(y)] ≤ 2−`. For example, the set of all affine functions1. from {0, 1}n
to {0, 1}` is two-universal [CW79]. The following theorem expresses how hash
functions can decrease Bob’s knowledge about a random variable when he holds
some quantum information. In our case, Bob will hold some quantum memory
and privacy amplification is used to find Alice’s attack.
10.2.3. Theorem (Th. 5.5.1 in [Ren05] (see also [KMR05])). Let G be a
class of two-universal hash functions from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}s. Application of g ∈ G
to the random variable X maps the ensemble E = {px, ρx} to Eg = {qgy , σgy} with
probabilities qgy =
∑
x∈g−1(y) px and quantum states σ
g
y =
∑
x∈g−1(y) pxρx. Then
1
|G|
∑
g∈G
d(Eg) ≤ 1
2
2−
1
2
[H2(ρAB |ρ)−s], (10.2)
where d(E) := D(∑x px|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρx, I/2n ⊗ ρ) (and similarly for d(Eg)).
Finally, the following reasoning that is used to prove the impossibility of quan-
tum bit commitment [LC97, May96b] will be essential: Suppose ρ0 and ρ1 are
density operators that correspond to the state of Bob’s system if Alice committed
a “0” or a “1” respectively. Let |φ0〉 and |φ1〉 be the corresponding purifications
on the joint system of Alice and Bob: Alice holds the purification of ρ0 and ρ1. If
ρ0 equals ρ1 then Alice can find a local unitary transformation U that Alice can
apply to her part of the system such that |φ1〉 = U ⊗ I|φ0〉. This enables Alice to
change the total state from |φ0〉 to |φ1〉 and thus cheat using entanglement! This
reasoning also holds in an approximate sense [May96b], here used in the following
form:
10.2.4. Lemma. Let D(ρ0, ρ1) ≤  and assume that the bit-commitment protocol
is error-free if both parties are honest. Then there exists a method for Alice to
cheat such that the probability of successfully revealing a 0 during the reveal phase,
given that she honestly committed herself to a 1 during the commit phase, is at
least 1−√2.
Proof. D(ρ0, ρ1) ≤  implies maxU |〈φ0|U ⊗ I|φ1〉| ≥ 1− ε by Uhlmann’s theo-
rem [Uhl76]. Here, |φ0〉 and |φ1〉 correspond to the joint states after the commit
phase if Alice committed to a ’0’ or ’1’ respectively where the maximization ranges
over all unitaries U on Alice’s (i.e. the purification) side. Let |ψ0〉 = U ⊗ I|φ1〉
for a U achieving the maximization, be the state that Alice prepares by applying
1Geometrically, an affine function is a linear function plus a translation
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U to the state on her side when she wants to reveal a ’1’, given a prior honest
commitment to ’0’. We then have
D(|φ0〉〈φ0|, |ψ0〉〈ψ0|) =
√
1− |〈φ0|ψ0〉|2
≤
√
1− (1− )2
≤
√
2.
If Bob is honest, the reveal phase can be regarded as a measurement resulting in a
distribution PY (or PZ) if |φ0〉 (or |ψ0〉) was the state before the reveal phase. The
random variables Y and Z can take values {0, 1} (corresponding to the opened
bit) or the value ‘reject (r)’. Since the trace distance does not increase under
measurements, D(PY , PZ) ≤ D(|φ0〉〈φ0|, |ψ0〉〈ψ0|) ≤
√
2. Hence 1
2
(|PY (0) −
PZ(0)| + |PY (1) − PZ(1)| + |PY (r) − PZ(r)|) ≤
√
2. Since |φ0〉 corresponds to
Alice’s honest commitment to 0 we have PY (0) = 1, PY (1) = PY (r) = 0 and
hence PZ(0) ≥ 1−
√
2. 2
10.3 Impossibility
of quantum string commitments
As we saw above, any (n, a, b)-QBSC is also an (n, a, b)-QBSCξ with the security
measure ξ(E) defined in Eq. (10.1). To prove our impossibility result we now prove
that an (n, a, b)-QBSCξ can only exist for values a, b and n obeying a+ b+ c ≥ n,
where c is a small constant independent of a, b and n. This in turn implies the
impossibility of an (n, a, b)-QBSC for such parameters. Finally, we show that if
we execute the protocol many times in parallel, the protocol can only be secure
if a+ b ≥ n.
The intuition behind our proof is simple: To cheat, Alice first chooses a two-
universal hash function g. She then commits to a superposition of all strings for
which g(x) = y for a specific y. We now know from the privacy amplification
theorem above, that even though Bob may gain some knowledge about x, he is
entirely ignorant about y. But then Alice can change her mind and reveal a string
from a different set of strings for which g(x) = y′ with y 6= y′ as we saw above!
The following figure illustrates this idea.
10.3.1. Theorem. (n, a, b)-QBSCξ schemes with a + b + c < n do not exist,
where c = 5 log 5− 4 ≈ 7.61 is a constant.
Proof. Consider an (n, a, b)-QBSCξ and the case where both Alice and Bob
are honest. Alice committed to x. We denote the joint state of the system Alice-
Bob-Channel HA ⊗HB ⊗HC after the commit phase by |φx〉 for input state |x〉.
Let ρx be Bob’s reduced density matrix, and let E = {px, ρx} where px = 2−n.
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Figure 10.1: Moving from a set of string with g(x) = y to a set of strings with
g(x) = (y mod 5) + 1.
Assuming that Bob is honest, we will give a cheating strategy for Alice in the
case where a+ b+5 log 5− 4 < n. The strategy will depend on the two-universal
hash function g : X = {0, 1}n → Y = {0, 1}n−m, for appropriately chosen m.
Alice picks a y ∈ Y and constructs the state (∑x∈g−1(y) |x〉|x〉)/√|g−1(y)|. She
then gives the second half of this state as input to the protocol and stays honest
for the rest of the commit phase. The joint state of Alice and Bob at the end of the
commit phase is thus |ψgy〉 = (
∑
x∈g−1(y) |x〉|φx〉)/
√|g−1(y)|. The reduced states
on Bob’s side are σgy =
1
qgy
∑
x∈g−1(y) pxρx with probability q
g
y =
∑
x∈g−1(y) px. We
denote this ensemble by Eg. Let σg =
∑
y q
g
yσ
g
y .
We now apply Theorem 10.2.3 with s = n − m and ξ(E) ≤ b and obtain
1
|G|
∑
g∈G d(Eg) ≤ ε where ε = 122−
1
2
(m−b). Hence, there is at least one g such that
d(Eg) ≤ ε. Intuitively, this means that Bob knows only very little about the value
of g(x). This g defines Alice’s cheating strategy. It is straightforward to verify
that d(Eg) ≤ ε implies
2−(n−m)
∑
y∈Y
D(σg, σgy) ≤ 2ε. (10.3)
We therefore assume without loss of generality that Alice chooses y0 ∈ Y with
D(σgy0 , σ
g) ≤ 2ε.
We first observe that the probability to successfully reveal some x in g−1(y)
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given |ψgy〉 is one2. We say that Alice reveals y if she reveals an x such that
y = g(x). We then also have that the probability for Alice to reveal y given |ψgy〉
successfully is one. Let p˜x and q˜
g
y denote the probabilities to successfully reveal
x and y respectively and p˜gx|y be the conditional probability to successfully reveal
x, given y. We have ∑
x
p˜x =
∑
y
q˜gy
∑
x∈g−1(y)
p˜gx|y ≥
∑
y
q˜gy ,
where the inequality follows from our observation above.
As in the impossibility proof of bit commitment, Alice can now transform
|ψgy0〉 approximately into |ψgy〉 if σgy0 is sufficiently close to σgy by using only lo-
cal transformations on her part. Indeed, Lemma 10.2.4 tells us how to bound
the probability of revealing y, given that the state was really |ψy0〉. Since this
reasoning applies to all y, on average, we have∑
y
q˜gy ≥
∑
y
(
1−
√
2
√
D(σgy0 , σ
g
y)
)
≥ 2n−m − 2n−m
√
2
√
2m−n
∑
y
D(σgy0 , σ
g
y)
≥ 2n−m
1−√2
√√√√2m−n(∑
y
D(σgy0 , σg) +D(σg, σ
g
y)
)
≥ 2n−m(1− 2
√
2ε),
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 10.2.4, the second from Jensen’s in-
equality and the concavity of the square root function, the third from the triangle
inequality and the fourth from Eq. (10.3) and D(σgy0 , σ
g) ≤ 2ε. Recall that to be
secure against Alice, we require 2a ≥ 2n−m(1− 2√2ε). We insert ε = 1
2
2−
1
2
(m−b),
define m = b+ γ and take the logarithm on both sides to get
a+ b+ δ ≥ n, (10.4)
where δ = γ − log(1 − 2−γ/4+1). Keeping in mind that 1 − 2−γ/4+1 > 0 (or
equivalently γ > 4), we find that the minimum value of δ for which Eq. (10.4)
is satisfied is δ = 5 log 5− 4 and arises from γ = 4(log 5− 1). Thus, no (n, a, b)-
QBSCξ with a+ b+ 5 log 5− 4 < n exists. 2
It follows immediately that the same restriction holds for an (n, a, b)-QBSC:
2Alice learns x, but can’t pick it: she committed to a superposition and x is chosen randomly
by measurement.
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10.3.2. Corollary. (n, a, b)-QBSC schemes, with a + b + c < n do not exist,
where c = 5 log 5− 4 ≈ 7.61 is a constant.
Proof. For the uniform distribution px = 2
−n, we have from the concealing
condition that
∑
x p
B
x|x ≤ 2b, which by Lemma 10.2.2 implies ξ(E) ≤ b. Thus, a
(n, a, b)-QBSC is an (n, a, b)-QBSCξ from which the result follows. 2
Since the constant c does not depend on a, b and n, multiple parallel executions
of the protocol can only be secure if a + b ≥ n. This follows by considering m
parallel executions of the protocol as a single execution with a string of length
mn.
10.3.3. Corollary. Let P be an (n, a, b)-QBSC with Pm an (mn,ma,mb)-
QBSC. Then n < a + b + c/m. In particular, no (n, a, b)-QBSC with a + b < n
can be executed securely an arbitrary number of times in parallel.
Thus, we can indeed hope to do no better than the trivial protocol. It follows
directly from [KMP04] that the results in this section also hold in the presence
of superselection rules, where, very informally, quantum actions are restricted to
act only on certain subspaces of a larger Hilbert space.
10.4 Possibility
Surprisingly, if one is willing to measure Bob’s ability to learn x using a weaker
measure of information, the accessible information, non-trivial protocols become
possible. These protocols are based on a discovery known as “locking of classical
information in quantum states” which we already encountered in Chapter 5.
The protocol, which we call LOCKCOM(n, U), uses this effect and is specified
by a set U = {U1, . . . , U|U|} of unitaries. We have
Protocol 1: LOCKCOM(n,U)
1: Commit phase: Alice has the string x ∈ {0, 1}n and randomly chooses
r ∈ {1, . . . , |U|}. She sends the state Ur|x〉 to Bob, where Ur ∈ U .
2: Reveal phase: Alice announces r and x. Bob applies U †r and measures in
the computational basis to obtain x′. He accepts if and only if x′ = x.
We now first show that our protocol is secure with respect to Definition 10.2.1 if
Alice is dishonest. Note that our proof only depends on the number of unitaries
used, and is independent of a concrete instantiation of the protocol.
10.4.1. Lemma. For any LOCKCOM(n,U) protocol the security against a dis-
honest Alice is bounded by 2a ≤ |U|,
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Proof. Let p˜x denote the probability that Alice reveals x successfully. Then,
p˜x ≤
∑
r p˜x,r, where p˜x,r is the probability that x is accepted by Bob when the
reveal information was r. Let ρ denote the state of Bob’s system. Summation
over x now yields ∑
x
p˜x ≤
∑
x,r
p˜x,r
=
∑
x,r
Tr|x〉〈x|U †rρUr
=
∑
r
Trρ = 2a.
2
In order to examine security against a dishonest Bob, we have to consider the
actual form of the unitaries. We first show that there do indeed exist interesting
protocols. Secondly, we present a simple, implementable, protocol. To see that
interesting protocols can exist, let Alice choose a set of O(n4) unitaries indepen-
dently according to the Haar measure (approximately discretized) and announce
the resulting set U to Bob. They then perform LOCKCOM(n,U). Following the
work of [HLSW04], we now show that this variant is secure against Bob with
high probability. That is, there exist O(n4) unitaries that bring Bob’s accessible
information down to a constant: Iacc(E) ≤ 4:
10.4.2. Theorem. For n ≥ 3, there exist (n, 4 log n+ O(1), 4)-QBSCIacc proto-
cols.
Proof. Let Uran denote the set of m randomly chosen bases and consider the
LOCKCOM(n, a, b) scheme using unitaries U = Uran. Security against Alice is
again given by Lemma 10.4.1. We now need to show that this choice of unitaries
achieves the desired locking effect and thus security against Bob. Again, let
d = 2n denote the dimension. As we saw in Section 5.2.1 we have that
Iacc(E) ≤ log d+max|φ〉
∑
j
1
m
H(Xj),
where Xj denotes the outcome of the measurement of |φ〉 in basis j and the
maximum is taken over all pure states |φ〉. According to [HLSW04, Appendix B]
there is a constant C ′ > 0 such that
Pr[inf
φ
1
m
m∑
j=1
H(Xj) ≤ (1− ε) log d− 3]
≤
(
10
ε
)2d
2
−m
“
εC′d
2(log d)2
−1
”
,
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for d ≥ 7 and ε ≤ 2/5. Set ε = 1
log d
. The RHS of the above equation
then decreases provided that m > 8
C′ (log d)
4. Thus with d = 2n and logm =
4 log n + O(1), the accessible information of the ensemble corresponding to the
commitment is then Iacc(E) ≤ log d − (1 − ε) log d + 3 = ε log d + 3 = 4 for our
choice of ε. 2
Unfortunately, the protocol is inefficient both in terms of computation and
communication. It remains open to find an efficient constructive scheme with
those parameters.
In contrast, for only two bases, an efficient construction exists and uses the
identity and the Hadamard transform as unitaries. For this case, the security
of the standard LOCKCOM protocol follows immediately from the locking argu-
ments of Chapter 5. It has been shown that this protocol can be made cheat-
sensitive [Chr05].
10.4.3. Theorem. LOCKCOM(n, 1, n/2) using U = {I⊗n, H⊗n} is a (n, 1, n/2)-
QBSCIacc protocol.
Proof. The result follows immediately from Lemma 10.4.1 and the fact that by
Corollary 5.2.3 Iacc(E) ≤ n/2 for Bob. 2
We can thus obtain non-trivial protocols by exploiting the locking effects dis-
cussed in Chapter 5. Note, however, that the security parameters are very weak.
Indeed, if Alice uses only two possible bases chosen with equal probability then
Bob is always able to obtain the encoded string with probability at least 1/2: he
simply guesses the basis and performs the corresponding measurement.
10.5 Conclusion
We have introduced a framework for quantum commitments to a string of bits.
Even if we consider string commitments that are weaker than bit commitments,
no non-trivial protocols can exist if we choose a very strong measure of security.
A property of quantum states known as locking, however, allowed us to propose
meaningful protocols for a much weaker security demand. One could extend our
method to the case of weak secure function evaluation as was done for the original
bit commitment protocol in [Lo97]. After completion of our work, Jain [Jai05] has
also shown using a different method that QBSCχ protocols with a+16b+31 < n
cannot exist.
A drawback of weakening the security requirement is that LOCKCOM proto-
cols are not necessarily composable. Thus, if LOCKCOM is used as a sub-protocol
in a larger protocol, the security of the resulting scheme has to be evaluated on
a case by case basis. However, LOCKCOM protocols are secure when executed
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in parallel. This is a consequence of the definition of Alice’s security parameter
and the additivity of the accessible information (see Chapter 2), and sufficient for
many cryptographic purposes.
However, two important open questions remain: First, how can we construct
efficient protocols using more than two bases? It may be tempting to conclude
that we could simply use a larger number of mutually unbiased bases, such as
given by the identity and Hadamard transform. Yet, as we saw in Chapter 4
using more mutually unbiased bases does not necessarily lead to a better locking
effect and thus better string commitment protocols. Finally, are there any novel
applications for this weak quantum string commitment?
Fortunately, it turns out that we can implement protocol with very strong
security parameters if we are willing to introduce additional assumptions. We
now show how to obtain oblivious transfer from the assumption that qubits are
affected by noise during storage.
Chapter 11
Possibilities: Exploiting storage errors
Given the negative results from the last chapter, what can we still hope to achieve?
Fortunately, the situation is not quite as bleak if we are taking advantage of
the technical limitation that quantum storage is necessarily noisy. Here, the
very problem that still prevents us from implementing a quantum computer can
actually be turned to our advantage! As we saw in Chapter 1 the primitive of
oblivious transfer allows us to implement essentially all cryptographic protocols
among two mutually distrustful players, and hence we focus on this primitive.
11.1 Introduction
As outlined in Chapter 1, it was recently shown that secure OT is possible when
the receiver Bob has a limited amount of quantum memory [DFSS05, DFR+07]
at his disposal. Within this ‘bounded-quantum-storage model’ OT can be imple-
mented securely as long as a dishonest receiver Bob can store at most n/4−O(1)
qubits coherently, where n is the number of qubits transmitted from Alice to Bob.
The problem with this approach is that it assumes an explicit limit on the physical
number of qubits (or more precisely, the rank of the adversary’s quantum state).
However, at present we do not know of any practical physical situation which en-
forces such a limit for quantum information. On the other hand it is a fact that
currently and in the near-future storing photonic qubits is noisy. We therefore
propose an alternative model of noisy-quantum storage inspired by present-day
physical implementations: We require no explicit memory bound, but we assume
that any qubit that is placed into quantum storage undergoes a certain amount
of noise. Here, we take the 1-2 OT protocol from [DFR+07] as our starting point,
and analyze it in this model. This simple 1-2 OT protocol can be implemented
using photonic qubits (using polarization or phase-encoding) with standard BB84
quantum key distribution [BB84, GRTZ02] hardware, only with different classical
post-processing.
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Our adversary model is that of collective attacks (in analogy with collective
eavesdropping attacks in the quantum key distribution setting). More precisely:
• Bob may choose to (partially) measure (a subset of) his qubits immediately
upon reception using an error-free product measurement.
• Bob may store each incoming qubit, or post-measurement state from a prior
partial measurement, separately and wait until he gets additional informa-
tion from Alice (at Step 3 in Protocol 1).
• Once he obtained the additional information he may perform an arbitrary
coherent measurement on his stored qubits and stored classical data.
We assume that a qubit qi undergoes some noise while in storage, where we
denote the combined channel given by Bob’s initial (partial) measurement, fol-
lowed by the noise by super-operator Si. The source of noise can be due to the
transfer of qubit onto a different physical carrier, such as an atomic ensemble or
atomic state for example, or into an error-correcting code with fidelity less than 1.
In addition, the (encoded) qubit will undergo noise once it has been transferred
into ‘storage’. Hence, the quantum operation Si in any real world setting will nec-
essarily include some form of noise. Note that such noise is typically much larger
than the noise experienced by honest players who only need to make immediate
complete measurements in the BB84 basis.
First of all, we show that for any initial measurement by Bob, and any noisy
superoperator Si the 1-2 OT protocol is secure if the honest players can perform
perfect noise-free quantum operations. As an explicit example, we consider de-
polarizing noise for which reduce the set of optimal attacks to two simple ones:
measure in the so-called Breidbart basis or let the qubits undergo depolarizing
noise. This allows us to obtain an explicit tradeoff between the amount of noise
in storage and the security of the protocol.
In a real implementation using photonic qubits the execution of the protocol
by the honest players is imperfect: their quantum operations can be inaccurate
or noisy, weak laser pulses instead of single photon sources are used and qubits
undergo decoherence in transmission. Note, however, that unlike in QKD, we also
want to execute such protocols over very short distances (for example in banking
applications) such that the depolarization rate during transmission in free-space
is very low. Our practical 1-2 OT-protocol is a small modification of the perfect
protocol, so that we can separately deal with erasure errors (i.e. photon loss) and
the rate of these errors does not affect the security of the protocol. We then show
for this practical protocol how one can derive trade-offs between the amount of
storage noise, the amount of noise for the operations performed by the honest
players, and the security of the protocol. At the end, we discuss the issue of
analyzing fully coherent attacks for our protocol. Indeed, there is a close relation
between the 1-2 OT protocol and BB84 quantum key distribution.
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Our security analysis can in principle be carried over to obtain a secure iden-
tification scheme in the noisy-quantum-storage model analogous to [DFSS07].
This scheme achieves password-based identification and is of particular practical
relevance as it can be used for banking applications.
11.1.1 Related work
Precursors of the idea of basing the security of 1-2 OT on storage-noise are already
present in [BBCS92b] which laid the foundations for the protocol in [DFR+07],
but no rigorous analysis was carried through in that paper. Furthermore, it
was pointed out in [Sch07, DFSS08] how the original bounded-quantum-storage
analysis applies in the case of noise levels which are so large that the rank of a
dishonest player’s quantum storage is reduced to n/4. In contrast, we are able to
give an explicit security tradeoff even for small amounts of noise. We furthermore
note that our security proof is not exploiting the noise in the communication
channel (which has been done in the classical setting to achieve cryptographic
tasks, see e.g. [CK88, Cre´97, CMW04]), but is solely based on the fact that the
dishonest receiver’s quantum storage is noisy. Another technical limitation has
been considered in [Sal98] where a bit-commitment scheme was shown secure
under the assumption that the dishonest committer can only measure a limited
number of qubits coherently. Our analysis differs in that we allow any coherent
measurement at the very end. Furthermore, the security analysis of our protocol
is considerably simpler and more promising to be extended to cover more general
cases.
11.2 Preliminaries
11.2.1 Definitions
We start by introducing some tools, definitions and technical lemmas. To define
the security of 1-2 OT, we need to express what it means for a dishonest quantum
player not to gain any information. Let ρXE be a state that is part classical, part
quantum, i.e. a cq-state ρXE =
∑
x∈X PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE. Here, X is a classical
random variable distributed over the finite set X according to distribution PX .
In this Chapter, we will write the non-uniformity of X given ρE =
∑
x PX(x)ρ
x
E
as
d(X|ρE) := 1
2
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ I/|X | ⊗ ρE −∑
x
PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
1
.
Intuitively, if d(X|ρE) ≤ ε the distribution of X is ε-close to uniform even given
ρE, i.e., ρE gives hardly any information about X. A simple property of the non-
uniformity which follows from its definition is that for any cq-state of the form
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ρXED = ρXE ⊗ ρD, we have
d(X|ρED) = d(X|ρE) . (11.1)
We prove the security of a randomized version of OT. In such a protocol, Alice
does not choose her input strings herself, but instead receives two strings S0,
S1 ∈ {0, 1}` chosen uniformly at random by the protocol. Randomized OT (ROT)
can easily be converted into OT: after the ROT protocol is completed, Alice uses
her strings S0, S1 obtained from ROT as one-time pads to encrypt her original
inputs Sˆ0 and Sˆ1, i.e. she sends an additional classical message consisting of
Sˆ0 ⊕ S0 and Sˆ1 ⊕ S1 to Bob. Bob can retrieve the message of his choice by
computing SC ⊕ (SˆC ⊕ SC) = SˆC . He stays completely ignorant about the other
message Sˆ1−C since he is ignorant about S1−C . The security of a quantum protocol
implementing ROT is defined in [DFSS05, DFR+07] for a standalone setting. A
more involved definition allowing for composability can be found in [WW07]. In
the following, we use ρB to denote the complete quantum state of Bob’s lab at the
end of the protocol including any additional classical information he may have
received directly from Alice. Similarly, we use ρCS′0S′1A and ρS′0S′1A to denote the
c-q states corresponding to the state of Alice’s lab at the end of the protocol
including her classical information about Bob’s choice bit C and outputs S ′0 and
S ′1 as defined below.
11.2.1. Definition. An ε-secure 1-2 ROT` is a protocol between Alice and Bob,
where Bob has input C ∈ {0, 1}, and Alice has no input. For any distribution of
C:
• (Correctness) If both parties are honest, Alice gets output S0, S1 ∈ {0, 1}`
and Bob learns Y = SC except with probability ε.
• (Receiver-security) If Bob is honest and obtains output Y , then for any
cheating strategy of Alice resulting in her state ρA, there exist random
variables S ′0 and S
′
1 such that Pr[Y = S
′
C ] ≥ 1 − ε and C is ε-independent
of S ′0,S
′
1 and ρA, i.e., D(ρCS′0,S′1A, ρC ⊗ ρS′0,S′1A) ≤ ε.
• (Sender-security) If Alice is honest, then for any cheating strategy of Bob
resulting in his state ρB, there exists a random variable C
′ ∈ {0, 1} such
that d(S1−C′|SC′C ′ρB) ≤ ε.
Note that cheating Bob may of course not choose a C beforehand. Intuitively,
our requirement for security states that whatever Bob does, he will be ignorant
about at least one of Alice’s inputs. This input is determined by his cheating
strategy. Our requirement for receiver security states that C is independent of
Alice’s output, and hence Alice learns nothing about C.
The protocol makes use of two-universal hash functions that are used for
privacy amplification similar as in QKD, which we already encountered in Sec-
tion 10.2.3. For the remainder of this Chapter, we first define
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11.2.2. Definition. For a measurement M with POVM elements {Mx}x∈X let
pMy|x = Tr(Myρ
x
E) the probability of outputting guess y given ρ
x
E. Then
Pg(X|ρE) := sup
M
∑
x
PX(x)p
M
x|x
is the maximal average success probability of guessing x ∈ X given the reduced
state ρE of the cq-state ρXE.
We will employ privacy amplification in the form of the following Lemma, which
is an immediate consequence of Lemma 10.2.2 and Theorem 10.2.3 (Theorem
5.5.1 in [Ren05]):
11.2.3. Lemma. Let F be a class of two-universal hash functions from {0, 1}n
to {0, 1}`. Let F be a random variable that is uniformly and independently dis-
tributed over F , and let ρXE be a cq-state. Then,
d(F (X)|F, ρE) ≤ 2 `2−1
√
Pg(X|ρE) .
If we have an additional k bits of classical information D about X,
d(F (X)|F,D, ρE) ≤ 2 `+k2 −1
√
Pg(X|ρE).
Furthermore, we will need the following lemma which states that the optimal
strategy to guess X = x ∈ {0, 1}n given individual quantum information about
the bits of X is to measure each register individually.
11.2.4. Lemma. Let ρXE be a cq-state with uniformly distributed X = x ∈
{0, 1}n and ρxE = ρx1E1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ ρxnEn. Then the maximum probability of guessing
x given state ρE is Pg(X|ρE) = Πni=1Pg(Xi|ρEi), which can be achieved by mea-
suring each register separately.
Proof. For simplicity, we will assume that each bit is encoded using the same
states ρ0 = ρ
0
Ei
and ρ1 = ρ
1
Ei
. The argument for different encodings is analogous,
but harder to read. First of all, note that we can phrase the problem of finding
the optimal probability of distinguishing two states as a semi-definite program
(SDP)
maximize 1
2
(Tr(M0ρ0) + Tr(M1ρ1))
subject to M0,M1 ≥ 0
M0 +M1 = I
with the dual program
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minimize 1
2
Tr(Q)
subject to Q ≥ ρ0
Q ≥ ρ1.
Let p∗ and d∗ denote the optimal values of the primal and dual respectively.
From the weak duality of SDPs, we have p∗ ≤ d∗. Indeed, since M0,M1 = I/2
are feasible solutions, we even have strong duality: p∗ = d∗ [VB96].
Of course, the problem of determining the entire string x from ρˆx := ρ
x
E can
also be phrased as a SDP:
maximize 1
2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n Tr(Mxρˆx)
subject to ∀x,Mx ≥ 0∑
x∈{0,1}n Mx = I
with the corresponding dual
minimize 1
2n
Tr(Qˆ)
subject to ∀x, Qˆ ≥ ρˆx.
Let pˆ∗ and dˆ∗ denote the optimal values of this new primal and dual respectively.
Again, pˆ∗ = dˆ∗.
Note that when trying to learn the entire string x, we are of course free
to measure each register individually and thus (p∗)n ≤ pˆ∗. We now show that
dˆ∗ ≤ (d∗)n by constructing a dual solution Qˆ from the optimal solution to the
dual of the single-register case, Q∗: Take Qˆ = Q⊗n∗ . Since Q∗ ≥ ρ0 and Q∗ ≥ ρ1
it follows that ∀x,Q⊗n∗ ≥ ρˆx. Thus Qˆ is satisfies the dual constraints. Clearly,
2−nTr(Qˆ) = (2−1Tr(Q∗))n and thus we have dˆ∗ ≤ (d∗)n as promised. But from
(p∗)n ≤ pˆ∗, pˆ∗ = dˆ∗, and p∗ = d∗ we immediately have pˆ∗ = (p∗)n. 2
The next tool we need is an uncertainty relation for noisy channels and mea-
surements. Let σ0,+ = |0〉〈0|, σ1,+ = |1〉〈1|, σ0,× = |+〉〈+| and σ1,× = |−〉〈−|
denote the BB84-states corresponding to the encoding of a bit z ∈ {0, 1} into ba-
sis b ∈ {+,×} (computational resp. Hadamard basis). Let σ+ = (σ0,+ + σ1,+)/2
and σ× = (σ0,× + σ1,×)/2. Consider the state S(σz,b) for some super-operator S.
Note that Pg(X|S(σb)) (see Lemma 11.2.4) denotes the maximal average success
probability for guessing a uniformly distributed X when b = + or b = ×. An
uncertainty relation for such success probabilities can be stated as
Pg(X|S(σ+)) · Pg(X|S(σ×)) ≤ ∆(S)2, (11.2)
where ∆ is a function from the set of superoperators to the real numbers. For
example, when S is a quantum measurement M mapping the state σz,b onto
purely classical information it can be argued (e.g. by using a purification argument
and Corollary 4.15 in [Sch07]) that ∆(M) ≡ 1
2
(1 + 2−1/2) which can be achieved
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by a measurement in the Breidbart basis, where the Breidbart basis is given by
{|0〉B, |1〉B} with
|0〉B = cos(pi/8)|0〉+ sin(pi/8)|1〉
|1〉B = sin(pi/8)|0〉 − cos(pi/8)|1〉
It is clear that for a unitary superoperator U we have ∆(U)2 = 1 which can be
achieved. It is not hard to show that
11.2.5. Lemma. The only superoperators S : Hin → Hout with dim(Hin) = 2 for
which Pg(X|S(σ+)) · Pg(X|S(σ×)) = 1 are reversible operations.
Proof. Using Helstrom’s formula [Hel67] we have that Pg(Z|S(σb)) = 12 [1 +||S(σ0,b)− S(σ1,b)||1 /2] and thus for ∆(S) = 1 we need that for both b ∈ {×,+},
||S(σ0,b)−S(σ1,b)||1/2 = 1. This implies that S(σ0,b) and S(σ1,b) are states which
have support on orthogonal sub-spaces for both b. Let S(σ0,+) =
∑
k pk|ψk〉〈ψk|
and S(σ1,+) =
∑
k qk|ψ⊥k 〉〈ψ⊥k | where for all k, l 〈ψ⊥k |ψl〉 = 0. Consider the pu-
rification of S(σi,b) using an ancillary system i.e. |φi,b〉 = US |i〉b|0〉. We can
write |φ0,+〉 =
∑
k
√
pk|ψk, k〉 and |φ1,+〉 =
∑
k
√
qk|ψ⊥k , k〉. Hence US |0〉×|0〉 =
1√
2
(|φ0,+〉+ |φ1,+〉) and similar for US |1〉×|0〉. So we can write
||S(σ0,×)− S(σ1,×)||1 =
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∑
k
√
pkqk(|ψk〉〈ψ⊥k |+ |ψ⊥k 〉〈ψk|)
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
1
≤ 2
∑
k
√
pkqk.
For this quantity to be equal to 2 we observe that it is necessary that pk = qk.
Thus we set pk = qk. We observe that if any of the states |ψk〉 (or ψ⊥k ) are non-
orthogonal, i.e. |〈ψk|ψl〉| > 0, then we have ||
∑
k pk(|ψk〉〈ψ⊥k |+ |ψ⊥k 〉〈ψk|)||1 < 2.
Let Sk be the two-dimensional subspace spanned by the orthogonal vectors
|ψk〉 and |ψ⊥k 〉. By the arguments above, the spaces Sk are mutually orthogonal.
We can reverse the super-operator S by first projecting the output into one of
the orthogonal subspaces Sk and then applying a unitary operator Uk that maps
|ψk〉 and |ψ⊥k 〉 onto the states |0〉 and |1〉. 2
Finally, we need the following little technical lemma:
11.2.6. Lemma. For any 1
2
≤ pi ≤ 1 with
∏n
i=1 pi ≤ pn, we have
1
2n
n∏
i=1
(1 + pi) ≤ plog(4/3)n . (11.3)
Proof. With λ := log(4/3), it is easy to verify that p−λi + p
1−λ
i ≤ 2 for
1/2 ≤ pi ≤ 1 and therefore,
1
2n
n∏
i=1
(1 + pi) =
1
2n
n∏
i=1
pλi
(
p−λi + p
1−λ
i
) ≤ 1
2n
· pλn · 2n.
2
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11.3 Protocol and analysis
11.3.1 Protocol
We use ∈R to denote the uniform choice of an element from a set. We further use
x|T to denote the string x = x1, . . . , xn restricted to the bits indexed by the set
T ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. For convenience, we take {+,×} instead of {0, 1} as domain of
Bob’s choice bit C and denote by C the bit different from C.
Protocol 2: 1-2 ROT`(C, T )[DFR+07]
1: Alice picks X ∈R {0, 1}n and Θ ∈R {+,×}n. Let Ib = {i | Θi = b} for
b ∈ {+,×}. At time t = 0, she sends σX1,Θ1 ⊗ . . .⊗ σXn,Θn to Bob.
2: Bob measures all qubits in the basis corresponding to his choice bit C ∈
{+,×}. This yields outcome X ′ ∈ {0, 1}n.
3: Alice picks two hash functions F+, F× ∈R F , where F is a class of two-
universal hash functions. At time t = T , she sends I+,I×, F+,F× to Bob.
Alice outputs S+ = F+(X|I+) and S× = F×(X|I×)
a.
4: Bob outputs SC = FC(X
′
|IC ).
aIf X|Ib is less than n bits long Alice pads the string X|Ib with 0’s to get an n bit-string
in order to apply the hash function to n bits.
11.3.2 Analysis
We now show that this protocol is secure according to Definition 11.2.1.
(i) Correctness: It is clear that the protocol is correct. Bob can determine the
string X|IC (except with negligible probability 2
−n the set IC is non-empty) and
hence obtains SC .
(ii) Security against dishonest Alice: this holds in the same way as shown
in [DFR+07]. As the protocol is non-interactive, Alice never receives any infor-
mation from Bob at all, and Alice’s input strings can be extracted by letting her
interact with an unbounded receiver.
(iii) Security against dishonest Bob: Our goal is to show that there exists
a C ′ ∈ {+,×} such that Bob is completely ignorant about SC′ . In our adver-
sary model, Bob’s collective storage cheating strategy can be described by some
superoperator
S =
n⊗
i=1
Si
that is applied on the qubits between the time they arrive at Bob’s and the
time T that Alice sends the classical information. We define the choice bit C ′
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as a fixed function of Bob’s cheating strategy S. Formally, we set C ′ ≡ + if∏n
i=1 Pg(Xi|Si(σ+)) ≥
∏n
i=1 Pg(Xi|Si(σ×)) and C ′ ≡ × otherwise.
Due to the uncertainty relation for each Si (from Eq. (11.2)) it then holds
that ∏
i
Pg(Xi|Si(σC′)) ≤
∏
i
∆(Si) ≤ (∆max)n
where ∆max := maxi∆(Si). This will be used in the proof below.
In the remainder of this section, we show that the non-uniformity
δsec := d(SC′|SC′C ′ρB)
is negligible in n for a collective attack. Here ρB is the complete quantum
state of Bob’s lab at the end of the protocol including the classical information
I+, I×, F+, F× he got from Alice and his quantum information
⊗n
i=1 Si(σXi,Θi).
Expressing the non-uniformity in terms of the trace-distance allows us to observe
that δsec = 2
−n∑
θ∈{+,×}n d(SC′|Θ = θ, SC′C ′ρB). Now, for fixed Θ = θ, it is
clear from the construction that SC′ , C
′, FC′ and
⊗
i∈IC′ Si(σXi,C′) are indepen-
dent of SC′ = FC′(X|IC′ ) and we can use Eq. (11.1). Hence, one can bound the
non-uniformity as in Lemma 11.2.3, i.e. by the square-root of the probability of
correctly guessing X|I
C′
given the state
⊗
i∈I
C′
Si(σXi,C′). Lemma 11.2.4 tells us
that to guess X, Bob can measure each remaining qubit individually and hence
we obtain
δsec ≤ 2 `2−1 · 2−n
∑
θ∈{+,×}n
√∏
i∈I
C′
Pg(Xi|Si(σC′))
≤ 2 `2−1
√
2−n
∑
θ∈{+,×}n
∏
i∈I
C′
Pg(Xi|Si(σC′))
≤ 2 `2−1
√√√√2−n n∏
i=1
(
1 + Pg(Xi|Si(σC′))
)
,
where we used the concavity of the square-root function in the last inequality.
Lemma 11.2.6 together with the bound
∏
i Pg(Xi|Si(σC′)) ≤ (∆max)n lets us con-
clude that
δsec ≤ 2 `2−1 · (∆max)
log(4/3)
2
n.
Lemma 11.2.5 shows that for essentially any noisy superoperator ∆(S) < 1. This
shows that for any collective attacks there exists an n which yields arbitrarily
high security.
11.4 Practical oblivious transfer
In this section, we prove the security of a ROT protocol that is robust against
noise for the honest parties. Our protocol is thereby a small modification of the
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protocol considered in [Sch07]. Note that for our analysis, we have to assume a
worst-case scenario where a dishonest receiver Bob has access to a perfect noise-
free quantum channel and only experiences noise during storage.
First, we consider erasure noise (in practice corresponding to photon loss)
during preparation, transmission and measurement of the qubits by the honest
parties. Let 1 − perase be the total constant probability for an honest Bob to
measure and detect a photon in the {+,×} basis given that an honest Alice
prepares a qubit (or weak laser pulse) in her lab and sends it to him. The
probability perase is determined among others by the mean photon number in the
pulse, the loss on the channel and the quantum efficiency of the detector. In
our protocol we assume that the (honest) erasure rate perase is independent of
whether qubits were encoded or measured in the +- or ×-basis. This assumption
is necessary to guarantee the correctness and the security against a cheating Alice
only. Fortunately, this assumption is well matched with physical capabilities.
Any other noise source during preparation, transmission and measurement
can be characterized as an effective classical noisy channel resulting in the output
bits X ′ that Bob obtains at Step 3 of Protocol 11.4. For simplicity, we model this
compound noise source as a classical binary symmetric channel acting indepen-
dently on each bit of X. Typical noise sources for polarization-encoded qubits are
depolarization during transmission, dark counts in Bob’s detector and misaligned
polarizing beam-splitters. Let the effective bit-error probability of this binary
symmetric channel be perror < 1/2.
Before engaging in the actual protocol, Alice and Bob agree on the system
parameters perase and perror similarly to Step 1 of the protocol in [BBCS92b].
Furthermore, they agree on a family {Cn} of linear error correcting codes of
length n capable of efficiently correcting n·perror errors. For any string x ∈ {0, 1}n,
error correction is done by sending the syndrome information syn(x) to Bob from
which he can correctly recover x if he holds an output x′ ∈ {0, 1}n obtained by
flipping each bit of x independently with probability perror. It is known that for
large enough n, the code Cn can be chosen such that its rate is arbitrarily close
to 1 − h(perror) and the syndrome length (the number of parity check bits) are
asymptotically bounded by |syn(x)| < h(perror)n [Cre´97], where h(perror) is the
binary Shannon entropy. We assume the players have synchronized clocks. In
each time slot, Alice sends one qubit (laser pulse) to Bob.
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Protocol 3: Noise-Protected Photonic 1-2 ROT`(C, T )
1: Alice picks X ∈R {0, 1}n and Θ ∈R {+,×}n.
2: For i = 1, . . . , n: In time slot t = i, Alice sends σXi,Θi as a phase- or
polarization-encoded weak pulse of light to Bob.
3: In each time slot, Bob measures the incoming qubit in the basis corre-
sponding to his choice bit C ∈ {+,×} and records whether he detects a
photon or not. He obtains some bit-string X ′ ∈ {0, 1}m with m ≤ n.
4: Bob reports back to Alice in which time slots he received a qubit. Alice
restricts herself to the set of m ≤ n bits that Bob did not report as
missing. Let this set of qubits be Sremain with |Sremain| = m.
5: Let Ib = {i ∈ Sremain | Θi = b} for b ∈ {+,×} and let mb = |Ib|. Alice
aborts the protocol if either m+ or m× ≤ (1−perase)n/2−O(
√
n). If this
is not the case, Alice picks two hash functions F+, F× ∈R F , where F
is a set of two-universal hash functions. At time t = n + T , Alice sends
I+,I×, F+,F×, and the syndromes syn(X|I+) and syn(X|I×) according
to codes of appropriate length mb to Bob. Alice outputs S+ = F+(X|I+)
and S× = F×(X|I×).
6: Bob uses syn(X|IC ) to correct the errors on his output X
′
|IC . He obtains
the corrected bit-string Xcor and outputs S
′
C = FC(Xcor).
Let us consider the security and correctness of this modified protocol.
(i) Correctness: By assumption, perase is independent of the basis in which Alice
sent the qubits. Thus, Sremain is with high probability a random subset of the
transmitted qubits of of size m ≈ (1 − perase)n ± O(
√
n) qubits independent of
the value of bases Θ. This implies that in Step 5 the protocol is aborted with a
probability exponentially small in m, and hence in n. The codes are chosen such
that Bob can decode except with negligible probability. These facts imply that if
both parties are honest the protocol is correct (i.e. SC = S
′
C) with exponentially
small probability of error.
(ii) Security against dishonest Alice: Even though in this scenario Bob does com-
municate to Alice, the information stating which qubits were erased is by assump-
tion independent of the basis in which he measured and thus of his choice bit C.
Hence Alice does not learn anything about his choice bit C. Her input strings
can be extracted as in Protocol 1.
(iii) Security against dishonest Bob: Our analysis is essentially identical to our
analysis for Protocol 1 where we address the error-correcting properties as in [Sch07].
First of all, we note that Bob can always make Alice abort the protocol by report-
ing back an insufficient number of received qubits. If this is not the case, then we
define C ′ as in the analysis of Protocol 1 and we need to bound the non-uniformity
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δsec as before. Let us for simplicity assume that mb = m/2 (this is true with high
probability, up to a factor of O(
√
n) which becomes negligible for large n) with
m ≈ (1− perase)n. We perform the same analysis, where we restrict ourselves to
the set of remaining qubits. We first follow through the same steps simplifying
the non-uniformity using that the total attack superoperator S is a product of
superoperators. Then we use the bound in Lemma 11.2.3 for each θ ∈ {+,×}n
where we now have to condition on the additional information syn(X|I
C′
) which
is mh(perror)/2 bits long. Note that Bob does not gain any information when
Alice aborts the protocol, since her decision to abort is a function of the bits Bob
reported as being erased and he can thus compute Alice’s decision himself. Using
the second part of Lemma 11.2.3 and following identical steps in the remainder
of the proof implies
δsec ≤ 2 `2−1+h(perror)m4 (∆max)
log(4/3)
2
m . (11.4)
From this expression it is clear that the security depends crucially on the value
of ∆max versus the binary entropy h(perror). The trade-off in our bound is not
extremely favorable for security as we will see.
11.5 Example: depolarizing noise
Let us now consider the security in an explicit example, where Bob’s storage is
affected by depolarizing noise, and he is not able to encode the incoming qubits
into a higher-dimensional system such as an error correcting code.
Again, we first address the simpler setting where the honest players experience
no noise themselves. In order to explicitly bound ∆(Si) we should allow for
intermediate strategies of Bob in which he partially measures the incoming qubits
leaving some quantum information undergoing depolarizing noise. To model this
noise we let Si = N ◦ Pi, where Pi is any noiseless quantum operation of Bob’s
choosing from one qubit to one qubit that generates some classical output. For
example, Pi could be a partial measurement providing Bob with some classical
information and a slightly disturbed quantum state, or just a unitary operation.
Let
N (ρ) := rρ+ (1− r) I
2
be the fixed depolarizing ’quantum storage’ channel that Bob cannot influence
(see Figure 11.1).
To determine δsec, we have to find an uncertainty relation similar to Eq. (11.2)
by optimizing over all possible partial measurements Pi,
∆2max = maxSi
∆(Si)2 = maxPi Pg(X|Si(σ+)) · Pg(X|Si(σ×)). (11.5)
We solve this problem for depolarizing noise using the symmetries inherent in our
problem. In Section 11.5.1 we prove the following.
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Figure 11.1: Bob performs a partial measurement Pi, followed by noise N , and outputs
a guess bit xg depending on his classical measurement outcome, the remaining quantum
state, and the additional basis information.
11.5.1. Theorem. Let N be the depolarizing channel and let maxSi ∆(Si) be
defined as above. Then
max
Si
∆(Si) =
{
1+r
2
for r ≥ 1√
2
1
2
+ 1
2
√
2
for r < 1√
2
Our result shows that for r < 1/
√
2 a direct measurement M in the Breidbart
basis is the best attack Bob can perform. For this measurement, we have ∆(M) =
1/2+1/(2
√
2). If the depolarizing noise is low (r ≥ 1/√2), then our result states
that the best strategy for Bob is to simply store the qubit as is.
11.5.1 Optimal cheating strategy
We now prove Theorem 11.5.1 in a series of steps. Recall, that to determine the
security bound, we have to find an uncertainty relation similar to Eq. (11.2) by
optimizing over all possible partial measurements P and final measurements M
as in Eq. 11.5. To improve readability, we will drop the index i and use S in place
of Si to denote the cheating operation acting on a single qubit. For our analysis, it
will be convenient to think of P as a partial measurement of the incoming qubit.
Note that this corresponds to letting Bob perform an arbitrary CPTP map from
the space of the incoming qubit to the space carrying the stored qubit. It will
furthermore be convenient to consider the maximizing the sum instead:
Γ(S) = max
M,P
Pg(X|S(σ+)) + Pg(X|S(σ×)).
This immediately gives us the bound ∆(S) ≤ Γ(S)/2. In the following, we will
use the shorthand
p+ := Pg(X|S(σ+))
p× := Pg(X|S(σ×))
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for the probabilities that Bob correctly decodes the bit after Alice has announced
the basis information.
Any measurement Bob may perform can be characterized by a set of measure-
ment operators {Fk} such that
∑
k F
†
kFk = I. The probability that Bob succeeds
in decoding the bit after the announcement of the basis is simply the average over
the probability that he correctly decodes the bit, conditioned on the fact that he
obtained outcome k. I.e., for b ∈ {+,×}
pb =
∑
k
pk|b
(
1
2
+
1
4
||p0|kbN(σ˜k0,b)− p1|kbN(σ˜k1,b)||1
)
=
1
2
+
1
4
∑
k
pk|b||r(p0|kbσ˜k0,b − p1|kbσ˜k1,b) + (1− r)(p0|kb − p1|kb)I/2||1,
where
pk|b = Tr
(
Fk
σ0,b + σ1,b
2
F †k
)
=
1
2
Tr(FkF
†
k )
is the probability of obtaining measurement outcome k conditioned on the fact
that the basis was b (and we even see from the above that it is actually indepen-
dent of b), σ˜k0,b = Fkσ0,bF
†
k/pk|0b is the post-measurement state for outcome k, and
p0|kb is the probability that we are given this state. Definitions are analogous for
the bit 1.
We now show that Bob’s optimal strategy is to measure in the Breidbart basis
for r < 1/
√
2, and to simply store the qubit for r ≥ 1/√2. This then immediately
allows us to evaluate ∆max. To prove our result, we proceed in three steps: First,
we will simplify our problem considerably until we are left with a single Hermitian
measurement operator over which we need to maximize. Second, we show that
the optimal measurement operator is diagonal in the Breidbart basis. And finally,
we show that depending on the amount of noise, this measurement operator is
either proportional to the identity, or proportional to a rank one projector. Our
individual claims are indeed very intuitive.
For any measurement M = {Fk}, let B(M) = pM+ + pM× for the measurement
M , where pM+ and p
M
× are the success probabilities similar to Eq. (11.6), but
restricted to using the measurement M . First of all, note that we can easily
combine two measurements. Intuitively, the following statement says that if we
choose one measurement with probability α, and the other with probability β
our average success probability will be the average of the success probabilities
obtained via the individual measurements:
4. Claim. LetM1 = {F 1k } andM2 = {F 2k } be two measurements. Then B(αM1+
βM2) = αB(M1) + βB(M2), where where αM1 + βM2 = {
√
αF 1k } ∪ {
√
βF 2k } for
α, β ≥ 0 and α+ β = 1.
Proof. Let F = {Fk}fk=1 and G = {Gk}gk=1 be measurements, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and
M := {√αFk}fk=1 ∪ {
√
1− αGk}f+gk=f+1 be the measurement F with probability
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α and measurement G with probability 1 − α. We denote by pF· , pG· , pM· the
probabilities corresponding to measurements F,G,M respectively. Observe that
for 1 ≤ k ≤ f , pMk|b = 12Tr(αFkF †k ) = αpFk|b and analogously for f +1 ≤ k ≤ f + g,
we have pMk|b = (1 − α)pGk|b. We observe furthermore that for 1 ≤ k ≤ f and
x ∈ {0, 1}, α cancels out by the normalization, σ˜k,Mx,b = αFkσx,bF
†
k
pM
k|xb
=
Fkσx,bF
†
k
pF
k|xb
= σ˜k,Fx,b
and similarly for f + 1 ≤ k ≤ f + g. Finally, we can convince ourselves that
pMx|kb = p
F
x|kb = p
G
x|(k−f)b, as the probability to be given state σ˜
k
0,b is the same when
the measurement outcome and the basis is fixed. Putting everything together,
we obtain
pMb =
f+g∑
k=1
pMk|b
(
1
2
+
1
4
||pM0|kbN(σ˜k,M0,b )− pM1|kbN(σ˜k,M1,b )||1
)
=
f∑
k=1
αpFk|b
(
1
2
+
1
4
||pF0|kbN(σ˜k,F0,b )− pF1|kbN(σ˜k,F1,b )||1
)
+
g∑
k=f+1
(1− α)pGk|b
(
1
2
+
1
4
||pG0|kbN(σ˜k,G0,b )− pG1|kbN(σ˜k,G1,b )||1
)
= αpFb + (1− α)pGb .
2
We can now make a series of observations.
5. Claim. Let M = {Fk} and G = {I, X, Z,XZ}. Then for all g ∈ G we have
B(M) = B(gMg†).
Proof. This claim follows immediately from that fact that for the trace norm
we have ||UAU †||1 = ||A||1 for all unitaries U , and by noting that for all g ∈ G,
g can at most exchange the roles of 0 and 1. I.e., we perform a bit flip before
the measurement which we can correct for afterwards by applying classical post-
processing: we have for all g ∈ G that
pk|b
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣p0|kbN
(
Fkgσ0,bg
†F †k
pk|0b
)
− p1|kbN
(
Fkgσ1,bg
†F †k
pk|1b
)∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
1
= pk′|b
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣p0|kbN
(
Fkσ0,bF
†
k
pk|0b
)
− p1|kbN
(
Fkσ1,bF
†
k
pk|1b
)∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
1
.
2
It also follows that
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11.5.2. Corollary. For all k we have for all b ∈ {+,×} and g ∈ G that∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣p0|kbN
(
Fkσ0,bF
†
k
pk|0b
)
− p1|kbN
(
Fkσ1,bF
†
k
pk|1b
)∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
1
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣p0|kbN
(
Fkgσ0,bg
†F †k
pk|0b
)
− p1|kbN
(
Fkgσ1,bg
†F †k
pk|1b
)∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
1
.
Proof. This follows from the proof of Claim 5. 2
6. Claim. Let G = {I, X, Z,XZ}. There exists a measurement operator F such
that the maximum of B(M) over all measurements M is achieved by a measure-
ment proportional to {gFg† | g ∈ G}.
Proof. Let M = {Fk} be a measurement. Let K = |M | be the number of
measurement operators. Clearly, Mˆ = {Fˆg,k} with
Fˆg,k =
1
4
gFkg
†,
is also a quantum measurement since
∑
g,k Fˆ
†
g,kFˆg,k = I. It follows from Claims 4
and 5 that B(M) = B(Mˆ). Define operators
Ng,k =
1√
2Tr(F †kFk)
gFkg
†.
Note that ∑
g∈G
Ng,k =
1√
2Tr(F †kFk)
∑
u,v∈{0,1}
XuZvF †kFkZ
vXu = I.
(see for example Hayashi [Hay06]). Hence Mk = {Ng,k} is a valid quantum
measurement. Now, note that Mˆ can be obtained fromM1, . . . ,MK by averaging.
Hence, by Claim 4 we have
B(M) = B(Mˆ) ≤ max
k
B(Mk).
Let M∗ be the optimal measurement. Clearly, m = B(M∗) ≤ maxk B(M∗k ) ≤ m
by the above and Corollary 11.5.2 from which our claim follows. 2
Note that Claim 6 also gives us that we have at most 4 measurement operators.
Wlog, we will take the measurement outcomes to be labeled 1, 2, 3, 4.
Finally, we note that we can restrict ourselves to optimizing over positive-
semidefinite (and hence Hermitian) matrices only.
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7. Claim. Let F be a measurement operator, and let
g(F ) := 1 +
∑
b,k
pk|b
∣∣∣∣p0|bN( ˜σ0,b)− p1|bN( ˜σ1,b)∣∣∣∣1
with ˜σ0,b = Fσ0,bF
†/Tr(Fσ0,bF †) and ˜σ1,b = Fσ1,bF †/Tr(Fσ1,bF †). Then there
exists a Hermitian operator Fˆ , such that g(F ) = g(Fˆ ).
Proof. Let F † = FˆU be the polar decomposition of F †, where Fˆ is positive
semidefinite and U is unitary [HJ85, Corollary 7.3.3]. Evidently, since the trace is
cyclic, all probabilities remain the same. It follows immediately from the defini-
tion of the trace norm that ||UAU †||1 = ||A||1 for all unitaries U , which completes
our proof. 2
To summarize, our optimization problem can now be simplified to
max
M
B(M) = max
M
pM+ + p
M
× ≤
max
F
1 +
∑
b,k
pk|b
∣∣∣∣p0|bN( ˜σ0,b)− p1|bN( ˜σ1,b)∣∣∣∣1
= 1 + 2
∑
b
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣r(F (σ0,b − σ1,b)F ) + (1− r)Tr(F (σ0,b − σ1,b)F ) I2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
where the maximization is now taken over a single operator F , and we have
used the fact that we can write p0|kb = pk|0b/(2pk|b) and we have 4 measurement
operators.
F is diagonal in the Breidbart basis
Now that we have simplified our problem already considerably, we are ready to
perform the actual optimization. Since we are in dimension d = 2 and F is
Hermitian, we may express F as
F = α|φ〉〈φ|+ β|φ⊥〉〈φ⊥|,
for some state |φ〉 and real numbers α, β. We first of all note that from∑k FkF †k =
I, we obtain that
Tr
(∑
k
FkF
†
k
)
=
∑
k
Tr(FkFk) =∑
g∈{I,X,Z,XZ}
Tr(gFgg†Fg†) = 4Tr(FF ) = Tr(I) = 2,
and hence Tr(FF ) = α2+β2 = 1/2. Furthermore using that |φ〉〈φ|+|φ⊥〉〈φ⊥| = I
we then have
F = βI+ (α− β)|φ〉〈φ|, (11.6)
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with β =
√
1− α2. Our first goal is now to show that |φ〉 is a Breidbart vector
(or the bit-flipped version thereof). To this end, we first formalize our intuition
that we may take |φ〉 to lie in the XZ plane of the Bloch sphere only. Since we
are only interested in the trace-distance term of B(M), we restrict ourselves to
considering
C(F ) :=
∑
b
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣r(F (σ0,b − σ1,b)F ) + (1− r)Tr(F (σ0,b − σ1,b)F ) I2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
.
8. Claim. Let F be the operator that maximizes C(F ), and write F as in Eq.(11.6).
Then |φ〉 lies in the XZ plane of the Bloch sphere. (i.e. Tr(FY ) = 0).
Proof. We first parametrize the state in terms of its Bloch vector:
|φ〉〈φ| = I+ xX + yY + zZ
2
.
Since |φ〉 is pure we can write y = √1− x2 − z2. Hence, we can express F as
F =
1
2
((α+ β)I+ (α− β)(xX + yY + zZ)) .
Noting that σ0,+ − σ1,+ = Z and σ0,× − σ1,× = X we can compute for the
computational basis
P := r(FZF ) + (1− r)Tr(FZF ) I
2
=
1
2
((
2α2 − 1
2
)
zI+ r
(
(α− β)2xzX + (α− β)2yzY + ((α− β)2z2 + 2αβ)Z)) ,
and for the Hadamard basis:
T := r(FXF ) + (1− r)Tr(FXF ) I
2
=
1
2
((
2α2 − 1
2
)
xI+ r
((
(α− β)2x2 + 2αβ)X)
+ (α− β)2xyY + (α− β)2xzZ)
Note that ||P ||1 =
∑
j |λj(P )|, where λj is the j-th eigenvalue of P . A lengthy
computation (using Mathematica), and plugging in β =
√
1/2− α2 and y =√
1− x2 − z2 shows that we have
λ1(P ) =
1
4
((
4α2 − 1) z − r√z2 + 8α2(2α2 − 1)(z2 − 1))
λ2(P ) =
1
4
((
4α2 − 1) z + r√z2 + 8α2(2α2 − 1)(z2 − 1))
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Similarly, we obtain for the Hadamard basis that
λ1(T ) =
1
4
((
4α2 − 1) x− r√x2 + 8α2(2α2 − 1)(x2 − 1))
λ2(T ) =
1
4
((
4α2 − 1) x+ r√x2 + 8α2(2α2 − 1)(x2 − 1))
We define
f(α, x) :=
(
α2 − 1
4
)
x
g(α, x) :=
1
4
√
x2 + 8α2(2α2 − 1)(x2 − 1).
h(α, x, r) := |f(α, x) + rg(α, x)|+ |f(α, x)− rg(α, x)|
Note that our optimization problem now takes the form
maximize h(α, x, r) + h(α, z, r)
subject to x2 + z2 ≤ 1
0 ≤ x ≤ 1
0 ≤ z ≤ 1,
where we can introduce the last two inequality constraints without loss of gener-
ality, since the remaining three measurement operators will be given by XFX,
ZFZ, and XZFZX.
To show that we can let y = 0 for the optimal solution, we have to show that
for all α and all r, the function h(α, x, r) is increasing on the interval 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
(and indeed Mathematica will convince you in an instant that this is the case).
Our analysis is is further complicated by the absolute values. We therefore first
consider
h(α, x, r)2 = 2(f(α, x)2 + r2g(α, x)2 + |f(α, x)2 − r2g(α, x)2|,
where we have used the fact that f and g are real valued functions. In principle,
we can now analyze h+(α, x, r)
2 = 2(f(α, x)2 + r2g(α, x)2 + f(α, x)2 − r2g(α, x)2
and h−(α, x, r)2 = 2(f(α, x)2 + r2g(α, x)2 − f(α, x)2 + r2g(α, x)2 separately on
their respective domains. By rewriting, we obtain
h+(α, x, r)
2 =
1
4
r2(x2 + 8α2(2α2 − 1)(x2 − 1)),
and
h−(α, x, r)2 = 4
(
α2 − 1
4
)2
x2.
Luckily, the first derivatives of h+ and h− turns out to be positive everywhere
for our choice of parameters 0 ≤ α ≤ 1/√2, and 0 ≤ r, z ≤ 1. Hence, by further
182 Chapter 11. Possibilities: Exploiting storage errors
inspection at the transitional points we can conclude that h is an increasing
function of x. But this means that to maximize our target expression, we must
choose x and z as large as possible. Hence, choosing y = 0 is the best choice and
our claim follows. 2
We can now immediately extend this analysis to find
9. Claim. Let F be the operator that maximizes C(F ), and write F as in Eq.(11.6).
Then
|φ〉 = g(cos(pi/8)|0〉+ sin(pi/8)|1〉),
for some g ∈ {I, X, Z,XZ}.
Proof. Extending our analysis from the previous proof, we can compute the
second derivative of both functions. It turns out that also the second deriva-
tives are positive, and hence h is convex in x. By Claim 8, we can rewrite our
optimization problem as
maximize h(α, x, r) + h(α, z, r)
subject to x2 + z2 = 1
0 ≤ x ≤ 1
0 ≤ z ≤ 1
It now follows from the fact that h is convex in x and the constraint x2 + z2 = 1
(by computing the Lagrangian of the above optimization problem), that for the
optimal solution we must have x = z, and our claim follows. 2
Optimality of the trivial strategies
Now that we have shown that F is in fact diagonal in the Breidbart basis (or the
bit flipped version thereof) we have only a single parameter left in our optimiza-
tion problem. We must now optimize over all operators F of the form
F = α|φ〉〈φ|+
√
1/2− α2|φ⊥〉〈φ⊥|,
where we may take |φ〉 to be |0〉B or |1〉B. Our aim is now to show that either F
is the identity, or F = |φ〉〈φ| depending on the value of r.
10. Claim. Let F be the operator that maximizes C(F ). Then F = cI (for some
c ∈ R) for r ≥ 1/√2, and F = |φ〉〈φ| for r < 1/√2, where
|φ〉 = g(cos(pi/8)|0〉+ sin(pi/8)|1〉),
for some g ∈ {I, X, Z,XZ}.
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Proof. We can now plug in x = z = 1/
√
2 in the expressions for the eigen-
values in our previous proof. Ignoring the constant positive factors which do not
contribute to our argument, we can then write
λ1(P ) =
(
4α2 − 1)− r√1− 16α4 + 8α2,
λ2(P ) =
(
4α2 − 1)+ r√1− 16α4 + 8α2.
And similarly for the Hadamard basis. We again define functions
f(α) :=
(
4α2 − 1)
g(α) :=
√
1− 16α4 + 8α2
h(α, r) := |f(α, x) + rg(α, x)|+ |f(α, x)− rg(α, x)|
Note that our optimization problem now takes the form
maximize 2h(α, r)
subject to 0 ≤ α ≤ 1√
2
Since we are maximizing, we might as well consider the square of our target
function and ignore the leading constant as it is irrelevant for our argument.
h(α, r)2 = 2(f(α)2 + r2g(α)2 + |f(α)2 − r2g(α)2|,
To deal with the absolute value, we now perform a case analysis similar to the
one above. Computing the zeros crossings of the function f(α)2 − r2g(α)2, we
analyze each interval separately. Computing the first and second derivatives on
the intervals we find that h(α, r)2 has exactly two peaks: The first at α = 0, and
the second at α = 1/2. We have that h(0, r)2 = 2 for all r, and h(1/2, r)2 = 4r2.
Hence, we immediately see that the maximum is located at α = 0 for r ≤ 1/√2,
and at α = 1/2 for r ≥ 1/√2. 2
Theorem 11.5.1 now follows directly from Claim 10: Bob either measures in
the Breidbart basis, or stores the qubit as is. We believe that a similar analysis
can be done for the dephasing channel, by first symmetrizing the noise by applying
a rotation over pi/4 to our input states.
11.5.2 Noise tradeoff
We now consider the more practical setting, where the honest parties also experi-
ence noise. Clearly, there is a strict tradeoff between the noise perror on the channel
experienced by the honest parties, and the noise experienced by dishonest Bob.
Our practical security bound is fairly weak. In the near-future we may anticipate
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Figure 11.2: h((1−ar)/2)/4+log(1+r
2
) log(4/3)/2, where we only show the region
below 0, i.e., where security can be attained.
that storage is better than direct measurement if good photonic memories be-
come available. However, we are free in our protocol to stretch the waiting time
T between Bob’s reception of the qubits and his reception of the classical basis
information, say, to seconds, which means that one has to consider the overall
noise rate on a qubit that is stored for seconds.
We again consider the case of depolarizing noise during storage. For r < 1/
√
2
(when it is better for Bob to measure in the Breidbart basis), we obtain that our
protocol is secure as long as
h(perror) < 2 log
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
2
)
log(3/4).
Hence, we require that perror / 0.029. This puts a strong restriction on the noise
rate of the honest protocol. Yet, since our protocols are particularly interesting at
short distances (e.g. in the case of secure identification), we can imagine very short
free-space implementations such that depolarization noise during transmission
is negligible and the main depolarization noise source is due to Bob’s honest
measurements.
For r ≥ 1/√2 (when it’s better for Bob to store the qubit as is) we also obtain
a tradeoff involving r. As an example, suppose that the qubits in the honest proto-
col are also subjected to depolarizing noise at rate 1− rd,honest. The effective clas-
sical error rate for a depolarizing channel is then simply perror = (1− rd,honest)/2.
Thus we can consider when the function h(perror)/4 + log(
1+r
2
) log(4/3)/2 goes
below 0. If we assume that rd,honest = ar, for some scaling factor 1 ≤ a ≤ 1/r
(i.e., the honest party never has more noise than the dishonest party), we obtain
a clear tradeoff between a and r depicted in Figure 11.2.
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11.6 Conclusion
We have introduced the model of noisy-quantum storage. In this model, we have
determined security bounds for a perfect ROT protocol given collective storage
attacks by Bob. Furthermore, we showed how to construct a practical ROT where
we do allow the honest parties to experience noise during transmissions and their
operations as well. We provided an explicit security tradeoff between the noise
affecting the honest parties, and the noise during storage for a dishonest Bob.
Ideally, we would like to show security against general coherent noisy attacks.
The problem with analyzing a coherent attack of Bob described by some super-
operator S affecting all his incoming qubits is not merely a technical one: one
first needs to determine a realistic noise model in this setting. It may be possible
using variations of de Finetti theorems as in the proof of QKD [Ren05] to prove
for a symmetrized version of our protocol that any coherent attack by Bob is
equivalent to a collective attack. Yet, the present scenario differs in that it is not
as straightforward to achieve a symmetrization of the protocol. However, one can
in fact analyze a specific type of coherent noise, one that essentially corresponds
to an eavesdropping attack in QKD. Note that the 1-2 OT protocol can be seen
as two runs of QKD interleaved with each other. The strings f(x|I+) and f(x|I×)
are then the two keys generated. The noise must be such that it leaves Bob with
exactly the same information as the eavesdropper Eve in QKD. In this case, it
follows from the security of QKD that the dishonest Bob (learning exactly the
same information as the eavesdropper Eve) does not learn anything about the
two keys.
In terms of long-term security, fault-tolerant photonic computation (e.g., with
the KLM scheme [KLM01]) might allow a dishonest Bob to encode the incoming
quantum information into a fault-tolerant quantum memory. This implies that
in storage, the effective noise rate can be made arbitrarily small. However, the
encoding of a single unknown state is not a fault-tolerant quantum operation:
already the encoding process introduces errors whose rates cannot be made ar-
bitrarily small with increasing effort. Hence, even in the presence of a quantum
computer, there is a residual storage noise rate due to the unprotected encoding
operations. The question of security then becomes a question of a trade-off be-
tween this residual noise rate versus the intrinsic noise rate. Finally, it remains to
address composability of the protocol within our model, which has already been
considered for the bounded-quantum-storage model [WW07].

Appendix A
Linear algebra and semidefinite
programming
Semidefinite programming is a useful tool to solve optimization problems. Since
we employed semidefinite programming in Chapters 3, 7, and 11, we briefly state
the most important notions. We refer to [BV04] for an in-depth introduction.
A.1 Linear algebra prerequisites
Before turning to semidefinite programming in the next section, we first briefly
recall some elementary definitions from linear algebra. We thereby assume the
reader is familiar with basic concepts, such as matrix multiplication and addition.
Unless explicitly indicated, all vector spaces V considered here are over the field
of complex numbers. We use V = Cd to denote a d-dimensional complex vector
space, and Cd×d to denote the space of complex d× d matrices. A set of vectors
|v1〉, . . . , |vd〉 ∈ V is linearly independent if
∑d
i=1 ai|vi〉 = 0 implies that a1 =
. . . = ad = 0. A basis of a d-dimensional vector space V is a set of linearly
independent vectors |v1〉, . . . , |vd〉 ∈ V , the basis vectors , such that any vector
|u〉 ∈ V can be written as a linear combination of basis vectors. We use 〈v| to
denote the conjugate transpose of a vector |v〉. If there exists a vector |v〉 ∈ V
with |v〉 6= 0 such that A|v〉 = λ|v〉, we say that |v〉 is an eigenvector of A and
the scalar λ the corresponding eigenvalue.
The inner product of two vectors |u〉, |v〉 ∈ V with |u〉 = (u1, . . . , ud) and
|v〉 = (v1, . . . , vd) is given by 〈u|v〉 =
∑
i u
∗
i vi. The 2-norm of a vector is given by
|||v〉|| =√〈v|v〉. Unless otherwise indicated, all norms of a vector are 2-norms in
this text. We also use |||v〉||V to denote emphasize that the norm is defined on a
vector space V . Two vectors |u〉, |v〉 ∈ V such that 〈u|v〉 = 0 are orthogonal. If,
in addition, |||u〉|| = |||v〉|| = 1 then they are also called orthonormal.
A Hilbert space is defined as a vector space V with an inner product, where
the vector space is complete. We refer to [Con90] for a formal definition of the
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notion of completeness and merely note that informally a vector space is complete
if for any sequence of vectors in said space approaching a limit, the limit is also
an element of the vector space. A bounded operator is an operator A : V → V ′
such that there exists a c ∈ R satisfying ||A|v〉||V ′ ≤ c|||v〉||V for all v ∈ V . The
smallest such c is also called the operator norm of A.
The transpose of a matrix A is written as AT and given by ATij = Aji, where
Aij denotes the entry of the matrix A at column i and row j. Similarly, the
conjugate transpose A† of A is of the form A†ij = A
∗
ji. We use I to denote the
identity matrix defined as I = [Iij] with Iij = δij. A matrix U is called unitary
if UU † = U †U = I. Furthermore, M is called Hermitian if and only if M = M †.
Any Hermitian matrix can be decomposed in terms of its eigenvalues λj and
eigenvectors |uj〉 as M =
∑
j λj|uj〉〈uj|, where |uj〉〈uj| is a projector onto the
vector |uj〉. We also call this the eigendecomposition of M . The support of M is
the space spanned by all its eigenvectors with non-zero eigenvalue.
The tensor product of an m × n-matrix A and an m′ × n′ matrix B is given
by the mm′ × nn′-matrix
A⊗B =

A11B . . . A1nB
A21B . . . A2nB
. . .
An1B . . . AnnB
 .
The tensor product is also defined for two vector spaces V and V ′. In particular,
if the basis of the d-dimensional vector space V is given by {|v1〉, . . . , |vd〉} and
the basis of the d′-dimensional vector space V ′ is given by {|v′1〉, . . . , |v′d′〉}, then
W = V ⊗V ′ denotes the d ·d′-dimensional vector space W with basis {|vi〉⊗|v′j〉 |
i ∈ [d], j ∈ [d′]}.
The direct sum of an m × n-matrix A and an m′ × n′ matrix B is given by
the m+m′ × n+ n′ matrix (
A 0
0 B
)
.
Two vector spaces V and V ′ defined as above can also be composed in an analo-
gous fashion yielding a d + d′ dimensional vector space W = V ⊕ V ′, where any
|w〉 ∈ W can be written as |w〉 = |v〉 ⊕ |v′〉 for some |v〉 ∈ V and |v′〉 ∈ V ′ with
|v〉 ⊕ |v′〉 = (v1, . . . , vd, v′1, . . . , v′d′) for |v〉 = (v1, . . . , vd) and |v′〉 = (v′1, . . . , v′d′).
The trace of a matrix A is given by the sum of its diagonal entries Tr(A) =∑
iAii. Note that Tr(A + B) = Tr(A) + Tr(B), and Tr(AB) = Tr(BA). If A is
an Hermitian matrix, then Tr(A) is the sum of its eigenvalues.
Finally, the rank of a matrix A is denoted as rank(A) and given by the maximal
number of linearly independent columns (or rows) of A.
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A.2 Definitions
We now turn to the definitions relevant for our discussion of semidefinite pro-
gramming. A Hermitian matrix M is positive semidefinite if and only if all of its
eigenvalues are non-negative [HJ85, Theorem 7.2.1]. Throughout this text, we
use M ≥ 0 to indicate that M is positive semidefinite. We know from [HJ85,
Theorem 7.2.11]:
A.2.1. Proposition. For a Hermitian matrix M ∈ Cd×d the following three
statements are equivalent:
1. M ≥ 0,
2. x†Mx ≥ 0 for all vectors x ∈ Cd,
3. M = G†G for some matrix G ∈ Cd×d.
M is called positive definite if and only if all of its eigenvalues are positive: we
have x†Mx > 0 for all vectors x ∈ Cd. We use M > 0 to indicate that M is
positive definite. We also encounter projectors, where a Hermitian matrix M is a
projector if and only ifM2 =M . Note that this implies thatM ≥ 0. We say that
two projectors M1 and M2 are orthogonal projectors if and only if M1M2 = 0.
Furthermore, we use Sd to denote the set of all Hermitian matrices, Sd =
{X ∈ Cd×d | X = X†}, and Sd+ = {X ∈ Sd | X ≥ 0} for the set of all positive
semidefinite matrices. A set T is a cone, if for any α ≥ 0 and T ∈ T we have
αT ∈ T . A set T is convex, if for any α ∈ [0, 1] and T1, T2 ∈ T we have
αT1 + (1− α)T2 ∈ T . A set T is called a convex cone, if T is convex and a cone:
for any α1, α2 ≥ 0 and T1, T2 ∈ T we must have that α1T1+α2T2 ∈ T . Note that
Sd+ is a convex cone: Let α1, α2 ≥ 0, and A,B ∈ Sd+. Then for any x ∈ Cd we
have
x†(α1A+ α2B)x = α1x†Ax+ α2x†Bx ≥ 0.
Hence, α1A+ α2B ∈ Sd+. The following will be of use in Chapter 3.
A.2.2. Proposition. Let A,B ∈ Sd. Then A ≥ 0 if and only if for all B ≥ 0
Tr(AB) ≥ 0.
Proof. Suppose that A ≥ 0. Note that we can decompose B = ∑j λj|uj〉〈uj|
where for all j λj ≥ 0 since B ≥ 0. Hence, Tr(AB) =
∑
j λjTr(A|uj〉〈uj|) =∑
j λj〈uj|A|uj〉 ≥ 0, since A ≥ 0.
To prove the converse, suppose on the contrary that for all B ≥ 0 we have
Tr(AB) ≥ 0, but A 6≥ 0. If A 6≥ 0, then there exists some vector |v〉 such that
〈v|A|v〉 < 0. Let B = |v〉〈v|. Clearly, B ≥ 0 and Tr(AB) = 〈v|A|v〉 < 0 which is
a contradiction. 2
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A.3 Semidefinite programming
Semidefinite programming is a special case of convex optimization. Its goal is to
solve the following semidefinite program (SDP) in terms of the variable M ∈ Sd
maximize Tr(CM)
subject to Tr(AiM) = bi, i = 1, . . . , p, and M ≥ 0
for given matrices C,A1, . . . , Ap ∈ Sd. The above form is called the standard form
of an SDP, and any SDP can be cast in this fashion (possibly at the expense
of additional variables) [BV04]. To gain some geometric intuition about this
task, note that M ≥ 0 means that M must lie in the cone Sd+. The constraints
Tr(AiM) = bi determine a set of hyperplanes which further limit our possible
solutions. A matrix M is called feasible, if it satisfies all constraints.
An important aspect of semidefinite programming is duality. Intuitively, the
idea behind Lagrangian duality is to extend the objective function (here Tr(CM))
with a weighted sum of the constraints in such a way, that we will be penalized
if the constraints are not fulfilled. The weights then correspond to the dual
variables. Optimizing over these weights then gives rise to the dual problem. The
original problem is called the primal problem. For the above SDP in standard
form, we can write down the Lagrangian as
L(M,λ1, . . . , λp, K) = Tr(CM) +
p∑
i=1
λi(bi − Tr(AiM)) + Tr(KM)
= Tr((C −
∑
i
λiAi +K)M) +
∑
i
λibi,
where K ≥ 0. The dual function is then
g(λ1, . . . , λp, K) = sup
M
(
Tr((C −
∑
i
λiAi +K)M) +
∑
i
λibi
)
=
{ ∑
i λibi if C −
∑
i λiAi +K = 0
∞ otherwise
From C −∑i λiAi +K = 0 and K ≥ 0, we obtain that K = −C +∑i λiAi ≥ 0.
This gives us the dual problem as
minimize
∑
i λibi
subject to
∑
i λiAi ≥ C,
where the optimization is now over the dual variables λi.
We generally use d∗ to denote the optimal value of the dual problem, and p∗
for the optimal value of the primal problem. Weak duality says that d∗ ≥ p∗.
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Let’s see why this is true in the above construction of the dual problem. LetM (∗)
and {λ(∗)i } be the optimal solutions to the primal and dual problem respectively.
In particular, this means that M (∗) and {λ(∗)i } must satisfy the constraints. Then
d∗ − p∗ =
∑
i
λ
(∗)
i bi − Tr(CM (∗))
=
∑
i
λ
(∗)
i Tr(AiM
(∗))− Tr(CM (∗))
= Tr
((
−C +
∑
i
λ
(∗)
i Ai
)
M (∗)
)
≥ 0,
by Proposition A.2.2 since M (∗) ≥ 0 and ∑i λ(∗)i Ai ≥ C. An important conse-
quence of weak duality, is that if we have d∗ = p∗ for a feasible dual and primal
solution respectively, we can conclude that both solutions are optimal. If solutions
exist such that d∗ = p∗, we also speak of strong duality. We know from Slater’s
conditions [BV04], that strong duality holds if there exists a feasible solution to
the primal problem which also satisfies M > 0.
A.4 Applications
In many quantum problems, we want to optimize over states, or measurement
operators. Evidently, semidefinite programming is very well suited to this case:
When optimizing over a state ρ, we ask that ρ ≥ 0 and Tr(ρ) = 1. When
optimizing over measurement operators M1, . . . ,Mk belonging to one POVM, we
ask that Mj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ [k] and
∑
jMj = I. Concrete examples can be found
in Chapters 3, 7, and 11.

Appendix B
C∗-Algebra
As C∗-algebras are not usually encountered in computer science, we briefly state
the most important results we will refer to for convenience. In particular, they
help us understand the framework of post-measurement information we encoun-
tered in Chapter 3 as well as the structure of bipartite non-local games in Chap-
ter 6.
B.1 Introduction
Instead of starting out with the usual axioms of quantum states and their evolu-
tions, any physical system can be characterized by a C∗-algebra A of observables.
States of this system are now identified purely by means of measurements of these
observables. This starting point is rather beautiful in its abstraction: So far, noth-
ing has been said how we can represent elements of this algebra. Yet, it turns out
that all the usual axioms can be derived from this abstract structure: we can rep-
resent observables as operators and states as vectors in a Hilbert space. In fact,
any such algebra A is isomorphic to an algebra of bounded operators on a Hilbert
space. So why should we bother adopting this abstract viewpoint? It turns out
that C∗-algebras often make it easier to understand the fundamental differences
between the classical and the quantum setting. If the algebra A is abelian, we
have a classical system. Otherwise, our system is inherently quantum. Commu-
tativity leads to several nice structural properties of an algebra which have been
exploited to answer many central questions in quantum information: When can
we clone physical states? What information can be extracted without disturbing
the system? That is, what part of a system is in fact classical and what is truly
quantum?
Here, we will mere scratch the surface of this formalism. In particular, we will
focus on finite-dimensional C∗-algebras only, which is all we will need in Chap-
ters 3 and 6. For more information, consult any textbook on the topic [Tak79,
BR02, Arv76]. We assume that the reader is familiar with the basic concepts such
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as a Hilbert space and refer to [Con90] for an introduction. First, we need to in-
troduce some essential definitions in Section B.2. We then examine states and
observables, and their familiar representation in a Hilbert space in Section B.3.2.
In Section B.4, we then concentrate on commutation: We will sketch how from
commutation relations we in fact obtain a bipartite structure. It turns out that
commutation relations also play an important role in determining which opera-
tions leave states invariant. Looking at the structure of the problem, it turns out
that in fact many problems ranging from cloning to post-measurement informa-
tion and bipartite non-local games are quite closely related.
B.2 Some terminology
A Banach algebra A is a linear associative algebra1 which is also a Banach space,
with the property that for all A and B ∈ A we have
‖ AB ‖ ≤ ‖ A ‖‖ B ‖.
The norm ‖ A ‖ of A is thereby a real number satisfying the usual requirements
that for all A ∈ A we have ‖ A ‖ ≥ 0 where ‖ A ‖ = 0 if and only if A = 0,
‖ αA ‖ = α‖ A ‖, ‖ A+B ‖ ≤ ‖ A ‖ + ‖ B ‖, and ‖ AB ‖ ≤ ‖ A ‖‖ B ‖. A is
called a ∗-algebra if it has the additional property that it admits an involution
A → A† ∈ A such that for all A and B ∈ A the following holds: (A†)† = A,
(A + B)† = A† + B†, (αA)† = α¯A†, and (AB)† = B†A†. A C∗-algebra is now an
even more special case: in addition we also have that ‖ A†A ‖ = ‖ A ‖2 for all
A ∈ A . This also gives us ‖ A† ‖ = ‖ A ‖. In the following we will simply use the
term “algebra” to refer to a C∗-algebra. The trick is not to be intimidated. It is
easier to have a more concrete picture in mind: For example, the algebra B(H) of
all bounded operators on a Hilbert space H is a C∗-algebra, when we take sums
and products of operators in the usual way and take our norm to be the operator
norm ‖ A ‖ = sup(‖ Av ‖ | v ∈ H, ‖ v ‖ = 1), where ‖ v ‖2 = 〈v|v〉 for the inner
product 〈·|·〉 of the Hilbert space. This algebra is closed under all the usual
operations such as addition, multiplication, and multiplication by scalars2 and
the involution operation. This involution is now the adjoint operation A → A†,
which in physics is usually denoted by † instead of ∗. In some physics papers, you
will therefore also find the name †-algebra instead. As in the example of post-
measurement information, we are also often interested in the ∗-algebra generated
by a given set of operators. Any operator X in a Hilbert space H determines a
C∗-algebra A which we will denote by A = 〈X〉. This is the smallest C∗-algebra
which contains both X and the identity, i.e. 〈X〉 = ⋂X,I∈BB. What’s included
in 〈X〉? Recall that A is closed under the adjoint operation so we definitely
1An associative algebra over the complex numbers is a vector space over the complex numbers
with a multiplication that is associative.
2We will take the underlying field to be C.
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have X†. In addition, our conditions above imply that we will see all possible
polynomials in X and X†. For example, X+X† and XX† are also elements of the
algebra. We use 〈X1, . . . , Xk〉 to denote the C∗-algebra generated by operators
X1, . . . , Xk, and 〈S〉 to denote the algebra generated by operators from the set
S.
If an algebra B satisfies B ⊆ A , we call B a subalgebra of A . An algebra
A is unital if it contains the identity. We will always use I to denote the identity
element. Since we restrict ourselves to the finite-dimensional case, we can assume
that any C∗-algebra is in fact unital [Tak79]. We will always take A to be unital
here. An element A ∈ A of a Banach algebra A is called invertible if there exists
some A′ ∈ A such that AA′ = A′A = I. Furthermore, for a C∗-algebra A , the
spectrum of A ∈ A is given by SpA (A) = {λ ∈ C | A − λI is not invertible}.
Note that for any A ∈ B(H), this is just the spectrum of the operator relative to
B(H) in the usual sense.
A left ideal in some algebra A is a subalgebra B ⊆ A such that for any
elements B ∈ B and A ∈ A we have that AB ∈ B. Similarly, B is called a right
ideal if BA ∈ B. A two-sided ideal or simply ideal has both properties: B is both
a left and right ideal of A . An algebra A is called simple if its only ideals are {0}
and A itself. An algebra A is called semisimple, if it can be written as the direct
sum of simple algebras. To get a better feeling for what this actually means, it
is perhaps again helpful to think of a particular representation of the algebra in
terms of bounded operators on a Hilbert space. In terms of representations, being
simple means that the representation is irreducible. Being semisimple then means
that the representation is completely reducible: i.e. for the representation pi of
A we can express pi(A) as a sum of irreducible representations. We will examine
this decomposition in more detail in Section B.4.1.
B.3 Observables, states and representations
B.3.1 Observables and states
A physical system is characterized by a set of measurable quantities, i.e. observ-
ables. As mentioned above, we will assume that a physical system is in fact
described by a C∗-algebra A of observables. As we will see below, we can take
the observables to live in a Hilbert space H, and A ⊆ B(H). Where do the states
come in? In the language of C∗-algebras, states are positive linear functionals on
A : A linear functional on an algebra is a function f : A → C such that for all
A,B ∈ A we have f(A + B) = f(A) + f(B) and f(αA) = αf(A) where α ∈ C
is a scalar. A linear functional is called positive if f(A) ≥ 0 for any A ∈ A
whenever A ≥ 0. A state on A is a positive linear functional f on A with the
additional property that it has norm 1, i.e., f(I) = 1. The set of states is a
convex set of linear functionals and its extreme elements are called pure states.
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The set of all states on an algebra A is also called the state space, often denoted
by E(A ). Any observable A ∈ A in our algebra is uniquely characterized by
the expectation of all states when we measure A: So the value of f(A) for all
states f ∈ E(A ) in our state space uniquely characterizes any element A of our
algebra. The converse is also true: the value of f(A) for all A ∈ A completely
characterizes the state f . To get a better feeling for this, it is again helpful to
think of an algebra A ⊆ B(H). Given a vector v living in the Hilbert space H,
we can construct a linear functional on A by letting f(A) = 〈v|Av〉. The same
is true if we consider any abstract A and its representation pi on a Hilbert space,
by letting f(A) = 〈v|pi(A)v〉 given v ∈ H.
B.3.2 Representations
We now examine how an abstract C∗-algebra can be represented by a set of
operators on a Hilbert space, via the famous construction by Gelfand, Naimark
and Segal. An account of this construction can be found in any standard textbook
on C∗-algebra [Tak79, BR02, Arv76]. For completeness, we here give a heavily
annotated, largely self-contained, explanation of the GNS construction. As it
turns out, by the GNS construction, any C∗-algebra is isomorphic to an algebra
of bounded operators, a result which we will merely state here. When trying to
find a representation of a C∗-algebra A , our goal is to find a pair (pi,H) where
H is a Hilbert space and pi : A → B(H) is a ∗-homomorphism which maps any
element of our algebra to a bounded operator in the chosen Hilbert space.
B.3.1. Theorem (GNS). Let A be a unital C∗-algebra, and let f be a positive
linear functional on A . Then there exists a representation (Hf , pif ) of A with a
Hilbert space Hf , a ∗-homomorphism3 pif : A → B(Hf ) and a vector Φf ∈ Hf
such that for all A ∈ A
f(A) = 〈Φf |pif (A)Φf〉.
Proof. First, we construct the Hilbert space Hf . Since A is a Banach space,
we can turn it into a pre-Hilbert space4 by defining the positive semidefinite
sesquilinear form
〈A|B〉f = f(A†B),
for all A,B ∈ A . Note that this form may be degenerate5. In order to eliminate
this degeneracy, consider
If = {A | A ∈ A and f(A†A) = 0}.
3A homomorphism that preserves the ∗.
4We take a pre-Hilbert space to be a vector space with a positive semidefinite sesquilinear
form, and a strict pre-Hilbert space to be a vector space with an inner product.
5Such a form is nondegenerate if and only if: 〈A|B〉f = 0 for all B ∈ A implies that A = 0.
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Note that If is a linear subspace of A since for all I, J ∈ If we have f((I +
J)†(I + J)) = f(I†I) + f(J†I) + f(I†J) + f(J†J) ≤ 2√f(J†J)f(I†I) = 0, where
we used the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality6.
We now show that If is a left ideal of A : Let I ∈ If and A,B ∈ A . We then
need to show that AI ∈ If . Indeed, from (AI)†(AI) ≥ 0 we have
0 ≤ f((AI)†(AI)) = f(I†A†AI) ≤
√
f(I†I)f((A†AI)†(A†AI)) = 0,
where the inequality follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
The Hilbert space Hf is then constructed by completing the quotient space
A /If . This works as follows: Define the equivalence classes
ΨA = {A+ I | I ∈ If}.
Note that these equivalence classes constitute a complex vector space on their
own, where addition and scalar multiplication are defined via the following oper-
ations inherited from A . We have ΨA+B = ΨA + ΨB and ΨαA = αΨA. We can
then define the inner product
〈ΨA|ΨB〉 = 〈A|B〉f = f(A†B).
Note that ΨA and ΨB of course depend on f . One can verify that this a correct
definition. Indeed, the inner product does not depend on our choice of represen-
tative from each equivalence class: Let I1, I2 ∈ If , and let A,B ∈ A . Then
f((A+ I1)
†(B + I2)) = f(A†B) + f(A†I2) + f(I
†
1B) + f(I
†
1I2) = f(A
†B),
where the last equality follows again from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. We
can now obtain Hf by forming the completion of this space. It is well-known in
functional analysis that any strict pre-Hilbert space can be embedded as a dense
subspace of a Hilbert space in such a way that the inner product is preserved.
Second, we must construct pif . We first define the action of pif (A) on the
vectors constructed above as
pif (A)ΨB = ΨAB.
Note that this definition is again independent of our choice of representative from
each equivalence class since for all A,B ∈ A we have
pif (A)ΨB+I = ΨA(B+I) = ΨAB+AI = ΨAB = pif (A)ΨB,
since If is a left ideal of A and we already saw that AI ∈ If . It remains to show
that pif is a homomorphism and that pif (A) is indeed bounded. To see that pif is
a homomorphism, note that
pif (AB)ΨC = ΨABC = pif (A)pif (B)ΨC
6In this context the CS-inequality gives us that for all A,B ∈ A we have |f(A†B)|2 ≤
f(A†A)f(B†B)
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and
pif (λA+ γB)ΨC = ΨλA+γB = λΨA + γΨB = (λpif (A) + γpif (B))ΨC ,
as desired. To see that pif (A) is bounded, consider
‖ pif (A)ΨB ‖2 = 〈ΨAB|ΨAB〉 = f((AB)†(AB))
= f(B†A†AB) ≤ ‖ A ‖2f(B†B) ≤ ‖ A ‖2‖ ΨB ‖2,
where we used the fact that from B†A†AB ≤ ‖ A ‖2B†B we have f(B†A†AB) ≤
‖ A ‖2f(B†B) (see for example [Tak79]).
Finally, we need to construct the vector Φf . Since A is unital we can take
Φf = ΨI. This gives us 〈Φf |pif (A)Φf〉 = 〈ΨI|pif (A)ΨI〉 = 〈ΨI|ΨA〉 = f(I†A) =
f(A). Note that pif (A)ΨI = ΨA, i.e., Φf = ΨI is cyclic for (Hf , pif ). 2
The resulting representation is irreducible if and only if f is pure [BR02,
Theorem 2.3.19]. By considering a family of states F , and applying the GNS
construction to all f ∈ F and taking the direct sum of representations it is then
possible to show that:
B.3.2. Theorem. (GN) Let A be a unital C∗-algebra. Then A is isomorphic
to an algebra of bounded operators on a Hilbert space H.
B.4 Commuting operators
A is abelian if and only if the physical system corresponding to this algebra is
classical. Thus to distinguish the quantum from the classical problems, commu-
tation will be central to our discussion. In fact, it leads to very nice structural
properties which we already exploited in Chapter 3. First, however, we will need
a bit more terminology. The commutator of two operators A and B is given by
[A,B] = AB − BA. For quantum applications, two observables A and B are
called compatible if they commute, i.e., [A,B] = 0. Conversely, A and B are
called complementary if [A,B] 6= 0. The center ZA of an algebra A is the set of
all elements in A that commute with all elements of A , i.e.
ZA = {Z | Z ∈ A ,∀A ∈ A : [Z,A] = 0}.
It is easy to see that if A only has a trivial center, i.e. ZA = {cI | c ∈ C}, A is
simple [Tak79]. If A ⊆ B(H) for some Hilbert space H, then the commutant of
A in B(H) is
Comm(A ) = {X | X ∈ B(H),∀A ∈ A : [X,A] = 0}.
We have ZA = A ∩ Comm(A ).
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B.4.1 Decompositions
In any of our problems, the interesting case is when the algebra A under con-
sideration is in fact simple: that is, “fully quantum”. In all problems we will
consider, it will turn out that we can always break down the problem into smaller
components by decomposing any A into a sum of simple algebras.7 Luckily, such
a decomposition always exists in the finite-dimensional case:
B.4.1. Lemma. Let A be a finite-dimensional C∗-algebra. Then there exists a
decomposition
A =
⊕
j
Aj,
such that Aj is simple.
Proof. Let ZA be the center of A . Clearly, since A is finite-dimensional, ZA is
a finite-dimensional abelian C∗-algebra. Since ZA is finite, there exist a finite set
of positive linear functionals {f1, . . . , fm}, such that fj(AB) = fj(A)fj(B) and
fj(A) ∈ SpZA(A) for all A,B ∈ ZA.8 For all 1 ≤ k ≤ m, choose Πk ∈ ZA such
that fj(Πk) = δjk for all j. Note that Π1, . . . ,Πm are projectors and
∑
j Πj = I
since for all j we have fj(ΠkΠ`) = fj(Πk)fj(Π`) since ZA is abelian. Now we
have
A = IA I =
m∑
jk=1
ΠjA Πk =
m∑
j=1
ΠjA Πj,
since for all A ∈ A we have ΠjAΠk = ΠjΠkA = 0 since Πj,Πj ∈ ZA. Note that
Aj = ΠjA Πj only has a trivial center: its only elements that commute with any
element of Aj are scalar multiples of Πj. Hence, Aj is simple. 2
In fact, it is possible to show that [Tak79]:
B.4.2. Corollary. Let A be a finite-dimensional C∗-algebra Then there exists
H and a decomposition
H =
⊕
j
Hj,
such that
A ∼=
⊕
j
B(Hj),
Note that this means that any element A ∈ A can be written as A =∑j ΠjAΠj
where Πj is a projection onto Hj.
7Recall that we only consider the finite-dimensional case.
8For a matrix algebra these are just the eigenvectors with equal eigenvalue
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B.4.2 Bipartite structure
As we saw in Chapter 3, commutation relations induce a beautiful structure
captured by the Double Commutant theorem. We here sketch a proof of the parts
of this theorem which is interesting for understanding non-local games: Consider
a bipartite system H1 ⊗ H2, and operators A = Aˆ ⊗ I[2] and B = I[1] ⊗ Bˆ with
Aˆ ∈ B(H1) and Bˆ ∈ B(H2). Clearly, [A,B] = 0 since A and B act on two different
subsystems. Curiously, however, we can essentially reverse the argument: A set
of commutation relations gives rise to a bipartite structure itself!
B.4.3. Lemma. Let H be a finite-dimensional Hilbert space, and let {Xas ∈
B(H) | s ∈ S} and {Y bt ∈ B(H) | s ∈ T}. Then the following two statements are
equivalent:
1. For all s ∈ S, t ∈ T , a ∈ A and b ∈ B it holds that [Xas , Y bt ] = 0.
2. There exist Hilbert spaces HA,HB such that H = HA ⊗ HB and for all
s ∈ S, a ∈ A we have Xas ∈ B(HA) and for all t ∈ T , b ∈ B we have
Y bt ∈ B(HB).
This statement can easily be extended to more than two players. Here, we will
only address the finite-dimensional case.
First of all, recall that by Lemma 6.3.1, we can greatly simplify our problem
for non-local games and restrict ourselves to C∗-algebras that are simple. As we
saw earlier in Lemma B.4.1, it is well known that we can decompose any finite
dimensional algebra into the sum of simple algebras. We furthermore need that
for any simple algebra, the following holds:
B.4.4. Lemma. [Tak79] Let H be a Hilbert space, and let A ⊆ B(H) be simple.
Then H = HA ⊗HB and A ∼= B(HA)⊗ IB.
We are now ready to prove Lemma B.4.3. First, we examine the case where
we are given a simple algebra A ∈ B(H), for some Hilbert space H. We will need
the following version of Schur’s lemma.
B.4.5. Lemma. Let Z be the center of B(H). Then Z = {cI|c ∈ C}.
Proof. Let C ∈ Z and let d = dim(H). Let B = {Eij|i, j ∈ [d]} be a basis for
B(H), where Eij = |i〉〈j| is the matrix of all 0’s and a 1 at position (i, j). Since
C ∈ Z and Eij ∈ B(H) we have for all i ∈ [d]
CEii = EiiC.
Note that CEii (or EiiC) is the matrix of all 0’s but the ith column (or row) is
determined by the elements of C. Hence all off diagonal elements of C must be
0. Now consider
C(Eij + Eji) = (Eij + Eji)C.
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Note that C(Eij + Eji) (or (Eij + Eji)C) is the matrix in which the ith and jth
columns (rows) of C have been swapped and the remaining elements are 0. Hence
all diagonal elements of C must be equal. Thus there exists some c ∈ C such that
C = cI. 2
Using this Lemma, we can now show that
B.4.6. Lemma. Let C ∈ B(HA ⊗HB) such that for all B ∈ B(HB) we have
[C, (IA ⊗B)] = 0
Then there exists an A ∈ B(HA) such that C = A⊗ IB.
Proof. Let dA = dim(HA) and dB = dim(HB). Note that we can write any C
as
C =
 C11 . . . C1dA... ...
CdA1 . . . CdAdA
 ,
for dA × dA matrices Aij. We have C(IA ⊗ B) = (IA ⊗ B)C if and only if for all
i, j ∈ [dA] CijB = BCij, i.e. [Cij, B] = 0. Since this must hold for all B ∈ B(HB),
we have by Lemma B.4.5 that there exists some aij ∈ C such that Cij = aijIB.
Hence C = A⊗ IB with A = [aij]. 2
For the case that the algebra generated by Alice and Bob’s measurement
operators is simple, Lemma B.4.3 now follows immediately:
Proof. [Proof of Lemma B.4.3 if A is simple] Let A = 〈{Xas }〉 ⊆ B(H) be the
algebra generated by Alice’s measurement operators. If A is simple, it follows
from Lemma B.4.4 that A ∼= B(HA)⊗ IB for H = HA⊗HB. It then follows from
Lemma B.4.6 that for all t ∈ T and b ∈ B we must have Y bt ∈ B(HB). 2
Thus, we obtain a tensor product structure! Recall that Lemma 6.3.1 states
that for non-local games this is all we need.
In general, what happens if A is not simple? We now sketch the argument in
the case theA is semisimple, which by Lemma B.4.1 we may always assume in the
finite-dimensional case. Fortunately, we can still assume that our commutation
relations leave us with a bipartite structure. We can essentially infer this from
van Neumann’s famous Double Commutant Theorem [Tak79, BR02], partially
stated here.
B.4.7. Theorem. Let A be a finite-dimensional C∗-algebra. Then there exists
H = HA ⊗HB and a decomposition
H =
⊕
j
HAj ⊗HBj
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such that
A ∼=
⊕
j
B(HAj )⊗ IBj
and
Comm(A ) ∼=
⊕
j
IAj ⊗ B(HBj ). (B.1)
Proof. (Sketch) We already now from Lemma B.4.1 that A can be decomposed
into a sum of simple algebras. Clearly, the RHS of Eq. B.1 is an element of
Comm(A ). To see that the LHS is contained in the RHS, consider the projection
ΠAj onto HAj . Note that ΠAj ∈ A , and thus for any X ∈ Comm(A ) we have
[X,ΠAj ] = 0. Hence, we can write X =
∑
j(Π
A
j ⊗ IB)X(ΠAj ⊗ IB), and thus we can
restrict ourselves to considering each factor individually. The result then follows
immediately from Lemma B.4.6. 2
If we have more than two players, the argument is essentially analogous, and
we merely sketch it in the relevant case when the algebra generated by the play-
ers’s measurements is simple, since Lemma 6.3.1 directly extends to more than
two players as well. Suppose we have N players P1, . . . ,PN and let H denote
their joint Hilbert space. Let A be the algebra generated by all measurement
operators of players P1, . . . .PN−1 respectively. Then it follows from Lemma B.4.6
and Lemma B.4.4 that H = H1,...,N−1 ⊗HN where A ∼= B(H1,...,N−1) and for all
measurement operators M of player PN we have that M ∈ B(HN). By apply-
ing Lemma B.4.6 recursively we obtain that there exists a way to partition the
Hilbert space into subsystems H = H1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ HN such that the measurement
operators of player Pj act on Hj alone.
In quantum mechanics, we will always obtain such a tensor product struc-
ture from commutation relations, even if the Hilbert space is infinite dimen-
sional [Sum90]. Here, we start out with a type-I algebra, the corresponding
Hilbert space and operators can then be obtained by the famous GNS construc-
tion [Tak79], an approach which is rather beautiful in its abstraction. In quantum
statistical mechanics and quantum field theory, we will also encounter factors of
type-II and type-III. As it turns out, the above argument does not generally hold
in this case, however, there are a number of conditions that can lead to a similar
structure. Unfortunately, we cannot consider this case here and merely refer to
the survey article by Summers [Sum90].
B.4.3 Invariant observables and states
As we saw in Chapter 3, expressing our problem in terms of commutation relations
enables us to exploit their structural consequences. Particularly interesting is
also the fact that we can characterize the set of states which are invariant by a
quantum channel by means of such relations, repeated here for convenience sake:
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B.4.8. Lemma. (HKL) [HKL03] Let Λ : H → H be a unital quantum channel
with Λ(ρ) =
∑
m VmρV
†
m, and let S be a set of quantum states. Then
∀ρ ∈ S,Λ(ρ) = ρ if and only if ∀m∀ρ ∈ S, [Vm, ρ] = 0.
Let’s see what this means for a specific unital channel Λ(ρ) =
∑
m VmρV
†
m
and a particular ensemble given by states ρ1, . . . , ρn ∈ H. As in Chapter 3, we
now consider the ∗-algebra generated by ρ1, . . . , ρn. Let A denote the resulting
algebra. By Theorem B.4.7, we know that we can write
A ∼=
⊕
j
B(H1j )⊗ I[2]j
and
Comm(A ) ∼=
⊕
j
I[1]j ⊗ B(H2j ).
Clearly, we have from the above that if Λ leaves our ensemble of states untouched,
we must have Vm ∈ Comm(A ) for all m. Thus we know that Vm must be of the
form I[1]j ⊗ V [2]j on each factor. What does this mean operationally? Suppose
we can write H = ⊕jHj such that ρk = ∑j ΠjρkΠj for each ρk, where Πj is a
projector onto Hj. That is, we can simultaneously block-diagonalize all ρk. Then
we know that Vm must be equal to the identity on each factor Hj, i.e. Vm must
be of the form
⊕
j cjΠj for some cj with |cj| = 1. Another nice application of this
viewpoint is an algebraic no-cloning theorem, as put forward by Lindblad [Lin99].
B.5 Conclusion
Even though the sheer number of new definitions may appear daunting, we saw
that the language of C∗-algebras can help us get a grip on some of the fundamental
properties of quantum states quite easily. Of course, the language of C∗-algebras
is not the most convenient one for all problems. Yet, there are many cases for
which the language of C∗-algebras is especially useful. As we saw earlier, one
of these cases is when we consider measurements performed by two parties on a
bipartite system. Another class of problems deals with questions of the following
forms: Which operations leave a given set of states invariant? How much can we
learn from a given state without disturbing it? What part of a state is “truly”
quantum and which parts can we consider to be classical? How can we encode
our states such that they are left untouched by a set of operations?
For example, another application is the compression of quantum states. Koashi
and Imoto consider how a quantum state can be decomposed into a quantum,
a classical and a redundant part to aid compression. In their paper, they pro-
vide an algorithm which in fact allows us to compute (with a lot of pain) the
decomposition of an algebra and its commutant algebra [KI02]. It is probably
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not so surprising by now that other tasks involving invariance under operations
are also closely related: Choi and Kribs [CK06] have phrased the principle of
decoherence-free subspaces in terms of what they call algebraic noise commu-
tant formalism. In this text, we have exploited C∗-algebras to investigate the
use of post-measurement information in Chapter 3. As we saw in Chapter 8,
the question of how much post-measurement information is needed is in fact
closely related to how much entanglement we need to succeed in non-local games.
Whereas these two problem may appear unrelated at first sight, their structural
similarities show their close connection. Likewise, these similarities also enabled
us in Chapter 6 to investigate how much we can really gain by receiving additional
post-measurement information. Finally, the close connection of C∗-algebras and
Clifford algebras discussed in Appendix C was one of the factors that led us to
discover the uncertainty relations of Chapter 4. Hence, C∗-algebras sometimes
help us to understand the similarities between problems, and aid our intuition.
Appendix C
Clifford Algebra
Similar to C∗-algebra, Clifford algebra plays little role in computer science even
though it has recently found numerous applications in the area of computer graph-
ics. Here, we informally summarize the most important facts we need in this text.
Our aim is merely to provide the reader with some intuition underlying our un-
certainty relation in Chapter 4, and refer to [Lou01] for an in-depth introduction.
C.1 Introduction
Clifford algebra is closely related to C∗-algebra. Yet, it exhibits many beautiful
geometrical aspects which remain inaccessible to us otherwise. In particular, we
will see that commutation and anti-commutation carries a geometric meaning
within this algebra.
For any integer n, the unital associative algebra generated by Γ1, . . . ,Γ2n,
subject to the anti-commutation relations
ΓiΓj = −ΓjΓi, Γ2i = I
is called Clifford algebra. It has a unique representation by Hermitian matrices on
n qubits (up to unitary equivalence) which we fix henceforth. This representation
can be obtained via the famous Jordan-Wigner transformation [JW28]:
Γ2j−1 = σ⊗(j−1)y ⊗ σx ⊗ I⊗(n−j),
Γ2j = σ
⊗(j−1)
y ⊗ σz ⊗ I⊗(n−j),
for j = 1, . . . , n. A Clifford algebra of n generators is isomorphic to a C∗-algebra
of matrices of size 2n/2× 2n/2 for n even and to the direct sum of two C∗-algebras
of matrices of size 2(n−1)/2 × 2(n−1)/2 for n odd [Tsi87].
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C.2 Geometrical interpretation
The crucial advantage of the Clifford algebra is that we can view the operators
Γ1, . . . ,Γ2n as 2n orthogonal vectors forming a basis for a 2n-dimensional real
vector space R2n. Each vector a = (a1, . . . , a2n) ∈ R2n can then be written as
linear combination of basis elements as a =
∑
j ajΓj. The Clifford product of two
vectors a and b is given by
ab = a · b+ a ∧ b,
where a · b = ∑j ajbjI is the inner product of two vectors and a ∧ b is the
outer product, as given below. We will write scalars as scalar multiples of the
identity element whose matrix representation is simply the identity matrix. If we
represent Γ1, . . . ,Γ2n using the matrices from above, then the Clifford product is
simply the matrix product of the resulting matrices. Hence, we will now adopt
this viewpoint with the representation in mind. Note that the Clifford product
satisfies a2 = |a|2I = ∑j a2jI, where |a| = ||a||2 = √∑j a2j is the 2-norm of the
vector a which we refer to as the length of a vector.
C.2.1 Inner and outer product
We can see immediately from the definition of the Clifford product that the
inner product of two vectors a, b ∈ R2n as depicted in Figure C.1 is given by
a · b = |a||b| cosψI, and can be expressed as:
a · b = 1
2
{a, b} = 1
2
(ab+ ba).
Figure C.1: Two vectors
Hence, anti-commutation takes a geometric meaning within the algebra: two
vectors anti-commute if and only if they are orthogonal!
Similarly, we can write
a ∧ b = 1
2
[a, b] =
1
2
(ab− ba).
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Geometrically, this means that two vectors are parallel if and only if they com-
mute.
To gain some intuition, let’s look at the simple example of R2: Here, we have
a = a1Γ1 + a2Γ2 and b = b1Γ1 + b2Γ2. The Clifford product of a and b is now
given as
ab =
∑
jk
ajbkΓjΓk = (a1b1 + a2b2)I+ (a1b2 − b1a2)Γ1Γ2.
The element a ∧ b = (a1b2 − b1a2)Γ1Γ2 represents the oriented plane segment of
the parallelogram determined by a and b in Figure C.2 below. The area of this
parallelogram is exactly |a ∧ b| = |a1b2− b1a2|. Note that we have a∧ b = −b∧ a,
as shown in Figure C.3. Thus a∧ b not only gives us the area but also encodes a
direction.
Figure C.2: a ∧ b Figure C.3: b ∧ a
In higher dimensions, the elements generated by a ∧ b ∧ c etc similarly corre-
spond to oriented plane or volume segments. Note that we have Γi ∧ Γj = ΓiΓj
for all basis vectors Γi and Γj. We will refer to products of k elements of the form
Γi1 . . .Γik as k-vectors.
C.2.2 Reflections
The power of the Clifford algebra mainly lies in the fact that we can express
geometrical operations involving any k-vector in an extremely easy fashion using
the Clifford product. Here, we will only be concerned with performing operations
on 1-vectors.
Consider the projection of a vector a onto a vectorm as depicted in Figure C.4.
Let a‖ be the part of a that is parallel to m, and a⊥ the part of a that lies
perpendicular to m. Clearly, we may write a = a‖ + a⊥. Using the definition of
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Figure C.4: Projections onto a vector
the Clifford product, we may write
a‖ = |a| cosψ m|m| = (a ·m)m
†,
where we define m† = m/|m|2 to be the inverse of m. Indeed, we have mm† = I.
If m is a unit vector, then in terms of the matrix representation given above
m† is the adjoint of the matrix m. For the product of two vectors we define
(nm)† = m†n†. We can also write
a⊥ = a− a‖ = a− (a ·m)m† = (am− (a ·m))m† = (a ∧m)m†.
We can now easily determine the reflection of a around the vector m, as depicted
in Figure C.5:
t = a‖ − a⊥ = (a ·m− a ∧m)m† = (m · a+m ∧ a)m† = mam†.
Consider n = 1. Then the 2-dimensional real vector space is given by basis vectors
Γ1 = X and Γ2 = Z. Indeed, this is the familiar XZ-plane of the Bloch sphere
depicted in Figure 2.1. Consider the Hadamard transform H = (X + Z)/
√
2.
Figure C.7 demonstrates that H plays exactly this role: it reflects X around the
vector H to obtain HXH = Z. Given t, we can also easily derive the vector
obtained by reflecting a around the plane perpendicular to m (in 0), as shown in
Figure C.6.
−t = −mam†.
C.2.3 Rotations
From reflections we may now obtain rotations as successive reflections. Suppose
we are given vectors m and n as shown in Figure C.8. To rotate the vector a by
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Figure C.5: Reflection of a around m
an angle that is twice the angle between m and n, we now first reflect a around
b to obtain b = mam†. We then reflect b around n to obtain
c = nbn† = nmam†n† = RaR†,
where we let R = nm. As desired, R rotates a by an angle of 2(ψ + φ).
We can easily convince ourselves that R does not affect any vector d that is
orthogonal to both n and m.
RdR† = nmdm†n† = dnmm†n† = d,
where we have used the fact that two vectors anti-commute if and only if they
are orthogonal. Note also that RR† = I. It can be shown that if V is a k-vector,
then RV R† is also a k-vector for any rotation R [DL03]. Indeed, this is easy to
see, for the k-vector formed by orthogonal basis vectors:
R(Γi1 ∧ . . . ∧ Γik)R† = R(Γi1 . . .Γik)R† = RΓi1R† . . . RΓikR†
= RΓi1R
† ∧ . . . ∧RΓikR†,
where we have used the fact that rotations preserve the angles between vectors.
We will need this fact in our proof in Chapter 4.
Clifford algebra offers a very convenient way to express rotations around ar-
bitrary angles in the plane m ∧ n [Lou01]. In Chapter 4, however, we will only
need to understand how we can find the rotation R that takes us from a given
vector g =
∑
j gjΓj with length |g| to the vector |g|Γ1. Indeed, our strategy works
for finding the rotation of any vector g to a target vector t of the same length.
Consider Figure C.9.
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Figure C.6: Reflection of a plane perpendicular to m
Figure C.7: Hadamard transform as reflection
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Figure C.8: Rotating in the plane m ∧ n.
Figure C.9: Rotating g to |g|Γ1.
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For convenience, we first normalize g to obtain the vector
g′ =
g
|g| .
We then compute the vector m′ lying exactly half-way between g′ and our target
vector Γ1 and normalize it to obtain
m =
g′ + Γ1
|g′ + Γ1| =
g′ + Γ1√
2(1 + g1/|g|)
.
We now first reflect g′ around the plane perpendicular to the vector m to obtain
−mg′m, followed by a reflection around the plane perpendicular to the target
vector Γ1:
−Γ1(−mg′m)Γ1 = Γ1mg′mΓ1 = Rg′R†,
with R = Γ1m, where we have used the fact that both Γ1 and m have unit length
and hence m = m† and Γ1 = Γ
†
1. Evidently,
Rg′ = Γ1mg′ =
1
|g′ + Γ1|Γ1(g
′ + Γ1)g′
=
1
|g′ + Γ1|Γ1(g
′2 + Γ1g′) =
1
|g′ + Γ1|(Γ1 + g
′) = m,
and hence
Rg′R† = mmΓ1 = Γ1.
We then also have that
RgR† = |g|Rg′R† = |g|Γ1
as desired. We will employ a similar rotation in Chapter 4.
C.3 Application
Here, the primary benefit which we gain by considering a Clifford algebra, is that
we can parametrize matrices in terms of its generators, and products thereof.
Suppose we are given some matrix
ρ =
1
d
(
I+
∑
j
bjBj
)
,
where I∪{Bj} form a basis for the d×d complex matrices, such that for all j 6= j′
we have Tr(BjBj′) = 0, Tr(Bj) = 0, B
2
j = I, and bj ∈ R. We saw in Chapter 4
how to construct such a basis for d = 2n based on mutually unbiased bases. In
fact, this gives us the well-known Pauli basis, given by the 22n elements of the
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form Bj = B
1
j ⊗ . . . ⊗ Bnj with Bij ∈ {I, σx, σy, σz}. When solving optimization
problems within quantum information, we are often faced with the following
problem: When is ρ a quantum state? That is, what are the necessary and
sufficient conditions for the coefficients bj such that ρ ≥ 0?
For d = 2, this is an easy problem: We can write ρ = (I +
∑
j∈{x,y,z} rjσj)/2
where ~r = (rx, ry, rz) is the Bloch vector we encountered in Chapter 2. We have
that ρ ≥ 0 if and only if −I ≤∑j rjσj ≤ I, i.e.(∑
j
rjσj
)2
=
1
2
∑
j,j′
rjrj′{σj, σj′} =
(∑
j
r2j
)
I ≤ I.
Thus, we have ρ ≥ 0 if and only if ∑j r2j ≤ 1. Geometrically, this means that
any point on or inside the Bloch sphere corresponds to a valid quantum state
as illustrated in Figure 2.1. Sadly, when we consider d > 2, our task becomes
considerably more difficult. Clearly, since Tr(ρ2) ≤ 1 for any quantum state, we
can always say that
Tr(ρ2) =
1
d2
(
Tr(I) + 2
∑
j
bjTr(Bj) +
∑
jj′
bjbj′Tr(BjBj′)
)
=
1
d2
(
d+
∑
j
b2jTr(I)
)
=
1
d
(
1 +
∑
j
b2j
)
≤ 1,
giving us
∑
j b
2
j ≤ d − 1. Unfortunately, this condition is too weak for almost
all practical applications. There exist many matrices which obey this condition,
but nevertheless do not correspond to valid quantum states. Luckily, we can say
something much stronger using the Clifford algebra.
Let’s consider the operators Γ1, . . . ,Γ2n themselves. Evidently, each operator
Γi has exactly two eigenvalues ±1: Let |η〉 be an eigenvector of Γi with eigenvalue
λ. From Γ2i = I we have that λ2 = 1. Furthermore, we have Γi(Γj|η〉) = −λΓj|η〉.
Thus, if λ is an eigenvalue of Γi then so is −λ. We can therefore express each Γi
as
Γi = Γ
0
i − Γ1i ,
where Γ0i and Γ
1
i are projectors onto the positive and negative eigenspace of Γi
respectively. Furthermore, note that we have for all i, j with i 6= j
Tr(ΓiΓj) =
1
2
Tr(ΓiΓj + ΓjΓi) = 0,
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that is all such operators are orthogonal with respect to the Hilbert-Schmidt inner
product. We now use the fact that the collection of operators
I
Γj (1 ≤ j ≤ 2n)
Γjk := iΓjΓk (1 ≤ j < k ≤ 2n)
Γjk` := ΓjΓkΓ` (1 ≤ j < k < ` ≤ 2n)
...
Γ12...(2n) := iΓ1Γ2 · · ·Γ2n =: Γ0
forms an orthogonal basis for the d×d matrices with d = 2n [Die06]. By counting,
the above operators form a complete operator basis with respect to the Hilbert-
Schmidt inner product. In fact, by working out the individual basis elements
with respect to the representation above, we see that this basis is in fact equal
to the Pauli basis. Notice that the products with an odd number of factors are
Hermitian, while the ones with an even number of factors are skew-Hermitian, so
in the definition of the above operators we introduce a factor of i to all with an
even number of indices to make the whole set a basis for the Hermitian operators.
Hence we can write every state ρ ∈ H as
ρ =
1
d
(
I+
∑
j
gjΓj +
∑
j<k
gjkΓjk + . . .+ g0Γ0
)
,
with real coefficients gj, gjk, . . ..
It is clear from the above that if we transform the generating set of Γj linearly,
Γ′k =
∑
j
TjkΓj,
then the set {Γ′1, . . . ,Γ′2n} satisfies the anti-commutation relations if and only if
(Tjk)jk is an orthogonal matrix: these are exactly the operations which preserve
the inner product. In that case there exists a matching unitary U(T ) ∈ B(H)
which transforms the operator basis as
Γ′j = U(T )ΓjU(T )
†.
As an importance consequence, it can be shown [Die06] that any operation U(T )
transforms the state ρ as
U(T )ρU(T )† =
1
d
(
I+ T (g) +
∑
j<k
g′jkΓjk + . . .+ g
′
0Γ0
)
,
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where we write T (g) to indicate the transformation of the vector g =
∑
j gjΓj
by T . For example, for the rotation R constructed earlier, we may immediately
write
RρR† =
1
d
(
I+RgR† +
∑
j<k
gjkRΓjkR
† + . . .+ g0RΓ0R†
)
,
=
1
d
(
I+ |g|Γ1 +
∑
j<k
g′jkΓjk + . . .+ g
′
0Γ0
)
,
Thus, we can think of the 1-vector components of ρ as vectors in a generalized
Bloch sphere. In Chapter 4, we will extend this approach to include the Γ0 as an
additional “vector”. There, we use these facts to prove a useful statement which
leads to our uncertainty relations:
C.3.1. Lemma (Lemma 4.3.2). For any state ρ, we have
∑
j g
2
j ≤ 1.
With respect to our discussion above, this is indeed a generalization of what
we observed for the Bloch sphere in d = 2. Note that we obtain a whole range
of such statements as we can find different sets of 2n anti-commuting matrices
within the entire set of 22n basis elements above.
C.4 Conclusion
Luckily, we made some progress to give a characterization of quantum states
in terms of their basis coefficients that was sufficient to prove our uncertainty
relation from Chapter 4. Parametrizing states using Clifford algebra elements
provides us with additional structure to characterize quantum states that is not
at all obvious when looking at them from a linear algebra point of view alone.
We hope that parametrizing states in this fashion could enable us to make even
stronger statements in the future. It is also interesting to think about standard
quantum gates as geometrical operations within the Clifford algebra. Indeed, this
is possible to a large extent, but lies outside the scope of this text.
Clearly, the subspace spanned by the elements Γ1, . . . ,Γ2n plays a special role.
Note that when considering the state minimizing our uncertainty relation, only
its 1-vector coefficients played any role. The other coefficients do not contribute
at all to the minimization problem. It is interesting to observe that we have in
fact already seen a similar effect in Chapter 6. Recall that we used Tsirelson’s
construction to turn vectors a, b ∈ R2n back into observables by letting A =∑
j ajΓj and B =
∑
j bjΓj. The optimal strategy of Alice and Bob could then be
implemented using the maximally entangled state of local dimension d = 2n
|Ψ〉〈Ψ| = 1
d
(
I+
∑
j
gjΓj ⊗ Γj +
∑
j
rjRj ⊗Rj
)
,
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where gj = ±1 and we used the Rj simply as a remainder term. Clearly, the
coefficients rj do not contribute to the term 〈Ψ|A ⊗ B|Ψ〉 at all, and only the
coefficients gj matter. However, in dimension d = 2
n we have only 2n such terms.
Curiously, the remaining terms are only needed to ensure that ρ ≥ 0. Numerical
feasibility analysis using semidefinite programming for d = 4 and d = 8 reveals
that we do indeed need to take the maximally entangled state, and cannot omit
any of the remaining terms.
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Samenvatting
Quantum computing heeft een grote invloed op cryptografie gehad. Met de ont-
dekking van Shors quantum algorithme voor het factoriseren van grote getallen
kunnen opeens bijna alle klassieke systemen gebroken worden zodra een quantum
computer is gebouwd. Het is daarom belangrijk om andere manieren te verzinnen
om veilige cryptografische protocollen te kunnen implementeren. Dit proefschrift
draagt ertoe bij om zowel de fysieke beperkingen, als ook de mogelijkheden van
cryptographie in een quantum omgeving beter te begrijpen. Wij bekijken eerst
twee aspecten die een cruciale rol spelen voor de veiligheid van quantum proto-
collen: onzekerheidsrelaties en quantum entanglement. Hoe kunnen wij goede
onzekerheidsrelaties voor een groot aantal meetinstellingen vinden? Wat is het
effect van entanglement op klassieke protocollen? En, welke beperkingen legt
entanglement quantum protocollen op? Ten slotte, kunnen wij deze beperkingen
omzeilen onder realitische aanames?
Informatie in quantum toestanden
In dit deel houden wij ons bezig met het extraheren van informatie uit quan-
tum toestanden. Een van de meest fundamentele doelen is het onderscheiden
van quantum toestanden. Gegeven een set van mogelijke toestanden, wat is de
toestand die wij op dit moment voor handen hebben? Wij bestuderen een vari-
ant van dit probleem dat van belang is voor de veiligheid van protocollen in het
bounded quantum storage model. We ontvangen na de meting, of meer algemeen
nadat een quantum memory bound toegepast wordt, nog extra informatie. Wij
introduceren een algemeen algebraisch raamwerk, dat het mogelijk maakt om dit
probleem voor elke set van toestanden op te lossen en geven twee voorbeelden.
Verder onderzoeken wij entropische onzekerheidsrelaties, die een andere manier
vormen om Heisenberg’s onzekerheids principe te beschrijven. Dit is meestal
een beter manier om “onzekerheid” te beschrijven aangezien de ondergrens niet
afhangt van een bepaald toestand maar alleen van de metingen zelf. Entropische
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onzekerheidsrelaties hebben recentelijk meer invloed gekregen binnen het veld
van quantum cryptografie in het bounded storage model, waar de veiligheid van
protocollen uiteindelijk afhangt van zulke onzekerheidsrelaties. Dus nieuwe onzek-
erheidsrelaties kunnen tot nieuwe protocollen leiden.
Onzekerheidrelaties zijn bekend voor twee of d+1 wederzijds “unbiased mea-
surements”. Wij bewijzgn eerst nauwe entropische onzekerheidsrelaties voor metin-
gen met een groot aantal “mutually unbiased bases” (MUBs) in dimensionen
d = s2. Wij laten ook zien dat MUBs geen goede keuze zijn voor “locking” van
klassieke informatie in quantum toestanden; ook als wij meer dan twee van zulke
MUBs gebruiken neemt het locking effect niet toe.
Onze resultaten laten zien dat men heel voorzichtig dient te zijn om “maxi-
maal incompatibele” metingen als wederzijds “unbiased” te veronderstellen. Maar
welke eigenschappen moeten een meting hebben om heel ‘incompatibel’ te zijn?
Gelukkig kunnen wij zulke eigenschappen vinden voor metingen met twee uitkom-
sten. Voor anti-commuterende metingen die generatoren van een Clifford algebra
vormen, bewijzen wij optimale onzekerheidsrelaties voor de Shannon entropie, en
bijna optimale relaties voor de collision entropie. Onze resultaten kunnen worden
toegepast op quantum cryptographie.
Entanglement
In dit deel onderzoeken wij quantum entanglement. Allereerst, kijken wij naar
Tsirelson inequalities. Wij laten zien hoe wij de optimale strategie voor spelletjes
met twee uitkomsten met behulp van semidefinite programming kunnen bepalen.
Als voorbeeld laten wij een upper bound voor de gegeneraliseerde CHSH ongeli-
jkheid zien.
Verder laten wij zien hoe klassieke interactieve bewijssystemen met twee spel-
ers (provers) kunnen veranderen als de spelers entanglement kunnen delen. Dit is
een voorbeeld van hoe de veiligheid van klassieke systemen kan veranderen, ook
al is het alleen mogelijk een beperkt soort quantum operaties uit te voeren: Het
bewijssysteem wordt significant verzwakt ook al hebben de spelers geen toegang
tot een quantum computer.
Applicaties voor de cryptografie
In deel IV onderzoeken wij de consequenties van onzekerheidsrelaties en entan-
glement in quantum systemen voor de cryptografie. Traditioneel houdt de cryp-
tografie zich vooral bezig met het veilig versturen van berichten. Maar met de
opkomst van het internet zijn nieuwe taken van belang geworden. Wij willen
protocollen creeren voor het elektronisch stemmen, online veilingen, onderteke-
nen van contracten en vele andere applicaties, waarbij de deelnemers elkaar niet
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vertrouwen. De focus ligt daarbij op twee primitieven, met behulp waarvan wij al
deze problemen kunnen oplossen: bit commitment en oblivious transfer. Klassieke
protocollen voor deze primitieven zijn gebaseerd op computationele aanames die
met behulp van een quantum computer gebroken kunnen worden. Helaas is het
bekend dat zelfs in de quantum wereld deze primitieven niet helemaal zonder
aannames geimplementeerd kunnen worden. Wat hopen wij dan wel te kunnen
bereiken?
Als bit commitment onmogelijk is, kunnen wij misschien de taak een klein
beetje aanpassen en dan nuttige protocollen vinden? Hier bekijken wij commit-
ments van een hele string van bits tegelijk, waar de tegenstander niet is beperkt.
Als bit commitment onmogelijk is, is perfecte string commitment ook niet mo-
gelijk. Maar wij geven elke tegenstander de mogelijkheid om een beetje vals te
spelen. Wij geven een raamwerk voor een familie van string commitment pro-
tocollen. Hoe wij informatie meten blijkt een cruciale rol te spelen; voor een
heel sterke maat van informatie laten wij zien dat zelfs deze imperfecte string
commitments niet mogelijk zijn. Maar voor een zwakkere manier om informatie
te meten construeren wij toch niet-triviale protocollen die klassiek niet mogelijk
zijn.
Ten slotte laten wij zien dat bit commitment en oblivious transfer wel mo-
gelijk worden, indien wij de tegenstander realistische beperkingen opleggen. Wij
introduceeren het noisy-storage model, dat nauw is gerelateerd aan het bounded-
storage model. Wij laten zien dat het mogelijk is om oblivious transfer te imple-
menteren, zolang de tegenstander qubits niet zonder fouten kan opslaan. Gegeven
de status van de experimentele mogelijkheden vandaag de dag, lijkt dit een real-
istische aanname, maar is afhankelijk van de implementatie moeilijk te bepalen.
Dezelfde problemen die het ook zo moeilijk maken om een quantum computer te
bouwen komen ons hier ten goede!

Summary
Quantum computing had a profound impact on cryptography. Shor’s discovery
of an efficient quantum algorithm for factoring large integers implies that nearly
all existing classical systems based on computational assumptions can be bro-
ken, once a quantum computer is built. It is therefore imperative to find other
means of implementing secure protocols. This thesis aims to contribute to the
understanding of both the physical limitations, as well as the possibilities of cryp-
tography in the quantum setting. To this end, we first investigate two notions
that are crucial to the security of quantum protocols: uncertainty relations and
entanglement. How can we find good uncertainty relations for a large number
of measurement settings? How does the presence of entanglement affect classi-
cal protocols? And, what limitations does it impose on implementing quantum
protocols? Finally, can we circumvent some of those limitations using realistic
assumptions?
Information in Quantum States
In this part, we start by investigating how to extract information from quan-
tum states. One of the most basic tasks is the discrimination of quantum states.
Given an ensemble of known quantum states, which one do we hold in our hands?
We study a variant of this problem which is of central importance for the secu-
rity of protocols in the bounded-quantum-storage model. Here, we are given
additional information about the state after the measurement or, more generally,
after a quantum memory bound is applied. We prove general bounds on the suc-
cess probability which answer in the negative the question whether deterministic
privacy amplification is possible in all known protocols in the bounded-quantum-
storage model. To this end, we introduce a general algebraic framework which
allows us to solve this problem for any set of states and provide two explicit
examples.
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We then turn to examine entropic uncertainty relations, which are an alter-
native way to state Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. They are frequently a
more useful characterization, because the “uncertainty” is lower bounded by a
quantity that does not depend on the state to be measured. Recently, entropic
uncertainty relations have gained importance in the context of quantum cryp-
tography in the bounded-storage model, where proving the security of protocols
ultimately reduces to bounding such relations. Proving new entropic uncertainty
relations could thus give rise to new protocols. Such relations are known for two
or d + 1 mutually unbiased measurements. We prove tight entropic uncertainty
relations for measurements in a large number of specific mutually unbiased bases
(MUBs) in square dimensions. In a similar way, we show that such MUBs are
unsuitable for locking classical correlations in quantum states: Using 2 or all of
them does not increase the locking effect.
Our result shows that one needs to be careful about thinking of “maximally
incompatible” measurements as being necessarily mutually unbiased. But what
properties do measurements need to have in order to give strong uncertainty
relations? We find very strong uncertainty relations from the generators of a
Clifford algebra. In particular, we prove that for k such anti-commuting observ-
ables X1, . . . , Xk we obtain optimal uncertainty relations for the Shannon entropy
and nearly optimal relations for the collision entropy. Our results have immediate
applications to quantum cryptography in the bounded-storage model.
Entanglement
In this part, we investigate the intriguing notion of quantum entanglement. We
demonstrate how to find the optimal quantum strategies for correlation inequal-
ities where each measurement has exactly two outcomes using semidefinite pro-
gramming. As an example, we prove a tight upper bound for a well-known gen-
eralized CHSH inequality.
Furthermore, we consider how a classical two-prover interactive proof system
changes if the provers are allowed to share entanglement. In this setting, a polyno-
mial time bounded verifier is allowed to ask questions to two unbounded provers,
who are trying to convince the verifier of the validity of a specific statement, even
if the statement is false. The provers may thereby agree on any strategy ahead
of time, but can no longer communicate once the protocol starts. Surprisingly,
it turns out that, when the provers are allowed to share entanglement, it is pos-
sible to simulate two such classical provers using a single quantum prover. This
indicates that entanglement among provers truly weakens the proof system, and
provides an example of how classical systems can be affected, even if we only
allow a very limited set of quantum operations.
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Applications to Cryptography
In this part, we consider the consequences of uncertainty relations and entan-
glement in quantum systems to cryptography. Traditional cryptography is con-
cerned with the secure and reliable transmission of messages. With the advent
of widespread electronic communication and the internet, however, new crypto-
graphic tasks have become increasingly important. We would like to construct
secure protocols for electronic voting, online auctions, contract signing and many
other applications where the protocol participants themselves do not trust each
other. main focus is on two primitives, which form an important building block
for constructing multi-party protocols: bit commitment and oblivious transfer.
Classical protocols for such problems are usually based on computational assump-
tions which do not stand up to a quantum computer. Unfortunately, it has been
shown that even quantum computers do not help in this case and that perfect
quantum bit commitment and oblivious transfer are impossible. In the face of
such negative statements, what can we still hope to achieve?
Given that perfect bit commitment is impossible, perhaps we can alter the
task slightly and obtain useful protocols? Here, we considered commitments to
an entire string of bits at once, when the attacker has unbounded resources at
his disposal. Evidently, if perfect bit commitment is impossible, perfect string
commitment is also impossible as well. However, we showed that we can ob-
tain non-trivial quantum protocols, where the participants have a small ability
to cheat. To this end, we introduced a framework for the classification of string
commitment protocols. In particular, we proved that the measure of information
is crucial to the security: For a very strong notion of security, we showed that
even slightly imperfect quantum string commitments are also impossible. Never-
theless, we showed that for a weaker measure of information we can indeed obtain
nontrivial protocols, which are impossible in a classical world.
Luckily, it turns out that we can implement oblivious transfer if we are willing
to assume that storing qubits is noisy. We introduce the model of noisy quantum
storage, which is similar to the model of bounded quantum storage. Here, how-
ever, we consider an explicit noise model inspired by present day technology. If
the honest parties can perform perfect quantum operations, then we show that
the protocol is secure for any amount of noise. In case the honest participants are
only able to perform noisy operations themselves, we analyze a practical protocol
that can be implemented using present-day hardware. We show how to derive
explicit tradeoffs between the amount of storage noise, the amount of noise in the
operations performed by the honest participants and the security of the protocol.
Here, the very problem that makes it so hard to implement a quantum computer
can actually be turned to our advantage.

Titles in the ILLC Dissertation Series:
ILLC DS-2001-01: Maria Aloni
Quantification under Conceptual Covers
ILLC DS-2001-02: Alexander van den Bosch
Rationality in Discovery - a study of Logic, Cognition, Computation and Neu-
ropharmacology
ILLC DS-2001-03: Erik de Haas
Logics For OO Information Systems: a Semantic Study of Object Orientation
from a Categorial Substructural Perspective
ILLC DS-2001-04: Rosalie Iemhoff
Provability Logic and Admissible Rules
ILLC DS-2001-05: Eva Hoogland
Definability and Interpolation: Model-theoretic investigations
ILLC DS-2001-06: Ronald de Wolf
Quantum Computing and Communication Complexity
ILLC DS-2001-07: Katsumi Sasaki
Logics and Provability
ILLC DS-2001-08: Allard Tamminga
Belief Dynamics. (Epistemo)logical Investigations
ILLC DS-2001-09: Gwen Kerdiles
Saying It with Pictures: a Logical Landscape of Conceptual Graphs
ILLC DS-2001-10: Marc Pauly
Logic for Social Software
ILLC DS-2002-01: Nikos Massios
Decision-Theoretic Robotic Surveillance
ILLC DS-2002-02: Marco Aiello
Spatial Reasoning: Theory and Practice
ILLC DS-2002-03: Yuri Engelhardt
The Language of Graphics
ILLC DS-2002-04: Willem Klaas van Dam
On Quantum Computation Theory
ILLC DS-2002-05: Rosella Gennari
Mapping Inferences: Constraint Propagation and Diamond Satisfaction
ILLC DS-2002-06: Ivar Vermeulen
A Logical Approach to Competition in Industries
ILLC DS-2003-01: Barteld Kooi
Knowledge, chance, and change
ILLC DS-2003-02: Elisabeth Catherine Brouwer
Imagining Metaphors: Cognitive Representation in Interpretation and Under-
standing
ILLC DS-2003-03: Juan Heguiabehere
Building Logic Toolboxes
ILLC DS-2003-04: Christof Monz
From Document Retrieval to Question Answering
ILLC DS-2004-01: Hein Philipp Ro¨hrig
Quantum Query Complexity and Distributed Computing
ILLC DS-2004-02: Sebastian Brand
Rule-based Constraint Propagation: Theory and Applications
ILLC DS-2004-03: Boudewijn de Bruin
Explaining Games. On the Logic of Game Theoretic Explanations
ILLC DS-2005-01: Balder David ten Cate
Model theory for extended modal languages
ILLC DS-2005-02: Willem-Jan van Hoeve
Operations Research Techniques in Constraint Programming
ILLC DS-2005-03: Rosja Mastop
What can you do? Imperative mood in Semantic Theory
ILLC DS-2005-04: Anna Pilatova
A User’s Guide to Proper names: Their Pragmatics and Semanics
ILLC DS-2005-05: Sieuwert van Otterloo
A Strategic Analysis of Multi-agent Protocols
ILLC DS-2006-01: Troy Lee
Kolmogorov complexity and formula size lower bounds
ILLC DS-2006-02: Nick Bezhanishvili
Lattices of intermediate and cylindric modal logics
ILLC DS-2006-03: Clemens Kupke
Finitary coalgebraic logics
ILLC DS-2006-04: Robert Sˇpalek
Quantum Algorithms, Lower Bounds, and Time-Space Tradeoffs
ILLC DS-2006-05: Aline Honingh
The Origin and Well-Formedness of Tonal Pitch Structures
ILLC DS-2006-06: Merlijn Sevenster
Branches of imperfect information: logic, games, and computation
ILLC DS-2006-07: Marie Nilsenova
Rises and Falls. Studies in the Semantics and Pragmatics of Intonation
ILLC DS-2006-08: Darko Sarenac
Products of Topological Modal Logics
ILLC DS-2007-01: Rudi Cilibrasi
Statistical Inference Through Data Compression
ILLC DS-2007-02: Neta Spiro
What contributes to the perception of musical phrases in western classical
music?
ILLC DS-2007-03: Darrin Hindsill
It’s a Process and an Event: Perspectives in Event Semantics
ILLC DS-2007-04: Katrin Schulz
Minimal Models in Semantics and Pragmatics: Free Choice, Exhaustivity, and
Conditionals
ILLC DS-2007-05: Yoav Seginer
Learning Syntactic Structure
ILLC DS-2008-01: Stephanie Wehner
Cryptography in a Quantum World
